22 Glossary of Key Concepts
A reference guide to the analytical vocabulary of real economics
“A concept is a compressed history — the precipitation of a long argument about what matters and why.”
This glossary collects the analytical vocabulary built across the book’s nineteen chapters. Each entry states the concept, gives its precise economic meaning, and notes where in the book it is developed in depth. Entries that have particular Moroccan relevance include an empirical reference.
The organisation follows the book’s intellectual architecture: microeconomic foundations first, then the macroeconomy, then international economics and political economy, then the long run. Alphabetical ordering within each section.
22.1 I — Microeconomic Foundations
Adverse selection: the pre-contractual market failure arising when one party has information the other lacks, causing the market to attract disproportionately the unfavourable types. The classic case is Akerlof’s used car market (lemons problem): sellers know quality, buyers do not, so only low-quality goods trade. In credit markets: banks unable to distinguish creditworthy from uncreditworthy borrowers raise interest rates, which drives out the creditworthy (who have better outside options) and attracts the uncreditworthy. → Ch7
Bid rent: the maximum rent an economic activity is willing to pay at each location from the city centre, reflecting the productivity premium of proximity to the market minus transport costs. At each point in space, the highest-bid-rent activity wins. Generates von Thünen’s concentric ring structure. → Ch17
Coase theorem: Ronald Coase’s result that when property rights are clearly assigned and transaction costs are zero, parties will bargain their way to an efficient allocation regardless of who holds the initial right. Its practical importance is the contrapositive: where externalities are not resolved, it is because transaction costs prevent the bargain, not because people are irrational. Motivates institutional design to reduce transaction costs. → Ch5
Economies of agglomeration: productivity advantages that accrue to firms and workers from geographic proximity to other firms and workers. Marshall’s trinity: shared specialised inputs (supplier scale economies), labour market pooling (thick markets reduce mismatch risk), and knowledge spillovers (information diffuses through face-to-face interaction). Microfoundations: sharing, matching, learning (Duranton-Puga). → Ch17
Externality: a cost or benefit imposed on parties not involved in a transaction, without price compensation. Negative externalities (pollution, congestion) cause overproduction relative to the social optimum; positive externalities (education spillovers, vaccination herd immunity) cause underproduction. The Pigouvian correction: tax negative externalities at their marginal social cost; subsidise positive ones. → Ch5
Hold-up problem: when an investor makes a relationship-specific investment (an asset valuable only within a particular economic relationship), the other party can threaten to exit after investment is sunk, extracting a larger share of the relationship’s value. Explains vertical integration (internalising the relationship avoids the threat) and the importance of complete contracts or credible commitment mechanisms. → Ch3
Moral hazard: the post-contractual distortion that arises when one party, protected from risk, takes actions they would not take if bearing the full consequences. Bank deposit insurance creates moral hazard: depositors have no incentive to monitor bank risk-taking; banks have incentive to take more risk than they would without the guarantee. “Too big to fail” is institutionalised moral hazard. → Ch8
Natural monopoly: a market structure where long-run average costs are continuously declining over the relevant demand range, making it efficient for a single firm to serve the entire market. Requires regulatory intervention: unregulated, the natural monopolist prices at MC = AR, earning monopoly rents; regulated at P = AC (zero profit) but P > MC (allocative inefficiency). Examples: electricity transmission, water distribution, railway infrastructure. → Ch5
Pigouvian tax: a corrective tax set equal to the marginal external cost of an activity, internalising the externality into private decision-making. Named after Arthur Pigou who formalised the welfare economics of externalities. The EU Emissions Trading System is a quantity-based variant; a carbon tax is the price-based variant. Morocco’s Fonds de Dépollution Industrielle (FODEP) uses approximations of Pigouvian logic. → Ch5
Public good: a good characterised by non-rivalry (one person’s consumption does not reduce availability for others) and non-excludability (one cannot prevent non-payers from accessing it). The market undersupplies public goods because private providers cannot capture enough of the social benefit to justify investment. Basic scientific research, national defence, epidemic control: canonical public goods. → Ch5
Rent-seeking: investment of resources in activities designed to obtain or protect rents rather than to create productive value. Lobbying for regulatory protection, cultivating bureaucratic relationships to secure preferential contracts, legal strategies to extend intellectual property beyond social welfare-maximising duration: all are rent-seeking. The social cost equals the resources devoted to rent-seeking plus the productive distortion the rent creates. → Ch4, Ch15
Surplus consumer and producer: consumer surplus is the aggregate difference between buyers’ willingness to pay and the price they actually pay; producer surplus is the aggregate difference between the price sellers receive and their minimum acceptable price. Total welfare = consumer surplus + producer surplus. Market interventions (taxes, price controls, tariffs) that reduce the sum generate a deadweight loss. → Ch4
Transaction cost: the cost of executing an economic exchange beyond the direct production cost, search and information costs, negotiation and contracting costs, enforcement and monitoring costs. Coase showed that firm boundaries are determined by comparing the transaction costs of market exchange versus internal organisation. Williamson extended this to the theory of the firm and contracts. → Ch3
22.2 II — The Firm and Markets
Creative destruction: Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of the process through which capitalist innovation continuously destroys existing economic structures (firms, industries, skills, institutions) while creating new ones. The locomotive that eliminates the stagecoach; the internet that eliminates the travel agency; AI that threatens the entry-level analyst. The aggregate welfare result is positive (productivity rises) but the distribution of costs and gains is unequal and the transition costs are real. → Ch3
Degree of monopoly (Kalecki): Michał Kalecki’s concept of the markup that firms can sustain above variable costs, determined by market structure and the elasticity of demand. Price equals \((1+m) \times CUV\) where \(m\) is the degree of monopoly. More concentrated industries have higher degrees of monopoly, higher markups, and therefore lower wage shares in value added. The functional distribution of income is an aggregate consequence of the distribution of market power. → Ch4
Dominant strategy: in game theory, a strategy that is optimal for a player regardless of what the opponent plays. The prisoner’s dilemma is defined by the property that “defect” is a dominant strategy for both players even though mutual cooperation would make both better off. Dominant strategy equilibria are more robust predictions than Nash equilibria requiring more coordination assumptions. → Ch4
Economies of scale: reductions in average cost as output increases, arising from indivisibilities, specialisation, and geometric relationships between surface area and volume. Distinguished from economies of scope (cost reductions from joint production of multiple products). Both create barriers to entry and rationalise concentration. → Ch4
Nash equilibrium: a configuration of strategies in a game such that no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy, given others’ strategies. The foundational solution concept in game theory. Multiple Nash equilibria can exist in many games, raising the question of equilibrium selection, which requires additional assumptions about coordination, history, or focal points. → Ch4
Oligopoly: a market structure dominated by a small number of firms whose decisions are strategically interdependent, each firm’s optimal strategy depends on what it believes its competitors will do. Generates strategic complexity: Cournot competition (choosing quantities), Bertrand competition (choosing prices), tacit collusion, entry deterrence. The most common market structure in modern manufacturing. → Ch4
Principal-agent problem: arises when a principal (owner, employer, voter) delegates decision-making to an agent (manager, employee, elected official) whose interests and information differ. The agent may exploit information advantages or misaligned incentives to serve their own interests at the principal’s expense. Solved partially by: monitoring, incentive compensation, reputation mechanisms, and institutional constraints. → Ch3
Vertical integration: the extension of a firm’s activities upstream (toward inputs) or downstream (toward customers). Motivated by: eliminating holdup risk on specific investments, appropriating rents from supplier or customer market power, securing access to inputs or distribution channels, and internalising transaction costs. Disadvantage: loss of specialisation benefits and high-powered market incentives. → Ch3
22.3 III — Money, Finance, and Macroeconomics
Animal spirits: Keynes’s term for the autonomous fluctuations in investment driven by expectations about future profitability that are not fully grounded in calculable probabilities. Investment decisions are made under fundamental uncertainty, not just quantifiable risk, so they are inevitably influenced by the confidence and optimism of entrepreneurs that cannot be reduced to expected value calculations. → Ch7
CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model): the model (Sharpe 1964) specifying that the expected return on any asset equals the risk-free rate plus a risk premium proportional to the asset’s beta, its covariance with the market portfolio divided by market variance: \(E(r_i) = r_f + \beta_i [E(r_m) - r_f]\). The foundational model for asset pricing and the cost of capital in corporate finance. Its limitations: betas estimated from historical data, correlations rise toward 1 in crises, and empirical anomalies (size effect, value premium) suggest other risk factors matter. → Ch8
Crowding out: the mechanism through which government borrowing raises interest rates (or competes for a fixed supply of loanable funds), reducing private investment. Complete crowding out (one dollar of government borrowing eliminates one dollar of private investment) is the extreme case; partial crowding out is more plausible; zero crowding out occurs at the zero lower bound. The degree of crowding out determines the fiscal multiplier. → Ch9
Duration: the weighted average time to cash flow receipt from a bond, with weights being the present values of each cash flow as a fraction of the bond’s total present value. Measures interest rate sensitivity: a 1 percentage point rate increase reduces bond price by approximately the duration in percent. Long-dated bonds have high duration and are therefore highly sensitive to rate movements. → Ch8
Efficient market hypothesis (Fama): the proposition that asset prices fully reflect available information. Weak form: prices reflect all historical price information (technical analysis is useless). Semi-strong form: prices reflect all publicly available information (fundamental analysis earns no consistent excess return). Strong form: prices reflect all information including private information (insider trading cannot earn excess returns). The strong form is clearly violated; the semi-strong form has significant anomalies. → Ch8
Fisher effect: Irving Fisher’s observation that nominal interest rates adjust to expected inflation, leaving real interest rates determined by real factors. \(i = r + \pi^e\) where \(i\) is the nominal rate, \(r\) the real rate, and \(\pi^e\) expected inflation. Implication: central banks controlling nominal rates can affect real rates only by surprising inflation expectations, which has been the core debate about monetary policy since Friedman. → Ch7
Functional distribution of income: the division of national income between wages and profits (broadly: labour and capital), as opposed to the personal distribution (how income distributes among individuals). Kalecki’s model makes the functional distribution a direct consequence of market structure: more monopolistic markets generate higher profit shares at the expense of the wage share. The declining wage share in most advanced economies since 1980 is one of the most documented macroeconomic trends. → Ch9, Ch15
Liquidity trap: the situation, predicted by Keynes’s IS-LM framework, in which monetary policy loses traction because nominal interest rates are at or near zero and further money creation goes into idle balances rather than stimulating investment. Japan’s “lost decades” after 1990 and the global economy after 2008 both exhibited liquidity trap dynamics. The policy implication: at the zero lower bound, fiscal policy must substitute for monetary policy. → Ch9
Minsky moment: the point in a financial cycle at which a self-reinforcing process of speculation and debt accumulation suddenly reverses, triggering a cascade of asset sales, credit tightening, and defaults. Named after Hyman Minsky who showed that financial instability is endogenously generated by capitalism’s expansion phases, not an external shock. → Ch8
Money multiplier: the ratio of broad money to the monetary base (central bank money). In the textbook model: \(M = m \times H\) where \(m = 1/(r + e)\) with \(r\) the reserve ratio and \(e\) the currency-to-deposit ratio. In practice, the multiplier is not stable: banks’ decision to hold excess reserves and the public’s preference for cash versus deposits both vary. The post-2008 quantitative easing experience showed that massive base money expansion need not generate proportional broad money if banks hold reserves. → Ch7
Quantitative easing: unconventional monetary policy in which the central bank purchases longer-term financial assets (government bonds, corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities) to reduce longer-term interest rates and inject liquidity when the policy rate is at the zero lower bound. Used by the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England since 2008. BAM has not used QE: Morocco’s monetary framework remains conventional. → Ch7
Solow residual: the portion of output growth unexplained by measured factor input growth, often called “total factor productivity” growth or “the measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz). Decomposing growth: \(\Delta Y/Y = \alpha \Delta K/K + (1-\alpha) \Delta L/L + A\) where \(A\) is the residual. In practice, it captures technological progress, organisational improvement, allocative efficiency gains, and all measurement errors. → Ch10
22.4 IV — International Economics and Development
AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area): the free trade agreement covering 55 African Union member states, operational since 2021. Creates in legal architecture the world’s largest preferential trade area by number of countries. Its economic impact depends on implementation, tariff reduction, rules of origin, customs simplification, and whether production investment follows to create intra-African value chains. Morocco is a member and has positioned itself as a logistics and financial hub for AfCFTA integration. → Ch11, Ch18
Bancor: Keynes’s proposed supranational currency for the post-WWII monetary system, to be issued by an International Clearing Union. The key features: both surplus and deficit countries would face charges on their imbalances, creating symmetric adjustment pressure; no national currency would hold reserve status; and the system would be genuinely multilateral rather than hegemonic. The American delegation (Harry Dexter White) rejected it at Bretton Woods. The bancor remains the intellectual benchmark for equitable international monetary reform. → Ch12
Balance of payments constraint (Thirlwall): A.P. Thirlwall’s result that a country’s long-run sustainable growth rate is determined by the ratio of its export income elasticity to its import income elasticity, multiplied by world growth: \(g^* = (\varepsilon \cdot g_w) / \pi\). Countries with more income-elastic exports (sophisticated manufactured goods) have higher sustainable growth rates. Morocco’s estimated \(g^*\) of approximately 2% requires industrial upgrading toward higher income-elasticity exports to be raised. → Ch12
CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism): the EU instrument (operational from 2026) that levies a carbon cost on imports of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and hydrogen based on their production carbon intensity. For Morocco, most immediately affects OCP’s fertiliser exports to the EU: OCP must either demonstrate a credible decarbonation trajectory or pay a carbon tariff. The CBAM simultaneously poses a competitive threat (if OCP cannot decarbonate) and creates a powerful incentive to invest in green ammonia production using Moroccan renewable electricity. → Ch11, Ch18
Comparative advantage: Ricardo’s principle that mutually beneficial trade can occur even when one party is less efficient at producing everything, because relative cost differences (opportunity costs) always differ between countries. The prescription to specialise in current comparative advantage is a static efficiency principle; it is not a development strategy, because it says nothing about which comparative advantages should be built. → Ch11
Conditionality (IMF/World Bank): policy requirements attached to emergency financing from the IMF or World Bank, typically including fiscal deficit reduction, exchange rate devaluation, trade liberalisation, privatisation, and financial sector liberalisation. Justified as ensuring loan repayment and macroeconomic viability; criticised for applying pro-cyclical adjustment during downturns, prioritising creditor repayment over social welfare, and imposing Washington Consensus policies regardless of country context. Morocco adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983 under IMF conditionality. → Ch12
ECI (Economic Complexity Index): the Hausmann-Hidalgo measure of the sophistication of a country’s productive capabilities, derived from the network structure of global trade in goods. Countries with high ECI export many products that few other countries export; countries with low ECI export few products widely exported by many. Morocco’s ECI is slightly positive and growing but below what its income level would predict, indicating a complexity deficit that industrial policy should address. → Ch11
Hegemonic stability theory: Kindleberger’s proposition that a stable international economic order requires a dominant power willing and able to provide global public goods: maintaining open markets, supplying a stable reserve currency, and acting as lender of last resort in crises. The “Kindleberger trap” is the dangerous vacuum between declining and rising hegemons when no power provides these goods. → Ch16
HRV growth diagnostics: the Hausmann-Rodrik-Velasco framework for identifying the binding constraint on private investment in a specific country, using a structured decision tree of price signals, firm behaviour, and reform responses. The method asks: is investment low because of high cost of finance or low expected return? If the latter, is it because of appropriability failures or missing complementarities? Applied to Morocco: primary constraint appears to be missing productive complementarities (insufficient local supplier capability) rather than financing cost or macro instability. → Ch11
Original sin (Eichengreen-Hausmann): the structural incapacity of most developing country governments to borrow internationally in their own currency. Morocco’s external public debt is predominantly in euros and dollars. A currency mismatch results: revenues in dirhams, obligations in hard currency. A dirham depreciation mechanically increases the domestic-currency value of the debt. Escaping original sin requires building credibility through macroeconomic stability and deepening domestic bond markets for foreign investor access. → Ch12
Product space: the network representation (Hausmann-Hidalgo) of the proximity between all traded goods, based on the probability that a country exporting one good also exports another. The product space maps what productive capabilities are shared across products and therefore what diversification pathways are feasible. Economies diversify by moving to adjacent products. Morocco’s position: mid-space, with real adjacencies from automotive wiring toward EV electronics and from phosphates toward battery materials. → Ch11
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis: the thesis, independently formulated by Raúl Prebisch (CEPAL) and Hans Singer in the late 1940s, that the terms of trade of primary commodity exporters relative to manufactured goods importers tend to deteriorate secularly. Mechanisms: low income elasticity of demand for commodities (Engel’s Law); asymmetric distribution of productivity gains (manufactures generate wage and profit income in the centre; commodity gains translate into price reductions benefiting consumers in the centre). Implication: commodity-specialised economies face a structural growth ceiling. → Ch11
Structural adjustment programme (SAP): the package of IMF-World Bank conditioned financing typically requiring fiscal deficit reduction, currency devaluation, trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, and labour market flexibility. Morocco’s 1983 SAP reduced the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit while generating significant social costs: real wage compression, subsidy reductions, bread riots (1984), and a halving of structural transformation speed that the comparative literature documents as persisting for two decades. → Ch12
Thirlwall’s Law: see Balance of payments constraint. The formulation \(g^* = (\varepsilon \cdot g_w) / \pi\) operationalises what the Prebisch-Singer and structural transformation literatures describe qualitatively: that an economy’s growth ceiling is determined by the income-elasticity profile of its trade, and that changing this ceiling requires changing the productive structure. → Ch12
Triffin dilemma: Robert Triffin’s identification of the structural contradiction in the dollar reserve standard: the world needs growing dollar supplies for trade and reserves, which requires US current account deficits, which progressively undermines confidence in dollar-gold convertibility. Nixon’s 1971 gold window closure resolved the contradiction by abandoning the gold anchor, converting the dilemma into the “exorbitant privilege”: the US can run indefinite deficits because its debts are others’ reserves. → Ch12
22.5 V — Development and Structural Transformation
Backward and forward linkages (Hirschman): a sector creates backward linkages when its demand pulls in suppliers of inputs (automotive creates wiring harnesses, stamped metal, paint demand); it creates forward linkages when its output serves as input to other industries (phosphoric acid creates fertiliser, specialty chemical, battery materials potential). Sectors with strong linkages induce complementary investment, Hirschman’s “multidimensional conspiracy in favour of development.” Sectors without linkages are enclaves. → Ch11
Cumulative causation (Myrdal): the mechanism through which an initial regional advantage triggers a self-reinforcing spiral: more firms attract more workers (whose spending supports local services, whose taxes fund public services, which attracts more firms). Symmetric downward spiral for disadvantaged regions. Myrdal’s backwash effects (capital and talent drained to the prosperous region) typically dominate spread effects (demand and technology diffusing from centre to periphery) in poorly integrated economies. → Ch17
Embedded autonomy (Evans): Peter Evans’s concept of the institutional condition that allows effective industrial policy: state agencies that are simultaneously embedded in industrial networks (understanding technical realities, firm constraints, market dynamics) and autonomous from capture by those networks (able to enforce performance conditions and withdraw support from non-performers). The developmental states that succeeded (Korea’s EPB, Singapore’s EDB, Taiwan’s CEPD) combined both dimensions. → Ch11
Four conditions of industrial policy: the framework (Nouri, forthcoming) identifying the necessary conditions for industrial policy to generate learning rather than rents: (1) a real coordination failure that the policy addresses; (2) institutional capacity to design, implement, monitor, and enforce; (3) conditional reciprocity (support contingent on measurable performance); (4) credible exit (defined conditions under which support terminates). Morocco satisfies Conditions 1 and partially 2; Conditions 3 and 4 are structurally absent from its incentive architecture. → Ch11
Lewis model: W. Arthur Lewis’s two-sector model (1954) of development. The traditional sector (primarily agriculture) has surplus labour at near-subsistence wages; the modern sector (industry and services) absorbs this surplus, paying a modest wage premium. As the surplus is absorbed, wages begin rising in both sectors, the Lewis turning point. The model predicts a long phase of industrial growth with flat wages (labour transferred from agriculture) followed by accelerating wage growth (labour scarcity in the traditional sector). China reached its Lewis turning point around 2010. → Ch10
Pre-distribution (Atkinson): the concept that reducing inequality is more efficient through reforming the market structures that generate it (competition policy to reduce rents, labour market reform to extend formal employment, transparent public procurement to eliminate connected contractor advantages) than through taxing and redistributing the inequality after the market has produced it. Pre-distribution attacks the generative mechanisms; redistribution addresses the symptoms. → Ch15
Premature deindustrialisation: Rodrik’s concept of the phenomenon in which a country’s manufacturing employment share peaks and declines at a lower income level than was historically normal. Driven by: import competition from China, automation reducing the labour-intensity of manufacturing, and the services-led growth path available through ICT. Morocco’s manufacturing employment share has barely grown since the early 2000s, constituting a warning signal that structural transformation is generating insufficient formal industrial employment. → Ch11
Smile curve: the graphical representation (originating with Acer’s Stan Shih) of value added across production stages in a global value chain. Design/R&D and brand/marketing at the upstream and downstream ends capture high value; assembly and manufacturing in the middle capture low value. The curve has deepened over recent decades as production fragmentation has commoditised assembly. Morocco’s current position: assembly trough in automotive and aerospace, with the strategic challenge of moving toward the high-value ends. → Ch18
Verdoorn’s Law: the empirical regularity (Verdoorn 1949, popularised by Kaldor) that manufacturing productivity growth is positively correlated with manufacturing output growth. The coefficient (Verdoorn coefficient) estimated at approximately 0.5: a 2% faster manufacturing output growth generates approximately 1% faster productivity growth. Reflects: scale economies, learning-by-doing, and the innovation pressure that competitive manufacturing creates. The mechanism through which industrial clusters become dynamically more productive over time. → Ch11, Ch17
22.6 VI — The Long Run and Political Economy
Accumulation by dispossession (Harvey): David Harvey’s extension of Marx’s primitive accumulation concept to contemporary capitalism: the extraction of value not through the production process but through the privatisation of previously common goods, the monetisation of social relationships, and the use of financial crises to transfer assets from debtors to creditors at below-market prices. The structural adjustment programmes that transferred public enterprises to private capital at fire-sale prices, and the debt crisis dynamics that generated those programmes, are canonical examples. → Ch16
Arrighi’s systemic cycles: the succession of hegemonic centres in capitalist history (Genoese, Dutch, British, American), each following a material expansion (M-C phase: productive investment) then financial expansion (C-M’ phase: financial extraction) pattern. The signal crisis marks the end of productive supremacy; the terminal crisis marks the end of financial leverage. We are in the late financial expansion phase of the American cycle; China is in the material expansion phase of the potential next cycle. → Ch16, Ch19
Braudel’s three temporal registers: longue durée (geographic and structural constraints, centuries-long duration), conjoncture (economic cycles and institutional regimes, decade-to-generation duration), and événement (political events and economic shocks, months-to-years duration). Each register requires different analytical instruments; strategic economic analysis must address all three. → Ch16, Ch19
Double movement (Polanyi): Karl Polanyi’s concept of the structural tension between the expansion of self-regulating market mechanisms (disembedding economic activity from social and moral constraints) and the social counter-movements that market disruptions generate (labour legislation, social insurance, regulatory constraints). The Washington Consensus was a disembedding episode; the social protection reforms of the 2020s (including Morocco’s 2021-2025 reform) are re-embedding responses. → Ch19
Hegemonic transition: the historical period between the declining phase of one dominant power’s hegemonic cycle and the consolidation of the next. Characterised by: contested rules of the international economic game, intensifying great power competition, weakened multilateral institutions, and genuine strategic opportunity for middle powers able to navigate multiple competing centres. The current US-China rivalry is the hegemonic transition of our era. → Ch16, Ch19
Longue durée: see Braudel’s three temporal registers. For Morocco, the longue durée assets are: Atlantic and Mediterranean geographic position, renewable energy resource endowment, phosphate reserves, and the accumulated institutional depth of a state with a millennium of organised governance. These assets are the structural foundation on which every shorter-run strategy must build. → Ch17, Ch19
World-systems theory (Wallerstein): the analytical framework that categorises economies into core (high-skill, capital-intensive, high-wage production; financial and technological dominance), semi-periphery (intermediate production, simultaneous exploitation by core and exploitation of periphery), and periphery (low-skill, labour-intensive, resource-extraction oriented). The framework’s predictive power: peripheral specialisation tends to reproduce itself through the mechanisms of unequal exchange, dependency, and systematic transfer of value toward the core. Morocco’s trajectory: progressive movement from periphery toward semi-periphery. → Ch16
This glossary is a living document. The concepts here are not the endpoint of analysis but its vocabulary, the shared language through which economic phenomena become communicable and through which the complexity of the real world can be navigated with precision, honesty, and the curiosity that all serious economics requires.