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15  Chapter 13 — International Trade: Theory, False Debates, and Commercial Sovereignty

From comparative advantage to the political economy of who gains

“Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and its labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each.” — David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy (1817)

“It is a clever trick, when one has reached the summit of greatness, to kick away the ladder by which one climbed up.” — Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (1841)

The guiding thread of this chapter
  1. Comparative advantage is real, but it is not destiny. Ricardo’s principle that mutually beneficial exchange can occur even when one party is less efficient at everything is one of economics’ genuine intellectual achievements. Its fatal flaw as a development prescription: it confuses the current structure of relative costs with the desirable future structure of productive capabilities.
  2. Trade theory has evolved beyond Ricardo. Heckscher-Ohlin explained trade by factor endowments; Leontief’s paradox showed this was incomplete. Krugman added increasing returns and monopolistic competition, explaining intra-industry trade. Melitz added firm heterogeneity, explaining why only the most productive firms export. Each layer reveals something the previous model missed.
  3. The structuralist tradition identifies power. Prebisch, Emmanuel, Amin, and Rodney showed that trade between structurally unequal economies transfers value systematically from the periphery to the centre, not through bad faith but through differential bargaining power, wage structures, and terms-of-trade dynamics. The 19th-century Corn Laws debate and the 21st-century WTO negotiations are the same political economy conflict with different names.
  4. Developed countries industrialised behind tariff walls, then preached free trade. The historical record from Hamilton to Korea is unambiguous. The policy question is not “free trade or protectionism” but “which trade policy, for which sectors, at which stage of development, with which institutional discipline.”
  5. Rodrik’s trilemma: deep international economic integration, national sovereignty, and democratic governance cannot all be simultaneously maximised. The WTO, IMF, and World Bank’s structural adjustment prescriptions consistently subordinated the second and third to the first. Recognising the trilemma is the precondition for designing trade policy that serves development.
  6. Morocco’s trade architecture reflects both the gains and the asymmetries of integration: automotive exports as a genuine success, structural energy and food import dependence, a commercial coverage rate of 59.8% that reveals an economy importing more than it earns from merchandise trade, and the CBAM as the new regulatory frontier that can either constrain OCP or accelerate Morocco’s green transition.

The Map

Trade is where macroeconomics meets power. The exchange of goods between nations produces real gains: the efficiency improvements that specialisation enables, the scale economies that export markets permit, and the technological diffusion that import competition forces. But it also distributes those gains unequally, reinforces existing productive structures, and can lock in peripheral specialisations that prevent the capability-building that long-run development requires.

The chapter advances in seven movements. First, the classical foundations: Ricardo’s comparative advantage, its logic, its conditions, and its limits. Second, the factor-endowment extension: Heckscher-Ohlin, the Leontief paradox, and what they reveal about why trade theory oversimplifies. Third, the new trade theory: Krugman’s increasing returns and intra-industry trade, Melitz’s firm heterogeneity, and why most trade is not between unlike partners. Fourth, the structuralist challenge: Prebisch, Emmanuel, Amin, and the terms-of-trade thesis. Fifth, the trade policy toolkit and its political economy: from tariffs to WTO disciplines to CBAM. Sixth, Rodrik’s trilemma and the political limits of hyperglobalisation. Seventh, Morocco in the world economy: the structure of exports and imports, the EU association agreement, the AfCFTA, and the strategic challenges of the coming decade.


16 Part I — Ricardo and Comparative Advantage: The Logic and Its Limits

16.1 The foundational argument

David Ricardo’s 1817 demonstration is one of economics’ genuine intellectual achievements, and one of its most misused policy prescriptions.

The canonical example: England and Portugal, cloth and wine. Suppose Portugal is absolutely more efficient at producing both goods (it takes fewer labour hours per unit of wine and per unit of cloth in Lisbon than in London. Adam Smith’s logic would conclude that no exchange should occur: Portugal should produce everything). Ricardo shows this is wrong.

What matters is not absolute efficiency but relative efficiency, the cost of producing one good in terms of the other. If Portugal is relatively more efficient at wine (its wine-cloth productivity ratio is higher), it should specialise in wine and import cloth. England, even less efficient at both, is relatively less disadvantaged in cloth, and should specialise in cloth and import wine. Both countries gain: Portugal frees labour from its less-advantaged cloth production for more wine, and England frees labour from its more-disadvantaged wine production for more cloth. Total output of both goods increases; both countries consume more.

Maître Alami and her secretary

Maître Alami is the best lawyer in her firm and also the fastest typist: she types faster than her secretary. Should she type her own letters? No. Every hour spent typing is an hour not spent arguing in court, and an hour of litigation earns 2,000 dirhams while an hour of typing earns 50. Even though she is absolutely better at both tasks, her comparative advantage is in law. She should delegate typing and specialise in litigation. This is exactly Ricardo’s reasoning: what matters is not who is best in the absolute, but who forgoes the least by specialising. Morocco and Germany trade by the same logic as Maître Alami and her secretary.

The formal logic is clear. Comparative advantage arises from differences in opportunity cost across countries: England’s opportunity cost of producing one unit of cloth (how much wine must be foregone) is lower than Portugal’s. Trade allows each country to specialise where its opportunity cost is lowest, expanding the joint production frontier. The gains from trade are real: they represent additional output made possible by specialisation that autarky precludes.

16.2 Ricardo’s conditions and limits

The intellectual honesty that the model demands requires stating explicitly what it assumes, and what it therefore cannot say.

Labour is the only factor, perfectly mobile internally but immobile internationally. In reality, capital is internationally mobile, and its flow to low-wage economies dissolves the static comparative advantage argument. If German capital moves to Morocco because wages are lower, the static equilibrium shifts continuously in ways the one-period model cannot capture.

Specialisation is static. Ricardo treats comparative advantage as given. But a comparative advantage in phosphates or cotton does not imply that a country should specialise there permanently. These are activities with limited learning externalities, low economic complexity, and tendentially unfavourable terms of trade (the Prebisch-Singer thesis). A country that permanently specialises in its current comparative advantage forgoes the structural transformation that long-run development requires.

Not all comparative advantages are equally valuable. Weaving cotton and fabricating semiconductors do not generate the same learning, the same externalities, or the same inducement linkages. The market does not make this distinction, it allocates resources to where immediate profitability is highest. But from a development perspective, the composition of specialisation matters as much as specialisation itself.

There are no adjustment costs. In the Ricardian model, reallocation from one industry to another is costless and instantaneous. In reality, industrial capabilities take years to build and months to destroy, and a trade liberalisation shock that closes a textile industry creates structural unemployment that persists for a generation. The model assumes away precisely the costs that determine whether trade liberalisation’s benefits exceed its disruptions in any specific country context.

These limits do not destroy the comparative advantage principle, they situate it. It remains a powerful tool for understanding why trade occurs. But it does not tell us which specialisation a country should seek, nor how to manage the transition: it is an incomplete guide to trade policy.

The policy implication is direct and consequential. In 1960, Morocco had a static comparative advantage in raw phosphates and fresh produce, it accordingly exported primarily these goods. South Korea in 1960 had a static comparative advantage in low-wage labour-intensive manufacturing. If both countries had followed comparative advantage as a permanent policy prescription, Morocco would still export phosphate rock and South Korea would still assemble cheap toys. Instead, South Korea deliberately violated its static comparative advantage by protecting and promoting steel, shipbuilding, electronics, and semiconductors: activities where it had no current advantage but was building future capability. The result is one of the most spectacular development trajectories in economic history. Morocco’s challenge is to do the same: use its current comparative advantages (phosphates, geographic proximity to Europe, renewable energy potential) not as permanent specialisations but as platforms from which to build the comparative advantages that development requires.


17 Part II — Factor Endowments, Increasing Returns, and Firm Heterogeneity

17.1 Heckscher-Ohlin: factor endowments determine trade patterns

Eli Heckscher (1919) and Bertil Ohlin (1933) extended Ricardo by introducing multiple factors of production. Their prediction: countries export goods whose production uses intensively their most abundant, and therefore cheapest, factor. A capital-abundant country exports capital-intensive goods. A labour-abundant country exports labour-intensive goods.

The theorem generates the Factor Price Equalisation corollary: if trade occurs under H-O conditions, factor prices (wages, returns to capital) should converge across trading partners, because the increased demand for each country’s abundant factor bids up its price while competition in traded goods limits its divergence. Free trade, in this model, is a substitute for factor mobility: it achieves the same global allocation without labour migration or capital flows.

In 1953, Wassily Leontief subjected this prediction to empirical test. Using US input-output tables, he calculated the factor intensity of American exports and imports. The result was shocking: the United States, capital-abundant by any measure, exported labour-intensive goods and imported capital-intensive goods, the exact opposite of what H-O predicted. The Leontief Paradox was never fully resolved; proposed explanations include the high quality of American human capital (embodied in “labour”), technology differences not captured by raw factor counts, and consumer preference differences. But its deeper lesson: the real world’s trade patterns are too complex for two-factor models to explain.

Endowments are not natural — they are constructed

The fundamental heterodox critique of H-O is ontological. The model treats factor endowments as natural data: Morocco is “endowed” with phosphates, Germany with skilled human capital, Bangladesh with cheap labour. These endowments are therefore “natural comparative advantages” that trade permits to be exploited.

The heterodox response inverts the argument: endowments do not precede economic history, they are its product. Morocco is “endowed” with phosphates because the Moroccan state nationalised the French mines in 1975 and maintained their public exploitation. Germany is “endowed” with skilled human capital because the Rhine dual apprenticeship model was deliberately constructed after 1945. Bangladesh is “endowed” with cheap labour because structural adjustment dismantled wage protections. Factor endowments are institutional and political constructs, not natural givens.

This matters enormously for policy: if Morocco’s comparative advantage in phosphates and cheap labour is constructed by historical choices that could be made differently, then the normative prescription to specialise in those endowments is not a description of natural efficiency, it is a prescription to reproduce the institutional structures that generated them. OCP’s upgrading from raw rock to specialised fertilisers is precisely the deconstruction of “natural endowment” toward deliberately built capability. H-O cannot describe this process because it treats as fixed exactly what development policy must change.

17.2 Krugman and the new trade theory

The H-O model predicts that trade occurs between unlike partners, capital-abundant with labour-abundant, technology-rich with resource-rich. The empirical reality of 20th-century trade was the opposite: most trade was between similar countries, rich countries with rich countries, Germany with France, the US with Japan, exchanging similar goods (BMWs for Toyotas, French wine for Italian wine).

Paul Krugman’s 1979 paper introduced increasing returns and monopolistic competition to explain this intra-industry trade. When production exhibits increasing returns to scale, firms that expand their scale reduce their costs. This gives large firms a systematic cost advantage over small ones, but it also means that market equilibria involve firms of different scales coexisting through product differentiation, different varieties of similar goods. Countries trade these varieties with each other not because of cost differences (comparative advantage) but because each country’s producers have developed different varieties, and consumers value variety.

The model generates two powerful results. First, trade increases variety available to consumers in each country, raising welfare even when no comparative advantage difference exists. Second, trade allows firms to exploit increasing returns by accessing larger markets, reducing long-run average cost, a welfare gain independent of variety. These gains exist in addition to comparative advantage gains, and they can be large in industries with substantial scale economies.

Krugman’s model explains the geography of trade between similar economies and the pattern of industrial specialisation within countries, why Cologne has chemicals, Stuttgart has automobiles, and Munich has financial services, not because of natural endowments but because of historical accidents amplified by increasing returns (a theme extending the New Economic Geography of Chapter 6).

17.3 Melitz and firm heterogeneity: not all firms trade

Marc Melitz (2003) added a further dimension that earlier theories ignored: within any industry, firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. When trade barriers fall, the most productive firms can profitably export; less productive firms serve only the domestic market; and the least productive firms, exposed to import competition without being efficient enough to offset the pressure, exit. The selection effect of trade liberalisation thus simultaneously generates productivity gains (through exit of low-productivity firms and expansion of high-productivity exporters) and distributional effects (workers in exiting firms lose jobs).

The Melitz model predicts that export behaviour is concentrated in a small number of the most productive firms, a prediction well-supported by firm-level trade data across countries. It also predicts that trade liberalisation will be productivity-enhancing even without comparative advantage differences, through a reallocation mechanism: resources shift from less to more productive firms within industries.

For Morocco, the Melitz mechanism is directly observable. In the automotive sector, only the most capable local suppliers, those who invested in IATF 16949 certification, quality management systems, and just-in-time delivery capabilities, successfully export or supply exporting assemblers. Less capable firms serve only the domestic market. Trade exposure is therefore simultaneously a productivity filter (selecting the most capable firms) and a source of potential job losses for workers displaced from less competitive firms, which is precisely why trade policy must be accompanied by active labour market policy, not treated as welfare-neutral.


18 Part III — The Structuralist Challenge: Power in Trade

18.1 Prebisch-Singer and the terms of trade

Raúl Prebisch, working at CEPAL (the UN Economic Commission for Latin America) in the late 1940s, and Hans Singer independently, formulated the thesis that has structured development economics debates ever since: the secular deterioration of the terms of trade for primary commodity exporters relative to manufactured goods importers.

The uncle from Barcelona and the development paradox

Every summer, the uncle returns from Barcelona, his car loaded with goods, and all year he sends remittances that pay for his nephews’ studies, renovate the family home, sometimes launch a small business. Multiply this uncle by millions: transfers from Moroccans resident abroad bring in more foreign currency than many export sectors combined. But here is the paradox: these currency flows come not from what Morocco produces and sells but from its children working elsewhere. It is a strength (it balances the external accounts) and a fragility (it depends on Europe’s economic health and the maintenance of family ties). Relying on the arms of one’s emigrants more than on one’s factories is a success, and simultaneously a sign of what has not yet been achieved: keeping those arms at home.

The mechanisms: on the demand side, Engel’s Law applied internationally, as incomes grow, the share spent on food and primary commodities falls (low income elasticity of demand) while the share spent on manufactures and services rises. This means primary commodity export revenues grow more slowly than world income, structurally limiting commodity-specialised economies. On the supply side, the distribution of productivity gains is asymmetric: in industrial countries, productivity gains translate into higher wages and profits (because organised labour and concentrated market structures allow workers and firms to capture the gains). In primary-commodity economies, productivity gains translate into lower export prices, benefiting consumers in the centre rather than producers in the periphery.

The ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation) policy prescribed by CEPAL as the response to this diagnosis produced real results in the 1950s-1970s: Latin America industrialised, diversified, and reduced primary commodity dependence. It also showed its limits: protected industries remained uncompetitive, the export sector stagnated, and debt accumulated to finance public investment prepared the crises of the 1980s. The lesson is not that Prebisch was wrong about the diagnosis, the terms-of-trade deterioration has been empirically documented over long periods for many commodity groups, but that the ISI solution was insufficiently disciplined: not enough performance conditionality on protected industries, not enough export orientation, not enough investment in human capital.

For Morocco, the Prebisch-Singer lens has direct operational relevance. OCP’s strategic transformation, from raw rock to phosphoric acid to DAP to customised NPK formulations and now toward battery materials, is the operationalisation of the structuralist prescription: move up the value chain before the commodity terms of trade deteriorate further. The structuralist diagnosis and the product space strategy of Chapter 9 converge on the same industrial policy conclusion.

18.2 Emmanuel’s unequal exchange

Arghiri Emmanuel (L’Échange Inégal, 1969) proposed a more radical structural explanation of trade asymmetry rooted in the labour theory of value. His thesis: when a Moroccan textile worker and a German machinery operator both work one hour, and the Moroccan is paid ten times less, the international exchange of t-shirts for machines at market prices transfers value from Morocco to Germany, not through fraud or political manipulation but through the structure of differential wage levels.

The intuition: if a Moroccan worker produces the same hourly value as a German worker but is paid 10% of the German wage, then Moroccan goods embody far more labour per unit of price than German goods. An exchange at world market prices is an exchange of many hours of Moroccan labour for few hours of German labour. The exchange is “equal” by market prices; it is structurally unequal by labour content.

Emmanuel’s critics are numerous and not without force: the labour theory of value is contested; capital mobility may equalise profit rates rather than wage rates; the correlation between development and wages may run from productivity differences to wages rather than from wages to value transfer. But the empirical observation that the integration of low-wage economies into world trade consistently generates less value retention per worker than the integration of high-wage economies is robust regardless of the theoretical framework used to explain it.

18.3 Samir Amin and accumulation on a world scale

Samir Amin (Accumulation on a World Scale, 1970) synthesised the structuralist tradition into a comprehensive account of how global market integration reproduces rather than resolves underdevelopment. Peripheral economies, integrated into the world market through colonialism, developed productive structures oriented toward exporting to the centre rather than satisfying domestic needs. This extroverted articulation perpetuates dependence: primary exports finance manufactured imports, foreign subsidiary profits are repatriated to the centre, and local capital accumulates in the least transformative sectors.

The distinction Amin draws between centre accumulation (self-centred, articulating capital goods production with mass consumption) and peripheral accumulation (extroverted, articulating primary export with luxury goods for a narrow elite) is analytically powerful even for those who reject his prescriptions. For Morocco, the extroverted structure he describes is visible in the concentration of modern productive activity in export sectors (automotive, aerospace, phosphates) while domestic consumption demand is partly served by imports and domestic investment is partly oriented toward real estate rather than productive manufacturing.

18.4 Rodney and the historical construction of underdevelopment

Walter Rodney (How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 1972) contributed the historical dimension: colonial trade structures did not merely reflect existing differences in development, they deliberately constructed underdevelopment. Colonial economies were restructured to export raw materials while minimising local processing, preventing the formation of national industries that would compete with European manufactures. Colonial fiscal structures (taxes payable only in cash, forcing wage labour), transport infrastructure (roads and railways oriented toward export ports rather than internal integration), and educational systems (training clerks, not engineers) systematically organised dependence.

For Morocco, this historical angle is not abstract. The Protectorate (1912-1956) left structural legacies: dualism between modern export agriculture and subsistence farming, concentration of capital in foreign hands progressively transferred to a narrow national elite, communications infrastructure oriented toward Atlantic and Mediterranean ports rather than territorial integration, and an educational system that prioritised urban francophone elites over rural populations. These legacies do not disappear by independence decree, they continue to constrain economic policy choices.


19 Part IV — Trade Policy Instruments and Their Political Economy

19.1 The standard toolkit: tariffs, quotas, subsidies

Trade policy instruments operate through three basic mechanisms: affecting the relative price of imports, limiting the quantity of imports, or changing the relative profitability of domestic versus imported production.

A tariff (customs duty) raises the price of an imported good by levying a charge at the border, either ad valorem (a percentage of value) or specific (a fixed amount per unit). The welfare analysis is standard: the tariff raises domestic producer surplus (domestic producers sell at the protected higher price), reduces consumer surplus (domestic consumers pay more), generates government revenue (the tariff collected), and creates a deadweight loss (transactions that would have occurred at the lower world price but do not at the higher tariff-inclusive price). The net domestic welfare effect depends on whether the tariff revenue plus producer surplus gain exceeds the consumer surplus loss plus deadweight loss. For a small country that cannot affect world prices, a tariff is almost always welfare-reducing in static terms. For a large country that can improve its terms of trade by reducing import demand, an optimal tariff exists that improves national welfare, but at the expense of trade partners, producing a globally inefficient outcome.

A quota limits the physical quantity of imports rather than raising their price. Unlike a tariff, a quota does not generate government revenue: the price difference between the restricted import price and the world price accrues as rent to whoever holds the import licence. The allocation of quota rents is therefore a political economy question: who gets the licence to import at the lower world price and sell at the higher domestic price. This is precisely why import quotas are a particularly fertile ground for rent-seeking and corruption.

Export subsidies lower the price at which domestic producers can sell abroad, either by direct payment or through preferential financing. They transfer resources from taxpayers to exporters and potentially to foreign consumers. WTO rules prohibit most export subsidies for manufactured goods, though agricultural export subsidies have been a persistent contentious exception.

The anti-dumping duty and its political economy

China exports solar panels to Morocco at a price below their cost of production, classic “dumping.” Morocco has the right under WTO rules to impose anti-dumping duties equalising the price. This looks like a simple application of fair trade rules. But the politics are more complex. Who benefits from cheap Chinese solar panels? Moroccan households installing solar, MASEN meeting its renewable energy targets at lower cost. Who loses? Moroccan solar panel manufacturers (if any exist) who cannot compete at the Chinese price. The anti-dumping duty protects a domestic industry at the cost of raising the price of renewable energy for the entire economy. Whether this is the right trade-off depends on whether the domestic solar manufacturing capability being protected has genuine development value, genuine learning externalities, genuine backward linkage potential, or whether it would remain permanently uncompetitive. Anti-dumping law is designed to enforce fair competition; it is frequently used as a protectionist instrument under a fair-trade label.

19.2 WTO disciplines and the developmental space

The World Trade Organisation, established in 1995 as the institutional successor to GATT, embeds a comprehensive set of disciplines on national trade policy. Its core principles, Most Favoured Nation (equal treatment across all trading partners), National Treatment (imported goods treated like domestic ones once in-country), binding tariff commitments, and prohibition of most subsidies, substantially limit the trade policy toolkit available to developing countries.

The most consequential constraints for development policy are:

TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights): extending patent, copyright, and trade secret protection globally. For pharmaceutical access, this means developing countries cannot produce generic versions of patented medicines without paying royalties or triggering litigation, a concern that became acute during the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa in the 1990s and resurfaced during COVID-19 with vaccine IP.

Subsidy disciplines (ASCM): prohibiting export subsidies and many forms of domestic industrial subsidies. The precise boundaries are contested, but the rules substantially limit the directed credit, export incentive, and performance-conditioned subsidy instruments that Korea and Taiwan used in their catching-up phases.

Rules of origin: in preferential trade agreements, these determine what share of a product must be produced domestically (or within the agreement territory) to qualify for preferential tariff treatment. For Morocco’s automotive sector, the rules of origin in the EU Association Agreement determine whether Renault’s Tanger-assembled vehicles qualify as “Moroccan” for tariff purposes. The transition to electric vehicles is tightening these rules: the EU is requiring a progressively higher share of battery and electronic content to be produced within the EU or in a partner country with equivalent provisions, potentially requiring Morocco to localise battery manufacturing to maintain preferential access.

Agricultural Special and Differential Treatment: officially preserving developing countries’ policy space in agriculture, but in practice inconsistently applied and often overridden by conditionality in bilateral agreements.

19.3 Rodrik’s trilemma: the political limits of hyperglobalisation

Dani Rodrik’s most influential political economy insight is the globalisation trilemma: deep international economic integration, national sovereignty, and democratic governance are mutually incompatible, no more than two can be simultaneously maintained at maximum levels.

Deep economic integration requires that national policies converge: product standards, labour regulations, financial rules, intellectual property protections must be harmonised to eliminate barriers to trade and investment. This harmonisation reduces national policy space, the ability of democratic majorities to choose their own economic arrangements. If a European majority wants stricter environmental standards and a Moroccan government wants more investment flexibility, deep integration forces a choice: harmonise (which means one policy space wins), maintain national divergence (which limits trade depth), or limit democratic override of economic rules (which is what WTO dispute settlement, ISDS arbitration, and IMF conditionality effectively do).

The Bretton Woods compromise (Rodrik’s terminology for the 1945-1971 period) maintained national policy space, limited capital mobility, and allowed embedded liberalism: countries could use Keynesian demand management and social welfare states while trading in goods. The Washington Consensus of the 1980s-1990s flipped the priority: deep financial integration, capital account liberalisation, and structural adjustment conditionality sacrificed national policy space and democratic choice in the name of market efficiency. The result was the financial crises of Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), and the European periphery (2010-2012).

Morocco and the trilemma

Morocco’s experience of the Rodrik trilemma is specific and consequential. The Association Agreement with the EU, the FTA with the United States, and WTO commitments all constrain Morocco’s industrial policy space in ways that were not present for the East Asian developers in their catching-up phases. Morocco cannot freely use the directed credit, technology transfer requirements, local content mandates, and performance-conditioned subsidies that Korea and Taiwan deployed precisely because the multilateral and bilateral trade architecture that Morocco has subscribed to prohibits or disciplines these instruments.

This is not necessarily fatal for Moroccan development, WTO rules still permit a range of measures, and the EU Agreement’s implementation has been imperfect in enforcing discipline against Moroccan industrial policy. But it means that Morocco’s industrial policy must be designed to operate within a tighter institutional envelope than historical comparators operated in. The green space that remains includes R&D subsidies, public procurement preferences, zone infrastructure, training co-investments, and financial sector instruments. Using this space intelligently, rather than searching for non-existent policy freedom outside it, is the practical challenge.


19.4 Trade and within-country inequality

One dimension the traditional trade theory debate underemphasises is the distributional effects of trade within countries, not just between them. The H-O model’s Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that trade liberalisation in a labour-abundant developing country should raise wages for unskilled workers (the abundant factor whose demand increases with trade) while reducing returns to capital, making free trade egalitarian in developing countries.

Reality has been more complex. The Autor-Dorn-Hanson (2013) analysis of the “China shock” on American labour markets documented that regions specialised in industries suddenly competing with Chinese imports experienced persistent wage depression and unemployment: not the smooth factor reallocation H-O predicts. The adjustment process is slower, more painful, and geographically concentrated than aggregate efficiency analysis suggests.

For Morocco, trade liberalisation under the EU Association Agreement has had distributional effects that aggregate welfare analysis misses. Textile workers displaced by Asian competition in the 2000s did not seamlessly transition to automotive assembly in Tanger or aerospace work in Casablanca, partly because the jobs were in different cities, partly because skills requirements differed substantially, and partly because the pace of formal job creation in growing sectors did not match the pace of destruction in declining ones. Trade adjustment is a social and political process, not only an economic one: it requires active policy responses (retraining, relocation support, income bridges) that Morocco’s social protection system is not yet equipped to provide at adequate scale. Building those mechanisms is not separate from trade policy, it is the political condition for sustaining the openness that serves Morocco’s development interests.


20 Part V — Morocco in the World Economy

20.1 Trade structure: what Morocco exports, to whom, and why

Morocco’s trade openness rate (exports plus imports as a share of GDP) exceeds 80%, placing it among the most open economies at its income level. But aggregate openness conceals a structure that reveals both the successes and the vulnerabilities of Morocco’s economic model.

Phosphates and derivatives represent 20-30% of total exports depending on the year, making OCP Group Morocco’s largest single export earner. The gradual shift from raw phosphate rock (lowest value) to phosphoric acid and then to DAP, MAP, and customised NPK fertilisers represents the most successful functional upgrading in Morocco’s export history, from periphery commodity toward specialised industrial product. The next frontier: battery cathode materials from LFP chemistry, positioning Moroccan phosphate in the electric vehicle supply chain.

Automotive became Morocco’s leading manufactured export sector in under a decade. The Renault-Tanger and Stellantis-Kénitra investments transformed Morocco’s export composition: automotive exports reached approximately 157.6 billion dirhams in 2024, representing 35% of total goods exports. This integration is genuine, Morocco is a real node in EU automotive supply chains, but it is also fragile to the electric vehicle transition for the reasons Chapter 10 examined.

Aerospace at approximately 26.5 billion dirhams represents a more technologically sophisticated but employment-lighter sector. Its competitive position depends on continued investment in skills and the maintenance of the quality certifications that give Moroccan subcontractors access to Airbus and Boeing supply chains.

Textiles and garments have declined in relative importance under Asian competition but retain significance in the fast fashion segment where Morocco’s proximity to European retailers provides a logistical advantage in short-cycle production.

Tourism (approximately 8-10% of GDP in good years) and MRE remittances (approximately 8% of GDP in 2024, one of the most stable foreign currency sources) do not appear in merchandise trade but are essential to the current account balance.

20.2 Morocco’s terms of trade: a long-term analysis

Morocco’s terms of trade, the ratio of its export prices to its import prices, trace a structurally relevant pattern over the past three decades. When phosphate prices are high (as in 2007-2008 and 2021-2022), Morocco’s terms of trade improve substantially, generating windfall export revenues that improve the current account balance and fiscal position. When phosphate prices are low and energy prices are high (as during most of the 2010s), the terms of trade deteriorate, transferring real income out of Morocco through the unfavourable exchange of goods.

This volatility is the practical manifestation of the Prebisch-Singer dynamics: a country dependent on a primary commodity for a significant share of its export revenues faces terms-of-trade cycles that transmit directly into macroeconomic instability. The 2021-2022 commodity supercycle illustrates this from the positive side: phosphate price surges generated exceptional OCP profits and improved Morocco’s fiscal and current account positions significantly. The 2014-2016 commodity price collapse illustrates the negative side: reduced phosphate revenues, combined with declining remittances, widened the current account deficit despite other sectors’ improvement.

The long-run terms-of-trade trend matters for strategic planning. If the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis holds for phosphates over the next two to three decades, which is uncertain given both the EV battery demand for LFP chemistry and the competitive dynamics of the fertiliser market, Morocco’s export revenue per tonne will need to be supplemented by volume growth and product upgrading. OCP’s strategy of moving up the value chain is precisely the response that maintains export value even if unit commodity prices face long-run pressure.

20.3 The structural commercial deficit

Morocco’s goods trade is structurally deficitaire: imports consistently exceed exports, with the coverage rate at approximately 59.8% in 2024 (meaning goods exports cover only 59.8% of goods imports). The deficit is financed by tourism receipts, MRE remittances, and FDI inflows, all sources exposed to external shocks.

The deficit’s composition matters more than its level. Energy products represent approximately 25-35% of total imports in most years, a structural vulnerability to hydrocarbon prices. The Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 demonstrated this brutally: Morocco’s energy import bill surged, contributing to the inflationary shock of 2022-2023 and widening the current account deficit. The renewable energy transition is therefore simultaneously a climate policy, an industrial policy, and a balance of payments policy.

Capital goods and semi-processed materials represent approximately 40% of imports, the sign of an industrialising economy that imports machines and inputs to produce. This category is ambivalent: some represents productive investment that will generate future exports; some represents technological dependence that deepens rather than reduces over time.

Food imports (principally cereals) reflect the food security vulnerability that Morocco’s climatic variability imposes. Morocco imports approximately 50% of its wheat consumption in average years, and substantially more in drought years. The Black Sea corridor disruption of 2022 revealed this dependence acutely; the Génération Green strategy’s objectives include reducing this vulnerability through domestic cereal yield improvement and crop diversification.

20.4 The EU association agreement: balance sheet

The Maroc-EU Association Agreement (2000) created a progressive free trade zone for industrial goods. Its balance is genuinely mixed, which is the honest assessment that partisans on both sides tend to resist.

The gains: preferential access to the world’s largest single market has been a significant driver of the automotive and aerospace cluster development. European quality and standards requirements have forced genuine quality upgrading in food exports, textile manufacturing, and industrial production. The regulatory alignment required by association has improved governance in several regulatory domains.

The costs: sectors that lost tariff protection, segments of the food processing industry, some textile manufacturers, experienced competitive shocks they were not prepared for. The trade agreement’s industrial goods liberalisation was not accompanied by the adjustment assistance that would have allowed displaced workers to transition to new sectors.

The asymmetry: the Association Agreement was designed primarily around European interests in accessing the Moroccan market for manufactured goods and services, and in securing Moroccan cooperation on migration and security. Morocco’s interests in agricultural access were partially accommodated but subject to seasonal quotas and phytosanitary restrictions that limit competitive expansion. The negotiating dynamic reflected the structural power asymmetry between a large, wealthy, institutionally dense bloc and a medium-income country dependent on European market access.

The ALECA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement), in negotiation since 2013, would extend liberalisation to services, public procurement, investment, and intellectual property. The potential gains in services access are real; the risks in regulatory sovereignty are also real and have not been adequately debated publicly in Morocco.

20.5 The CBAM as strategic constraint and opportunity

The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), operational from 2026, levies a carbon cost on imports of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and hydrogen according to their carbon intensity. For Morocco, the OCP dimension is most immediate: OCP exports several hundred million euros of phosphate fertilisers to the EU annually. If OCP cannot demonstrate a credible decarbonation trajectory, the CBAM will increase the cost of Moroccan fertilisers in the European market, potentially at the benefit of competitors operating under different regulatory frameworks.

The strategic response is clear and represents one of Morocco’s most consequential industrial policy opportunities. OCP’s fertiliser production uses significant energy, primarily for the Haber-Bosch process that produces ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen. If that hydrogen is produced from renewable electricity (green hydrogen) rather than from natural gas (grey hydrogen), the carbon content of Moroccan fertilisers falls dramatically. Morocco’s exceptional renewable energy resources make this decarbonation economically viable at lower cost than in most competing production locations.

This pathway, from grey ammonia to green ammonia, using Moroccan renewable electricity, producing CBAM-compliant fertilisers, would simultaneously satisfy European carbon requirements, reduce OCP’s own carbon exposure, create demand for Moroccan renewable electricity, and build the green ammonia production capability that is a prerequisite for green hydrogen export to Europe. The CBAM is therefore not merely a threat to be managed: it is a regulatory signal that, responded to strategically, accelerates Morocco’s green industrial transition along a commercially motivated pathway that the EU itself is funding through carbon pricing.

20.6 Regional integration: creation vs diversion and the integration calculus

Regional trade agreements occupy the institutional space between autarky and free trade. Jacob Viner’s (1950) framework provides the essential analytical distinction: a regional agreement creates trade when it allows a member country to substitute cheaper regional imports for more expensive domestic production, and diverts trade when it displaces imports from more efficient non-member countries in favour of less efficient regional partners who benefit from preferential tariffs.

The welfare implications are clear: trade creation raises welfare (more efficient allocation); trade diversion reduces it (the preference artificially advantages an inefficient regional partner over a more efficient world-market producer). A regional agreement is net beneficial when trade creation exceeds trade diversion, which depends on how competitive member economies are relative to each other and to the rest of the world, and how large the existing tariff barriers are.

For Morocco’s EU association agreement, this framework generates a nuanced assessment. Trade creation: Morocco has access to European capital goods, technology, and intermediate products at below-tariff cost, enabling more efficient domestic production and assembly. Trade diversion: Morocco imports some European agricultural and manufactured goods at preferential terms when globally cheaper alternatives exist from Asia or Latin America, a pure welfare loss from trade diversion. The net balance is positive because the created trade, the automotive and aerospace GVC integration that the association framework enabled, substantially outweighs the diverted trade. But the analysis must be done sector by sector, not as a single aggregate assessment.

The dynamic gains from regional integration often exceed the static Viner trade creation-diversion balance. By committing Morocco to European product standards, regulatory disciplines, and transparency requirements, the Association Agreement created institutional infrastructure that private investors (European and non-European alike) use to evaluate Morocco’s commercial credibility. The regulatory alignment effect generates ongoing investment attraction that does not appear in static trade creation calculations.

20.7 Morocco, Africa, and the AfCFTA

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), operational since 2021, represents the world’s largest preferential trade area by country membership (55 states) and one of the most significant structural opportunities for Morocco’s medium-term commercial strategy.

Morocco’s geographic position, two hours by air from Lagos, Dakar, and Abidjan, its logistics infrastructure (Tanger Med, Africa’s leading port by container volume), and its industrial capabilities (automotive components, agri-food processing, chemicals, financial services) position it as a natural hub for African manufacturing and distribution under the AfCFTA framework.

The barriers to realising this potential are substantial but specific:

Logistics: the cost of transporting goods from Casablanca to Lagos exceeds the cost of a container from Casablanca to Shanghai, because trans-Saharan road infrastructure is underdeveloped, border procedures are burdensome, and payment systems require routing through dollar-clearing banks. Concrete improvements: the PAPSS (Pan-African Payment and Settlement System) reduces payment friction; direct airline connections have expanded; the road and rail connections through the Saharan corridor remain the most binding infrastructure constraint.

Productive complementarity: if most African economies export primary commodities and import manufactures, the AfCFTA creates little intra-African manufactured goods trade automatically. Value chains must be built, not just tariff barriers removed. Morocco’s role would be most productive not as a simple exporter but as a hub where value is added to regional raw materials and processed products are exported intra-African. This is OCP’s fertiliser strategy in Africa (tailored formulations for specific African soil profiles), Attijariwafa Bank’s expansion across 30 African countries, and the Moroccan construction firms active across West Africa.

Rules of origin: the AfCFTA’s rules of origin must be designed to encourage productive accumulation within Africa, rewarding value addition across the continent, rather than acting as barriers that exclude non-originating inputs. Morocco has a direct interest in rules that facilitate assembly from global components for African markets, not just intra-African processing.

Tanger Med as gateway to Africa: the logistics opportunity

Tanger Med handled over 9 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) in 2023, making it Africa’s busiest container port. Most of this volume is transshipment: containers moving between major shipping routes without entering Morocco’s domestic economy. The AfCFTA opportunity is to convert transshipment volume into value-adding trade: instead of containers passing through, goods arriving at Tanger Med would be processed, assembled, mixed, packaged, labelled, before being distributed across Africa. This industrial transshipment model requires not just port infrastructure (which exists) but the industrial zone capacity, logistics services, and customs facilitation that transform a transit node into a productive hub. The investments needed are specific and manageable: the strategic decision is whether Morocco’s industrial policy framework makes them a priority.


21 Part VI — The Real Debate: Which Trade Policy?

The intellectual history surveyed in this chapter arrives at a conclusion that breaks the false binary between “free trade good” and “protectionism good.”

The historical record is unambiguous on one point: every successful industrialiser protected its nascent industries during the development phase. Britain protected textiles for centuries. The United States maintained the world’s highest average tariff rates during its 19th-century industrialisation. Germany under List. Japan under MITI. Korea and Taiwan under their developmental states. The free trade prescription that the WTO and the Washington Consensus embedded in global governance is what these countries preached after reaching the summit, not what they practised on the way up.

But the historical record is equally unambiguous on a second point: protection without performance conditionality generates rents rather than capabilities. For every South Korea that protected its semiconductor industry and produced globally competitive chips, there are dozens of developing countries that protected industries for decades without ever producing competitive firms. The difference was institutional discipline: conditional protection with performance requirements, and credible removal of protection for non-performers.

The synthesis that emerges from Ricardo through Krugman through Rodrik is this: the principle that trade creates gains from specialisation is correct. The prescription that any country at any stage of development should adopt free trade unconditionally is historically false. The policy implication is context-dependent industrial trade policy: temporary, conditional protection of sectors with genuine learning externalities and strategic linkage potential, embedded in an institutional framework that disciplines performance and exits non-performers.

For Morocco specifically, three principles follow. Defend productive space in sectors where learning externalities are real, automotive components, aerospace, green technology, through instruments that WTO rules permit (public procurement, R&D subsidies, zone infrastructure, training co-investment). Use trade agreements strategically rather than passively, the AfCFTA and the EU relationship are not just market access agreements but platforms for building industrial ecosystems and acquiring regulatory credibility. Address the structural deficit not through blanket protectionism but through targeted import substitution in strategic inputs (green energy replacing hydrocarbon imports, fertiliser inputs to reduce food vulnerability) that simultaneously strengthen Morocco’s current account and build productive capability.


22 Conclusion: Trade as Power and Possibility

Three tensions structure the economics of international trade, and navigating them requires the kind of context-sensitive, institutionally grounded analysis that neither free-trade orthodoxy nor reflexive protectionism can provide.

Gains versus distribution: trade creates aggregate gains through specialisation and scale economies. But the distribution of those gains depends on the structure of production, the balance of bargaining power, and the institutional framework. The Prebisch-Singer diagnosis, that commodity-exporting peripheries transfer value to manufacturing centres, is not a counsel of despair. It is a specification of the structural change required to escape the transfer.

Efficiency versus capability: the static efficiency of free trade (comparative advantage) and the dynamic capability-building of managed trade (infant industry protection) are not permanently in tension, but they require sequencing. The right question is not which to choose permanently but how to navigate the transition from comparative advantage as it currently exists to comparative advantage as it should be built.

Sovereignty versus integration: Rodrik’s trilemma is real. Deep international economic integration constrained the policy instruments that 20th-century developers used, and those constraints are now embedded in legally binding WTO commitments. Designing development-oriented trade policy within available space is more demanding than it was for Korea in 1970, but it is not impossible. It requires political economy sophistication: understanding which instruments are legally available, which are politically feasible, and which generate the productive learning that development requires.

What this chapter should leave with the reader

Comparative advantage is the principle that specialisation according to relative cost differences creates mutual gains even when one partner is absolutely less efficient at everything. It is real and powerful, but it describes current structure, not desirable future structure.

H-O and its extensions (Krugman, Melitz) progressively enriched the trade theory framework: factor endowments determine trade patterns, but endowments are not natural, they are institutional constructs. Increasing returns and firm heterogeneity explain intra-industry trade and the productivity selection effect of trade opening.

The structuralist challenge (Prebisch, Emmanuel, Amin, Rodney) shows that trade between structurally unequal partners transfers value from periphery to centre through differential terms of trade, wage structures, and colonial institutional legacies. These are not arguments against trade, they are arguments for which trade and under which conditions.

Historical hypocrisy: all currently rich countries industrialised behind protective tariff walls, then preached free trade once their industrial supremacy was established. The relevant lesson is not which policy to imitate but what institutional conditions made some protectionism productive and other protectionism rent-generating.

Rodrik’s trilemma: deep economic integration, national sovereignty, and democratic governance cannot all be simultaneously maximised. The Washington Consensus consistently sacrificed the latter two for the first. Recognising this is the precondition for designing trade policy that serves democratic development objectives.

Morocco’s trade architecture: 59.8% coverage rate reveals a structural import surplus in goods; automotive is the genuine manufactured export success; the CBAM is both a threat and an opportunity for OCP’s green transformation; the AfCFTA is the medium-term strategic priority; and the EU association agreement requires renegotiation of its asymmetries as Morocco’s productive structure matures.


23 Further Reading

Ricardo, D. (1817). Principles of Political Economy, Chapter 7. The original statement. Still one of the most elegant demonstrations in the history of economic thought.

Krugman, P. (1979). “Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade.” Journal of International Economics. The paper that launched the new trade theory. Short and technically accessible.

Melitz, M. (2003). “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica. The founding paper of the heterogeneous firms trade model. Technical but fundamental.

Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder. Anthem Press. The historical argument that developing countries are denied the tools developed countries used. Concise and well-documented.

Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox. Norton. The trilemma and the political limits of hyperglobalisation. Essential for understanding why WTO rules constrain development more than Ricardo would require.

Prebisch, R. (1950). The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. CEPAL. The founding document of the structuralist tradition and the terms-of-trade thesis.

Emmanuel, A. (1972). Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade. Monthly Review Press. The most systematic attempt to ground unequal exchange in value theory. Difficult but intellectually important.

Office des Changes du Maroc. Monthly foreign trade data. Primary empirical source for Morocco’s trade structure.

World Bank. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). wits.worldbank.org, Morocco’s product-level trade data. Essential for applying product space analysis to real trade flows.