16 Chapter 14 — The Balance of Payments and the International Monetary System
Accounting for the world economy, monetary hierarchy, and peripheral constraints
“The exorbitant privilege.” — Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, on the dollar’s place in the world monetary system
“A national currency becomes a world currency the day its debts become the reserves of others.” — Reformulation of the Triffin paradox
“Studying international economics serves to learn not to be governed by constraints that are in reality political choices.” — after Joan Robinson
The Map
The balance of payments is where microeconomics meets macroeconomics meets geopolitics. At the micro level, each export and import transaction is a firm’s commercial decision. Aggregated, these decisions produce a current account that reflects a country’s competitive position, savings behaviour, and investment needs. Placed in the international monetary system, a hierarchical structure dominated by the dollar since 1944, these aggregates reveal the constraints of sovereignty for a country like Morocco that does not issue a reserve currency.
The chapter advances in six movements. First, the mechanics: how to read a balance of payments, what the accounting identity means, and what it conceals. Second, the exchange rate: how depreciation affects the trade balance, the Marshall-Lerner condition, and Morocco’s gradual exchange rate liberalisation. Third, global imbalances: the China-America interdependence and the recycling of surpluses that financed two decades of global growth. Fourth, the architecture of the international monetary system: from Bretton Woods to the dollar standard, the Triffin dilemma, and Keynes’s rejected alternative. Fifth, the debt crisis and structural adjustment: the Volcker shock, petrodollar recycling, and the political economy of IMF conditionality. Sixth, Morocco’s external position: the structure of the current account, the Thirlwall constraint, reserves adequacy, and the strategic priorities for reducing external vulnerability.
17 Part I — Reading the Balance of Payments
17.1 Architecture and accounting logic
The balance of payments records all economic and financial transactions between a country’s residents and the rest of the world during a given period. It has three principal components, each capturing a different dimension of external economic relations.
The current account records real transactions: exports and imports of goods (the trade balance or balance commerciale); services (tourism received and spent abroad, transport, financial services, consulting); primary income (wages and dividends received from or paid to foreigners); and current transfers (most importantly, remittances from the Moroccan diaspora). The current account is the closest equivalent to a profit-and-loss statement for a national economy: it shows whether the country is earning more or less from the world than it is spending in it.
The financial account records capital movements: foreign direct investment (received or outgoing), portfolio investments (foreign purchases of Moroccan stocks and bonds, or Moroccan purchases of foreign securities), loans and bank deposits, and other capital flows. If Morocco receives €2 billion of FDI from a European automotive manufacturer, this appears as a financial account inflow, a foreign entity is acquiring a Moroccan productive asset.
The reserve account records changes in the central bank’s official foreign exchange holdings. When Morocco runs a current account deficit not fully covered by financial account inflows, Bank Al-Maghrib may sell foreign exchange reserves to fill the gap. This reserve drawdown appears as a positive entry (reserves are being used to finance the deficit), offset by the negative entries elsewhere.
The fundamental accounting identity:
\[\text{Current Account} + \text{Financial Account} + \Delta\text{Reserves} + \text{Errors and Omissions} = 0\]
This identity holds by construction. Every transaction has a counterpart. But it is an accounting equilibrium, not an economic one. An economy can be in severe structural disequilibrium while its balance of payments always sums to zero, because it is borrowing to cover its deficit (financial account inflow) or depleting its reserves. The equilibrium tells you the arithmetic is correct; it tells you nothing about sustainability.
17.2 Sign conventions and what they reveal
The sign conventions in a balance of payments are logical but initially counter-intuitive. The principle: any inflow of foreign exchange is positive; any outflow of foreign exchange is negative.
Exports generate foreign exchange inflows: positive. Imports consume foreign exchange: negative. FDI received from abroad is a capital inflow: positive. A Moroccan firm investing abroad is a capital outflow: negative.
The counter-intuitive case is reserves. When a central bank accumulates reserves, this appears as a negative entry, because accumulating reserves means buying foreign assets: the central bank is sending domestic currency outward (in effect) to acquire dollar or euro assets. When the central bank sells reserves to defend the currency, that is a positive entry, it is injecting foreign exchange into the market.
The practical meaning: a country running a current account deficit must finance it. If the financial account generates sufficient inflows (FDI, portfolio investment, loans), the deficit is financed and reserves are stable or growing. If financial inflows are insufficient, reserves decline. If reserves approach dangerously low levels, the country faces a balance of payments crisis.
For Morocco in 2024: a current account deficit of approximately −1.5% to −2.5% of GDP, financed primarily by FDI inflows and MRE remittances. The coverage rate of approximately 59.8% on goods trade alone understates Morocco’s external position because services (tourism: ~120 billion MAD) and transfers (MRE remittances: ~115 billion MAD) contribute substantially to the current account. When these are included, the current account deficit narrows dramatically, which is precisely why Morocco maintains adequate reserve coverage (approximately 5-5.5 months of imports) despite the goods trade deficit.
18 Part II — Exchange Rates, Depreciation, and the Marshall-Lerner Condition
18.1 How exchange rate changes affect the trade balance
When a currency depreciates, when it takes more of the domestic currency to buy one unit of foreign currency, exports become cheaper in foreign currency and imports become more expensive in domestic currency. The intuitive expectation: depreciation should improve the trade balance by boosting exports and reducing imports. But the reality is more complex.
The Marshall-Lerner condition specifies when depreciation actually improves the current account. The condition requires that the sum of the absolute value of the price elasticity of exports and the price elasticity of imports exceeds one:
\[|\varepsilon_X| + |\varepsilon_M| > 1\]
where \(\varepsilon_X\) measures how much export volume changes for a given change in the export price (in foreign currency), and \(\varepsilon_M\) measures how much import volume changes for a given change in the import price (in domestic currency).
If Marshall-Lerner is satisfied, depreciation improves the trade balance in the long run, because export volumes rise enough (foreigners buy more of the now-cheaper exports) and import volumes fall enough (residents buy less of the now-more-expensive imports) to outweigh the initial deterioration in the value terms of trade.
18.2 The J-curve effect
The complication is timing. In the short run, the Marshall-Lerner condition is typically not satisfied, because trade volumes are sticky. Existing contracts are fulfilled at old prices; buyers and sellers need time to adjust their sourcing decisions; firms need time to identify new export markets or find import substitutes. In the short run, depreciation worsens the trade balance:
- Import prices rise immediately (imports become more expensive in dirhams)
- Import volumes fall only slowly (consumers and firms have existing contracts and habits)
- Export prices fall immediately (exporters receive fewer dirhams per unit sold abroad)
- Export volumes rise only slowly (foreign buyers need time to switch to now-cheaper Moroccan goods)
The net short-run effect is therefore a deterioration in the trade balance, followed by an improvement as volumes adjust. Graphically, this traces a J-shape: the balance first falls then rises. The J-curve effect explains why exchange rate depreciation is not an instant cure for trade deficits, and why the short-run response to depreciation can appear paradoxical.
For Morocco’s exchange rate liberalisation trajectory: the IMF and World Bank analyses suggest that Morocco’s export and import elasticities are sufficient for the Marshall-Lerner condition to hold over a 12-18 month horizon. This is part of the economic case for the progressive exchange rate band widening from ±0.3% (pre-2018) through ±2.5% (2018), ±5% (2020), and toward greater flexibility. If Morocco’s exports have low price elasticity (because they compete primarily on quality, proximity, or unique resources like phosphates), a depreciation would generate less export volume response, reducing the benefit of exchange rate flexibility and reinforcing the case for capability-based rather than cost-based competitiveness strategy.
18.3 Mundell’s impossible trinity and Morocco’s navigation
Robert Mundell’s impossible trinity is the most consequential result in international macroeconomics for developing country policy. A country cannot simultaneously:
- Maintain a fixed exchange rate
- Maintain free capital flows
- Conduct independent monetary policy
Any two can be achieved, but not all three. The logic: if a country has a fixed exchange rate and free capital mobility, and its central bank lowers interest rates, capital flows outward (seeking higher returns elsewhere), creating depreciation pressure on the exchange rate. To defend the peg, the central bank must buy its currency with foreign exchange, contracting money supply and raising interest rates back to their original level. The rate cut is reversed: monetary policy is not autonomous.
Three polar solutions emerge: - Fixed rate + free capital flows → no monetary autonomy: The European Monetary System before the euro. France and Italy had to align their interest rates with Germany’s or face speculative attacks that destabilised their parities. - Fixed rate + monetary autonomy → capital controls: China’s model. Strict capital account controls allow simultaneous exchange rate management and independent monetary policy. - Monetary autonomy + free capital flows → floating rate: The US-EU model. Exchange rates fluctuate; each central bank sets rates by domestic objectives without exchange rate constraint.
Morocco’s pre-2018 regime sat in the second corner: semi-fixed exchange rate with capital controls, allowing BAM to conduct meaningful monetary policy. The 2018-2020 band widening is a gradual movement toward greater flexibility, acknowledging that Morocco’s increasing financial integration with the world will make comprehensive capital controls progressively harder to maintain while sustaining the credibility needed for investment attraction.
19 Part III — Global Imbalances: The Chinamérica Anatomy
19.1 The structural interdependence
For three decades from 1980 to 2010, the world economy was organised around a structural complementarity that Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick named “Chimerica”: the United States as the world’s great consumer-debtor, and China as the world’s great producer-creditor.
The mechanism was elegant in its circularity. American consumers and firms imported massively from Chinese factories, paying in dollars. Chinese exporters received those dollars and ceded them to state institutions (People’s Bank of China, sovereign wealth funds) that recycled them by purchasing American Treasury bonds and financial assets. This recycling simultaneously achieved three goals: it kept the renminbi undervalued (constant dollar demand prevented yuan appreciation), stimulated Chinese exports (a weak yuan made Chinese goods cheap globally), and financed American deficits at low cost (Chinese Treasury demand kept US yields artificially low).
But the Chinese strategy was not primarily about financial returns. The renminbi’s deliberate undervaluation attracted Western FDI seeking low production costs, but China was not a passive assembly platform. It imposed conditions: mandatory joint ventures, technology transfer requirements, localisation of production. Western capital was used as a technology transfer vehicle, accelerating national learning at a scale and speed no indigenous R&D programme could have achieved alone. The financial return was deliberately sacrificed for the industrial return. In thirty years, China moved from assembling toys to designing electric vehicles, advanced semiconductors, and AI systems. The Chimerica was, from Beijing’s perspective, a rational accumulation strategy.
19.2 The end of Chimerica and its consequences
After 2010, the structural complementarity began unwinding. China’s technology catch-up was substantially achieved, making Western FDI less necessary. Beijing reoriented growth toward domestic consumption and began investing outward through the Belt and Road Initiative, becoming a creditor to Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. Washington, recognising the strategic contradiction of financing a competitor’s technological ascent, responded with punitive tariffs (Trump) and explicit industrial policy (CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act under Biden).
For the rest of the world, and for Morocco specifically, this realignment creates both risk and opportunity. The risk: disruption of the stable global supply chain architecture that Chimerica had underwritten. The opportunity: the nearshoring that European and American manufacturers pursue as alternatives to Chinese production, the manufacturing relocation that a more fragmented global economy makes attractive, and the technology competition that generates multiple potential partners for capability transfer rather than a single US-led hierarchy.
20 Part IV — The Architecture of the International Monetary System
20.1 Bretton Woods and the dollar standard
The international monetary architecture in which Morocco operates was built in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire. The forty-four allied nations negotiating a post-war monetary order made a choice that determined the structure of international finance for the next eighty years: the dollar would be the world’s reserve currency, convertible to gold at $35 per ounce, and all other currencies would maintain fixed parities against the dollar.
The American negotiating team, led by Harry Dexter White, prevailed over the British team led by John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had proposed an entirely different architecture: a supranational currency called the bancor, managed by a new International Clearing Union. Under Keynes’s plan, trade surpluses would be penalised symmetrically with trade deficits: both surplus and deficit countries would face charges on their imbalances, creating mutual incentive for adjustment. The system would be symmetric; no national currency would play the reserve role.
The American proposal, and the dollar’s reserve status, won because the US held the world’s largest gold reserves and the most productive economy at the moment of maximum negotiating leverage: a Europe in ruins, a devastated Asia, and an America that had financed the Allied victory and held the world’s productive and financial surplus.
Keynes’s proposal had three distinctive features that made it superior in theory but politically unacceptable to the American delegation. First, the bancor would be issued by the International Clearing Union, not by any national authority, eliminating the “exorbitant privilege” that would otherwise accrue to the reserve currency issuer. Second, both surplus and deficit countries would face symmetric adjustment obligations, with charges accumulating on bancor balances above or below a norm: this would have obligated the United States (as a structural surplus country in 1944) to share the burden of global adjustment rather than exporting it entirely to deficit countries. Third, the system included capital controls as legitimate rather than aberrant: Keynes understood that free capital mobility was incompatible with the policy space needed for full employment economics.
The American rejection of the bancor was not principally economic, White’s team acknowledged Keynes’s design was intellectually superior. It was geopolitical: the United States, for the first time in history the world’s dominant creditor and producer, had no interest in a symmetric system that would have required it to stimulate demand rather than simply recycling its surpluses through dollar lending at American-determined terms. But Keynes’s intellectual case was compelling: a system where one national currency is the world reserve medium is inherently asymmetric, because the issuing country, the United States, can run external deficits indefinitely (its “debt” is just reserve creation for others), while all other countries face genuine external financing constraints.
20.2 The Triffin dilemma
Robert Triffin identified the structural contradiction at the heart of the dollar standard in his 1960 book Gold and the Dollar Crisis. The Triffin dilemma is this:
For the world economy to grow, it needs a growing stock of international reserves, dollars, for trade settlement and safety buffers. The only way to supply these dollars is for the United States to run persistent balance of payments deficits: it must spend more abroad than it earns, creating dollar claims that the rest of the world holds as reserves.
But if the United States runs persistent deficits, it accumulates debt, and eventually, the dollar’s gold convertibility becomes doubtful (if US liabilities to foreigners exceed US gold holdings). At that point, confidence in the dollar as a store of value collapses, triggering a run on US gold reserves.
The dilemma is inescapable within the dollar standard: the system needs US deficits to supply reserve liquidity, but those deficits ultimately undermine the dollar’s credibility as a reserve asset.
President Nixon’s decision on August 15, 1971 to unilaterally close the gold window, suspending dollar-gold convertibility, resolved the dilemma by abandoning the gold anchor. The dollar remained the world reserve currency not through an institutional backing but through network effects, market depth, and the absence of a credible alternative. Keynes’s proposed bancor was never implemented. Keynes’s predicted problem, the instability of a dollar standard without symmetric adjustment, has never been solved.
20.3 The “exorbitant privilege”
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s phrase, “l’exorbitant privilège”, names the structural advantage the United States derives from the dollar’s reserve status. This privilege has several dimensions.
Seigniorage: the United States earns a return from the rest of the world’s demand for dollar assets. When a Moroccan firm or Bank Al-Maghrib holds dollars in US Treasury bills, it is essentially lending to the US government at low interest, subsidising US government borrowing relative to what would prevail in a symmetric reserve system.
Deficit financing: the United States can run persistent current account deficits without facing the balance of payments crisis that would immediately constrain any other economy. As long as the world demands dollar assets, the US can issue them, its “debts are the reserves of others.” This is precisely the Triffin mechanism operationalised as a permanent structural advantage.
Sanctions power: denominating most international trade in dollars gives the United States control over the international payment system. Dollar-clearing banks must comply with US regulatory requirements; SWIFT, which routes most international bank-to-bank transfers, operates under American jurisdictional pressure. This has been weaponised in the Iran sanctions, the Russia SWIFT exclusion, and other instances where financial infrastructure has been converted into geopolitical leverage.
The peripheral country’s position is the mirror image of this privilege. Morocco cannot run deficits financed by the rest of the world’s reserve demand. It must earn its foreign exchange through exports, remittances, and tourism. A depreciation of the dirham raises the domestic cost of its dollar- and euro-denominated debt. A sudden stop in external financing, capital outflows triggered by a US interest rate increase or a global risk-off episode, requires either depleting reserves or sharply contracting domestic demand.
20.4 The “original sin” and peripheral financing constraints
Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann identified a specific pathology that amplifies peripheral countries’ external vulnerability: the original sin, the structural incapacity of most developing country governments to borrow internationally in their own currency. Morocco’s external public debt is predominantly in euros and dollars. This creates a currency mismatch: revenues are in dirhams but obligations are in hard currency. If the dirham depreciates, the domestic currency value of the debt rises mechanically, potentially triggering debt sustainability crises even when the underlying fiscal position has not worsened.
The original sin is not immutable. Countries accumulate the credibility to issue in local currency by demonstrating sustained macroeconomic discipline, deepening domestic bond markets, and attracting foreign investors into local-currency assets. Mexico, Brazil, and South Korea have partially escaped the original sin over the past two decades, they can now borrow partly in their own currency in international markets. Morocco’s development of a deep domestic Treasury bond market, and the progressive opening of this market to foreign investors, is the domestic financial development pathway toward reducing original sin exposure.
21 Part V — The Debt Crisis and Structural Adjustment
21.1 The Volcker shock and the periphery
In October 1979, Paul Volcker, the newly appointed Federal Reserve chairman, made a decision whose consequences for the developing world rivalled any deliberate policy action. To break the US inflation that had been running at 10-14% since the mid-1970s, he implemented a monetary shock: the Fed funds rate rose from approximately 10% to above 20% within months.
The consequences for developing country debtors were automatic and devastating. Most had borrowed in the 1970s at floating interest rates indexed to LIBOR, taking advantage of abundant recycled petrodollars (see below). When US rates spiked, the service on these floating-rate dollar loans rose in direct proportion. Simultaneously, the rising dollar (which appreciates when US rates rise, attracting global capital) meant that the local-currency burden of dollar-denominated debt rose for every country that had not dollarised. And capital that had flowed to emerging markets during the low-rate 1970s reversed direction, seeking the suddenly attractive US returns.
Mexico was first, announcing in August 1982 that it could not service its debt. The declaration triggered a cascade: as each country defaulted, international banks (suddenly realising their developing-country exposure) closed credit lines to all remaining borrowers. The global credit contraction was self-fulfilling: even countries capable of servicing their debts could not roll over the short-term instruments they depended on, forcing default.
The Volcker shock was not the consequence of American malice. It was the consequence of the structural asymmetry of the international monetary system: a unilateral monetary decision in Washington had systemic external effects that no policy coordination mechanism existed to manage. This asymmetry, American monetary policy as global economic weather, has recurred in every subsequent tightening cycle. The 1994 Mexican crisis. The 2013 “taper tantrum” when Ben Bernanke’s mere suggestion of reducing QE triggered capital flight from emerging markets. The 2022 Fed rate cycle that triggered crises in Turkey, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The pattern is structural, not coincidental.
21.2 Petrodollar recycling and the debt trap
Understanding why so many developing countries were so heavily dollar-indebted in the late 1970s requires the petrodollar circuit. The 1973 and 1979 OPEC price shocks transferred massive dollar income to oil-exporting countries. These petrodollars, oil revenues denominated and held in dollars, were deposited in large Western banks (principally American and British), creating a vast reservoir of dollar liquidity seeking yield.
With limited domestic investment opportunities at home, these petrodollars were recycled by Western banks as loans to developing countries, initially at modest rates, justified by the development financing rationale. Countries borrowed to finance infrastructure, subsidies, and public investment, believing (and being told) that commodity price trends and global growth would generate the export revenues to service the debt.
The trap closed when Volcker raised rates. The same petrodollar recycling circuit that had appeared virtuous, oil surpluses financing development, became catastrophic when the dollar interest rates to which those loans were indexed spiked. The loans that had been presented as development finance were revealed as a mechanism for transmitting American monetary risk to peripheral balance sheets.
21.3 Arrighi and the long cycles of financial hegemony
Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century (1994) places the dollar standard, the debt crisis, and structural adjustment within a framework of very long historical cycles that transforms the analysis from a policy debate into a theory of systemic reproduction.
Arrighi’s fundamental observation: every major systemic cycle of capital accumulation follows a pattern. A period of material expansion (production-based growth, industrial dynamism, trade growth) is succeeded by a period of financial expansion (capital flowing out of trade into financial speculation, the productive hegemon becoming the world’s banker). This transition, what Arrighi calls the signal crisis of each cycle, signals that the leading power’s productive supremacy is eroding and that financial mechanisms are being used to extract value from the system rather than create it.
The sequence from Genoese finance capital (15th-16th centuries) through Dutch mercantile capitalism (17th century) to British industrial capitalism (18th-19th centuries) to American financial capitalism (20th-21st centuries) traces each cycle. Each systemic leader has first been a producer, then a financier, then been succeeded by a new producer who eventually financialises in turn.
The implications for Morocco and the Global South: the current US financial hegemony, characterised by the dollar reserve status, Treasury bond recycling, and disciplinary conditionality through the IMF and World Bank, is not a permanent institutional equilibrium but a phase in a long historical cycle. Its twilight, which observers since at least 2008 have debated, would open a period of systemic transition in which the rules of the international monetary game become contested rather than fixed. This transition creates genuine policy space for countries like Morocco to diversify their external anchors, the China Belt and Road, the Gulf sovereign wealth funds, the EU’s green transition financing, and potentially new multipolar reserve arrangements, rather than depending exclusively on the dollar-centred system that the post-Bretton Woods order constructed.
21.4 Structural adjustment: discipline or subjugation?
The IMF and World Bank’s response to the debt crisis was the Structural Adjustment Programme, a standard package of conditions attached to emergency financing. The official rationale was macroeconomic: restore fiscal viability, reduce the current account deficit, enable debt service resumption. The unstated rationale, which became more visible over time, was ensuring that creditor banks were repaid before any other objective.
SAPs followed a standard formula: budget deficit reduction (cutting social spending, public wages, and subsidies); currency devaluation (to stimulate exports and reduce imports); market liberalisation (deregulation, privatisations); and capital account opening (to attract foreign investment). These measures are internally coherent for restoring short-run macroeconomic balances. They also carry massive social costs, immediately visible, when the gains (improved export competitiveness, long-run fiscal health) materialise only over years.
Morocco adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983. The timeline is documented: dirham devaluation, subsidy reductions on bread, sugar, cooking oil, and fuel, public investment compression, civil service hiring freezes, and preparation for privatisation. In January 1984, the subsidy reductions triggered riots in the northern cities, Nador, Tétouan, Al-Hoceima, Oujda, that left dozens dead. The “émeutes du pain” (bread riots) are the concrete human face of balance of payments adjustment: the costs are immediate and concentrated on the most vulnerable; the macroeconomic benefits are deferred and diffuse.
Joseph Stiglitz’s critique from within the World Bank, documented in Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), showed how SAPs systematically prioritised financial balances over human development, often worsening inequality while achieving nominal fiscal targets. The deeper systemic critique from Arrighi and the dependency tradition holds that SAPs were not neutral technical responses to internal imbalances: they were instruments of a globalised financial capitalism centred on American rents, disciplining peripheral economies after debt cycles that the system’s own dynamics had created.
22 Part VI — Morocco’s External Position
22.1 The current account anatomy
Morocco’s current account structure reveals a distinctive risk profile: persistent goods trade deficit offset by structurally important service and transfer inflows, with vulnerability concentrated in commodity price shocks and geopolitical disruptions to remittance flows.
Goods trade runs a chronic deficit: 2024 imports of approximately 761 billion MAD against exports of approximately 455 billion, yielding the 59.8% coverage rate. The deficit reflects three structural features: energy dependence (approximately 25-35% of imports are hydrocarbons, making the current account exquisitely sensitive to oil prices); capital equipment dependence (approximately 40% of imports are machinery and industrial inputs, partly productive investment, partly technological dependence); and food vulnerability (Morocco imports approximately 50% of its soft wheat needs, whose price was significantly disrupted by the Ukraine war).
Tourism receipts of approximately 120 billion MAD in normal years represent a major current account buffer, equivalent to approximately one-third of the goods trade deficit. But tourism is highly cyclical and vulnerable to security incidents, pandemic disruptions, and European consumer sentiment, as the 2020 COVID shock demonstrated when tourism income collapsed to near-zero.
MRE remittances of approximately 115 billion MAD in 2024 are Morocco’s most stable foreign exchange source, more stable than exports, more stable than FDI, and more stable than tourism. The Moroccan diaspora has demonstrated a remarkable counter-cyclical pattern: remittances increased during the 2020 crisis (solidarity motive) and remained robust through the 2022 commodity shock. This stability makes remittances Morocco’s most valuable external account buffer, but one that depends on the economic health and political commitment of a diaspora Morocco does not control.
FDI inflows (approximately 25-35 billion MAD annually in normal years) contribute to the financial account, partially offsetting the current account deficit without generating the external debt that bond issuance requires. The challenge: as Chapter 10 showed, FDI profit repatriation rates are high, meaning the financial account benefit of FDI is systematically reduced by dividend outflows in subsequent years.
22.2 Morocco in comparative perspective
Situating Morocco’s external position relative to comparable economies reveals both its relative strengths and the structural constraints it shares with regional peers.
| Indicator | Morocco (2023) | Tunisia (2023) | Turkey (2023) | Egypt (2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current account (% GDP) | ~−1.5% | ~−6.8% | ~−4.0% | ~−1.0% |
| Reserve coverage (months) | ~5.5 | ~3.0 | ~4.0 | ~4.5 |
| External debt (% GDP) | ~35% | ~90% | ~50% | ~45% |
| Diaspora transfers (USD bn) | ~9.5 | ~2.5 | ~3.5 | ~22 |
| Goods coverage rate | ~60% | ~55% | ~75% | ~40% |
Morocco’s relative position is one of moderate structural vulnerability with above-average buffers. Its current account deficit is smaller than regional comparators; its reserve coverage is the strongest; its external debt is lower than Tunisia or Turkey; and MRE remittances are among the largest relative to GDP in the MENA region.
Turkey’s experience offers a cautionary illustration of how quickly comfortable reserve positions can deteriorate: the 2018 and 2021 Turkish lira crises resulted from the combination of persistent current account deficits, high short-term external debt rollovers, and exchange rate management inconsistent with the Mundell triangle’s constraints. Turkey had adequate nominal reserves but massive net short-term dollar obligations, once confidence broke, a self-reinforcing devaluation-inflation-rate spike spiral developed that required years of painful adjustment to reverse.
Morocco’s buffer advantage is not structural destiny: it reflects accumulated policy credibility and strategic choices (stable BAM governance, progressive exchange rate liberalisation, diversified financing sources) that require continued maintenance. The scenario that most threatens Morocco’s external stability is the one that combines an energy price spike, a European recession reducing remittances and tourism simultaneously, and a global capital outflow episode triggered by US monetary tightening.
22.3 The Thirlwall constraint applied to Morocco
A.P. Thirlwall’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth model (1979) provides the analytical framework for identifying Morocco’s sustainable long-run growth rate given its external position.
\[g^* = \frac{\varepsilon \cdot g_w}{\pi}\]
With illustrative parameters for Morocco: export income elasticity \(\varepsilon \approx 1.2\) (a 1% increase in world income increases Moroccan export volumes by approximately 1.2%), world growth \(g_w = 3\%\), and import income elasticity \(\pi \approx 1.8\) (a 1% increase in Moroccan income increases import volumes by approximately 1.8%):
\[g^* = \frac{1.2 \times 3.0}{1.8} = 2.0\%\]
This is Morocco’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate, the maximum sustainable growth without continuous current account deterioration. At Moroccan income levels and demographic structure, 2.0% growth is far below what is needed for meaningful convergence or job creation for the approximately 250,000 new labour market entrants each year.
The arithmetic of escape from the Thirlwall constraint is clear: raise \(\varepsilon\) (increase the income elasticity of exports by moving up the product space toward goods whose demand grows faster with world income) or reduce \(\pi\) (decrease the import intensity of growth by building domestic supply chains in strategic input sectors). Both require exactly the structural transformation and industrial policy that Chapters 9 and 10 developed. The Thirlwall constraint is not an external macroeconomic abstraction, it is the growth theory consequence of Morocco’s productive structure, connecting Chapter 12’s balance of payments analytics directly to Chapters 9-10’s structural transformation analysis.
22.4 Reserves adequacy and crisis prevention
Morocco’s foreign exchange reserves of approximately 5.0-5.5 months of imports represent the primary buffer against external shocks. The “rule of thumb” threshold for adequate reserve coverage is typically 3 months of imports; Morocco’s position is therefore comfortable but not excessive.
The 2020 COVID crisis tested this buffer: the simultaneous collapse of tourism, sharp decline of FDI, and trade disruption reduced net reserve coverage below 5 months temporarily, while the IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line (reactivated at $3 billion) provided additional insurance. The recovery of tourism and the phosphate price surge in 2021-2022 restored and strengthened Morocco’s reserve position.
Three shocks could convert manageable reserve drawdown into crisis: a sharp sustained decline in phosphate prices (reducing OCP export revenues and dividends); a sustained European recession reducing both remittances and tourism receipts simultaneously; or a global risk-off episode triggering capital flight from emerging markets (as the 2013 taper tantrum demonstrated is possible). The third scenario is the most structural concern because it operates through the Mundell triangle: if Morocco continues liberalising its capital account, it becomes progressively more exposed to the capital flow volatility that has repeatedly destabilised peripheral economies at moments of US monetary policy tightening.
22.5 The strategic priorities for external rebalancing
Three structural priorities follow from this analysis.
Increase the sophistication and income elasticity of exports. The Thirlwall arithmetic shows that Morocco’s sustainable growth rate depends directly on export income elasticity. Moving up the product space, from assembling vehicles to manufacturing complex EV components, from exporting raw phosphate to supplying battery cathode materials, from basic call centres to engineering services, is simultaneously a development strategy and a balance of payments strategy. Each move up the complexity ladder raises \(\varepsilon\) and reduces the Thirlwall constraint on sustainable growth.
Reduce energy import dependence through the renewable energy programme. Energy imports represent approximately 25-35% of Morocco’s total import bill in most years. Each installed gigawatt of renewable capacity reduces energy imports by the equivalent of the hydrocarbon fuel it displaces. The MASEN renewable programme is therefore partly a current account programme, its economic rationale includes the balance of payments saving from reduced fuel imports, which the project-level financial analysis systematically fails to capture fully.
Manage the capital account liberalisation sequencing carefully. The Mundell triangle’s logic is unforgiving: as Morocco deepens financial integration, maintaining the exchange rate anchor becomes progressively more expensive in reserve terms, and episodes of external stress become more capable of triggering rapid reserve depletion. The sequencing principle that international financial institutions themselves recommend (domesticfinancial deepening before full capital account opening; strong prudential regulation before portfolio flow liberalisation) aligns with Morocco’s strategic interest in building reserve buffers and domestic bond market depth before removing remaining capital controls.
23 Conclusion: Sovereignty as External Constraint, and Its Margins
Three ideas should survive the closing of this chapter.
A current account deficit is a macroeconomic phenomenon, not a trade policy failure. It reflects the difference between national investment and national savings. Protectionist trade policies cannot fix this structural gap without addressing the underlying determinants: export competitiveness, savings rates, and fiscal discipline. What changes the current account sustainably is industrial upgrading, human capital investment, and public investment discipline, three projects that take a decade to produce visible effects.
The international monetary system is an asymmetric hierarchy, not a neutral mechanism. The Triffin dilemma was never resolved; it was converted into the “exorbitant privilege” for the United States and into permanent external constraint for everyone else. Keynes’s proposed bancor, a symmetric system where both surplus and deficit countries face adjustment pressure, remains the intellectually most coherent design for a fair international monetary order. It remains politically out of reach.
Morocco has more external sovereignty in 2024 than in 1983, partly through painful adjustments of that decade and partly through deliberate subsequent choices. Reserve adequacy, monetary credibility, export diversification, and the development of a domestic bond market all represent accumulated external sovereignty. But these margins are not permanent: they must be actively defended against the structural pressures of a monetary system that Morocco did not design and does not control.
The transition toward a multipolar monetary world, which geopolitical competition between the US and China is accelerating, is not necessarily adverse for countries like Morocco. A world with multiple reserve currencies (dollar, euro, renminbi, and potentially a reformed SDR-based system) provides more diversification options for reserve management and more financing partners for external adjustment. But it also increases complexity: navigating multiple monetary relationships, maintaining credibility across multiple institutional frameworks, and avoiding the competitive devaluations and capital flow volatility that multi-polar reserve systems historically generate. Morocco’s interest is in multilateral monetary governance that provides symmetric adjustment obligations and adequate safety nets for peripheral economies, not in the current asymmetric system but not in competitive monetary fragmentation either.
24 Further Reading
Triffin, R. (1960). Gold and the Dollar Crisis. Yale University Press. The original statement of the Triffin dilemma. Short, prophetic, and still the clearest account of the structural contradiction in the dollar standard.
Keynes, J.M. (1943). “Proposals for an International Clearing Union.” Keynes’s Bretton Woods proposal, the bancor and symmetric adjustment. Available from the UK National Archives and reproduced in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. XXV. The road not taken in 1944.
Eichengreen, B. (2011). Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar. Oxford University Press. The most accessible account of the dollar’s reserve status, its origins, its economics, and its potential futures.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. Norton. The insider’s account of how IMF structural adjustment programmes systematically prioritised financial stability over human development.
Mundell, R. (1963). “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. The original statement of the impossible trinity. Technical but short.
Thirlwall, A.P. (1979). “The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of International Growth Rate Differences.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. The founding paper of balance-of-payments-constrained growth theory.
Bank Al-Maghrib. Rapport annuel sur la Balance des Paiements (annual). The primary empirical source for Morocco’s external accounts. Detailed breakdowns of all current and financial account components. Available at bkam.ma.
IMF. World Economic Outlook (biannual). Global macroeconomic projections and current account sustainability analysis for member countries.