18 Chapter 16 — International Political Economy: Markets, States, and Power
Hegemony, interdependence, and Morocco’s strategic position
“Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state.” — Fernand Braudel, The Dynamics of Capitalism (1985)
“To think about the instability of capitalism is not abstract speculation. It is to recognise in every crisis a possible moment of bifurcation.” — Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century
The Map
The preceding chapters analysed the mechanisms of the international economy, trade theory, balance of payments, exchange rates, financial markets, as technical systems. This chapter adds the dimension that makes those technical systems intelligible: power. International economic institutions do not emerge from neutral technical optimisation; they are the crystallised results of historical conflicts over who gets to write the rules. The dollar reserve standard is not a naturally optimal monetary arrangement; it is a political settlement reached at Bretton Woods under specific power conditions that have been maintained and periodically renegotiated since.
The chapter advances in four movements. First, the theoretical frameworks for reading the international economic order: realism, liberal institutionalism, hegemonic stability theory, and constructivism. Second, Braudel’s distinction between market and capitalism, and Arrighi’s theory of hegemonic cycles. Third, the instruments through which interdependence becomes a weapon: sanctions, dollar extraterritoriality, supply chain leverage, regulatory coercion. Fourth, Morocco’s position in the current hegemonic transition and the strategic options available.
19 Part I — Theoretical Frameworks for Reading International Economic Order
19.1 Realism: anarchy, power, and interstate rivalry
The realist tradition in international relations theory holds that the international system is fundamentally anarchic, no overarching authority exists above the state, and that states behave as power-maximising actors in a competitive environment. Economic relations are therefore always also political: trade flows, investment decisions, and monetary arrangements are simultaneously economic exchanges and power relationships.
From a realist perspective, international economic institutions are not neutral rules applied uniformly to all states: they are instruments of the powerful. The WTO’s dispute resolution system, formally applicable to all members, in practice favours those with the legal and diplomatic capacity to bring and defend cases. The IMF’s conditionality programmes have been applied asymmetrically: with great frequency and stringency to peripheral borrowers, and never to the United States despite its persistent current account and fiscal deficits. International financial sanctions, the most powerful economic weapon in the contemporary state toolkit, are available in practice only to the dollar reserve currency issuer.
19.2 Liberal institutionalism: interdependence, cooperation, and rules
The liberal institutionalist tradition holds that international institutions reduce transaction costs, solve collective action problems, and create information environments that allow cooperation to emerge among self-interested states. The WTO reduces trade barriers by creating binding commitments that states would not credibly make unilaterally. The IMF’s surveillance function provides information about members’ economic conditions that would otherwise be unavailable to creditors and investors. The Network for Greening the Financial System coordinates climate risk assessment across central banks.
Liberal institutionalists acknowledge that institutions reflect power but argue that once created, institutions constrain the powerful as well as the weak and generate dynamics of cooperation that over time develop their own momentum. The WTO’s Appellate Body, before its de facto suspension through the United States’ refusal to appoint new members, had ruled against the United States in a significant number of cases, evidence that rule-based multilateralism does impose constraints even on the hegemon.
For Morocco, the liberal institutionalist perspective suggests that strengthening multilateral institutions and the rule of law in international economic relations serves the interests of middle powers. A Morocco that operates within well-functioning international rules has more predictable and better-protected access to major markets than a Morocco dependent entirely on bilateral negotiating leverage.
19.3 Hegemonic stability theory and the Kindleberger trap
Charles Kindleberger’s hegemonic stability theory holds that a stable international economic order requires a single dominant power willing and able to provide public goods: maintaining open markets, serving as lender of last resort in crises, and providing a stable reserve currency. Without a hegemon performing these functions, the international economy is prone to the fragmentation and instability of the 1930s, when Britain was too weak to maintain the gold standard and the Pax Britannica, and the United States was too reluctant to assume the role. This “Kindleberger trap”, a period between hegemonic transition when no power provides global public goods, is the structural risk of the current moment.
The theory has normative implications: the current American reluctance to sustain its hegemonic public-good provision role (the partial abandonment of multilateralism under Trump, the CHIPS Act’s supply chain nationalism under Biden) is the transition’s most dangerous dimension for the international system. Middle powers, including Morocco, have a direct interest in international governance frameworks that do not require a single hegemon but distribute the provision of global public goods more broadly.
19.4 Constructivism: the power of norms and ideas
Constructivist international relations theory emphasises the role of collectively shared norms, identities, and ideas in shaping the behaviour of states and international institutions, not just material power. The norms embedded in international institutions, market liberalisation, central bank independence, intellectual property protection, are not technically neutral; they reflect particular historical and ideological contexts that serve particular interests while presenting themselves as universally valid.
The Washington Consensus of the 1980s-1990s is a case study in the constructivist argument: a set of policy prescriptions (fiscal austerity, privatisation, capital account liberalisation, trade opening) achieved the status of technical orthodoxy through the simultaneous dominance of Anglo-American academic economics, US Treasury and IMF influence, and the discrediting of alternative frameworks after the Soviet collapse. These norms were genuinely believed by many of their proponents; they were also genuinely beneficial to some interests and harmful to others.
20 Part II — Braudel, Arrighi, and the Long History of Hegemonic Cycles
20.1 Braudel: market versus capitalism
Fernand Braudel’s most important contribution to economic thought is a conceptual distinction that mainstream economics systematically ignores: the difference between the market and capitalism.
The market is a relatively open, competitive space accessible to many participants. The baker selling bread, the artisan negotiating services, the farmer bringing vegetables to the weekly market, these exchanges obey supply and demand logic and produce coordination without centralisation. The market has existed since antiquity. It is not inherently capitalist.
Capitalism, for Braudel, is something radically different: the capacity of a minority to control exchange circuits, capture flows at strategic nodes, and centralise accumulation through information, credit, and alliance with political power. Capitalism thrives not in transparent competition but in opacity, monopoly, and rent. It is not the natural continuation of the market; it is the market’s strategic predator.
This distinction has profound analytical consequences. Most economic models analyse markets as if capitalism were simply the sum of many markets. Braudel shows that understanding where wealth really accumulates requires seeing the level above markets: the organisational structures, financial arrangements, and political connections through which some actors position themselves to extract value from market flows rather than competing within them. For Morocco, this means understanding that the automotive export cluster, the BVC, the banking system, and the agricultural value chains all have a market layer and a capitalist layer, and that policy which only addresses the market layer (competition, pricing, regulation) without addressing the capitalist layer (who controls circuit nodes, who captures rents) will produce incomplete results.
20.2 Arrighi’s systemic cycles of accumulation
Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century (1994) extends Braudel’s analysis into a theory of capitalist development as a succession of systemic cycles of accumulation. Each cycle follows the same structural pattern:
A phase of material expansion (MC in Arrighi’s notation, Money transformed into Commodities): a leading complex of capital (a state-capital alliance) dominates world trade and production, generating surplus through organisational and productive innovation. Profits are reinvested in further productive expansion.
A phase of financial expansion (CM’, Commodities transformed into more Money): as productive opportunities become saturated and competition from emerging challengers increases, the leading complex shifts toward financial intermediation, extracting returns through credit, speculation, and monetary management rather than through production. The M-C-M’ cycle becomes M-M’: money makes more money without productive intermediation.
The transition from material to financial expansion is the signal crisis of the cycle: the leading power’s productive supremacy is eroding, and financial mechanisms are being used to extract value while the productive foundations decline. Eventually a terminal crisis occurs when a challenger establishes productive dominance that the incumbent can no longer contest even through financial and military power.
The four historical cycles Arrighi identifies: the Genoese cycle (15th-16th centuries), centred on merchant banking and long-distance trade finance; the Dutch cycle (17th century), adding joint-stock companies and state-capital integration through the VOC; the British cycle (18th-19th centuries), adding industrial production, free trade doctrine, and sterling reserve status; and the American cycle (20th-21st centuries), adding mass production, multilateral institutions, and dollar reserve status.
The American cycle followed the pattern exactly. Material expansion: 1945-1970s, when American manufacturing dominated world markets, Marshall Plan aid rebuilt Europe and Japan as US markets and allies, and the Bretton Woods institutions codified American preferences as international rules. Financial expansion: 1970s to present, as dollar reserve status was maintained through financial rather than productive dominance, US current account deficits were recycled as dollar reserve accumulation by export economies, and American financial markets became the global centre of capital accumulation.
20.3 The signal crisis of the American cycle
The signal crisis of the American cycle can be dated to 1971: Nixon’s closure of the gold window, the first explicit acknowledgment that American productive capacity could not sustain the Bretton Woods commitments made when the US held 70% of world gold reserves. The subsequent decades involved the paradoxical strengthening of dollar hegemony through financial rather than productive means: precisely because no alternative reserve currency existed, dollar dominance survived the end of gold convertibility.
The 2008 financial crisis was the most visible symptom of the terminal crisis dynamics that Arrighi’s framework predicts. The leading financial complex (Wall Street-Treasury-Fed) had allowed the financialisation of the American economy to substitute for genuine productive renewal: household debt replaced wage growth as the engine of consumption, financial engineering displaced industrial investment as the engine of profit, and the illusion of perpetual asset appreciation substituted for the creation of new productive capacity. When the financial edifice collapsed, the productive vacuum it had concealed was exposed.
China’s rise represents the challenger complex in the Arrghian framework: a state-capital alliance that has used the material expansion phase (massive productive investment, export-led growth, controlled financial integration) to build the productive foundation for future hegemonic challenge. The current US-China rivalry, trade wars, semiconductor export restrictions, SWIFT exclusion competition, competing infrastructure financing initiatives, is the geopolitical expression of the hegemonic transition that Arrighi’s framework predicts.
20.4 Braudel’s three temporal registers
Braudel’s analytical framework operates across three temporal registers that correspond to different layers of historical reality, and require different analytical instruments.
The longue durée (long duration) is the domain of geographic and structural constraints that evolve over centuries: climate, topography, population density, soil conditions, resource endowments. These structures change so slowly that they appear almost static over human lifetimes, but they profoundly shape economic trajectories. Morocco’s Atlantic and Mediterranean geography, positioning it at the intersection of European, African, and Middle Eastern trading zones, is a longue durée asset that no economic policy created and that no policy failure can quickly eliminate. The phosphate deposits, the renewable energy potential, the Gibraltar strait strategic location: these are longue durée foundations on which economic strategy must build.
The conjuncture (medium duration) is the domain of economic and social cycles that play out over decades: Kondratieff waves of technological innovation, institutional regimes and their crises, demographic transitions, urbanisation processes. Morocco’s current conjuncture is shaped by: the demographic dividend (a young population that is an asset if education and employment are adequate, a liability if not), the energy transition (which reshapes Morocco’s resource position), and the global supply chain reorganisation that creates the nearshoring window.
The événement (event, short duration) is the domain of political decisions, diplomatic crises, natural disasters, and financial shocks that unfold in months or years. The COVID pandemic, the Ukraine war’s food price impact, and the 2023 Al Haouz earthquake are events that impose short-run adjustment costs but do not fundamentally alter Morocco’s longue durée or conjunctural position.
Braudel’s framework is most valuable as a corrective to economic analysis that operates only in the short-run event register: price movements, quarterly growth figures, electoral cycles. Understanding what is structurally stable (the longue durée advantages) and what is cyclically available (conjunctural windows) allows more robust strategic design than analysis that treats every shift as equally fundamental or equally ephemeral.
20.5 Morocco’s African strategy: hub, partner, or both?
Morocco’s repositioning as an African economic actor, after its return to the African Union in 2017 after a 33-year absence and its explicit post-2000 strategy of southward economic expansion, represents one of the more consequential strategic choices of its recent history.
The material foundations are real: Attijariwafa Bank operates in 30 African countries, making it one of the continent’s most expansive financial institutions; OCP’s Africa strategy, customised fertiliser formulations for specific African soil profiles, agronomy partnerships, and agricultural training programmes, positions it as a continental agri-nutrition actor, not just a commodity exporter; Moroccan construction firms (Groupe Alliances, Somagec) are active across West and Central Africa; Royal Air Maroc offers direct connections to over 50 African cities, making Casablanca the most connected African hub by intra-continental routes.
The geopolitical logic is clear: Morocco seeks to position itself as a gateway between Europe and Africa, not just in the transport infrastructure sense but in the economic and financial integration sense. European firms seeking African market access find in Morocco a partner with cultural proximity (French language, Islamic finance capacity), regulatory credibility (association agreement with the EU), and logistical infrastructure (Tanger Med, Casablanca hub) that no other country in the region combines. This positioning is simultaneously a commercial strategy and a geopolitical influence-building project.
The risk: Morocco’s African engagement can reinforce extractive patterns rather than building productive partnerships. If Moroccan banks in West Africa primarily channel savings toward lending that benefits Moroccan-origin firms, if OCP’s African agricultural strategy primarily sells fertilisers rather than building African agronomic capabilities, if Moroccan construction firms primarily execute projects with imported materials and expatriate management, the economic relationship reproduces dependency rather than partnership. The distinction Hirschman drew between the teaching sector and the enclave sector applies to Morocco’s African strategy: the question is whether this engagement leaves behind genuine productive capability or merely extends a larger economy’s reach.
21 Part III — Interdependence as a Weapon
21.1 Dollar weaponisation and SWIFT exclusion
The dollar’s reserve currency status creates instruments of coercion that go far beyond trade policy. Because most international transactions are denominated in dollars and cleared through US banks and SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the United States can deny market access to any entity worldwide by excluding it from dollar clearing, without requiring multilateral consent or formal military action.
The Iran sanctions regime, excluding Iranian banks from SWIFT, blocking dollar transactions, requiring non-US banks to choose between Iranian and American markets, demonstrated the coercive reach of dollar dominance. The Russia SWIFT exclusion in February 2022, implemented within days of the Ukraine invasion, was the most extensive application of financial weaponisation in history: Russia lost access to foreign exchange reserves held abroad and was cut off from the standard international payment system simultaneously.
The effectiveness of these instruments depends entirely on the dollar’s reserve status. If other currencies could substitute, if a significant share of world trade could be denominated and cleared in renminbi, euros, or a new BRICS payment system, the coercive leverage would diminish proportionally. This is precisely why the race to develop alternative payment systems (China’s CIPS, the BRICS common currency discussions, the Gulf states’ payment infrastructure investments) is simultaneously a geopolitical and monetary competition.
For Morocco, dollar weaponisation has two implications. Morocco’s own external financing, energy imports, and phosphate exports involve dollar denomination. Any disruption to Morocco’s dollar access, theoretically possible if Morocco were targeted by US financial sanctions, however improbable, would have immediate current account and fiscal consequences. More practically, the currency of Morocco’s main export customers (predominantly European) means that currency risk is primarily euro-dollar rather than dollar-dirham. Morocco’s trade and financial exposure to dollar system disruptions is real but mediated.
21.2 Supply chains as geopolitical leverage
The COVID-19 pandemic and the semiconductor supply chain disruptions of 2020-2022 revealed what strategic analysts had long observed: global supply chain concentration creates geopolitical leverage. Countries or firms that control critical nodes in concentrated supply chains, ASML (monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment), TSMC (dominant semiconductor fabrication), CATL (battery cells), Umicore and BASF (battery materials processing), hold power disproportionate to their economic size because their absence disables much larger downstream systems.
The recognition of this leverage has driven a fundamental reconfiguration of supply chain policy. The US CHIPS Act (2022), investing $52 billion in domestic semiconductor manufacturing, explicitly frames supply chain resilience as a national security issue. The EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act and Critical Raw Materials Act pursue the same logic for clean energy technologies. “Friend-shoring”, concentrating supply chains within politically aligned blocs, is replacing pure efficiency optimisation as the organising principle of industrial investment decisions.
For Morocco, this reconfiguration creates the nearshoring opportunity analysed in earlier chapters, while also revealing the geopolitical dimension of that opportunity. Morocco is attractive to European firms not only for cost but for political alignment: a country with deep EU association, stable governance, and Atlantic orientation sits outside the supply chain risk categories that motivate European nearshoring. This political alignment is an economic asset. It also implies a degree of dependency on European strategic preferences that Morocco’s diplomatic diversification seeks to balance.
21.3 Regulatory extraterritoriality
A less visible but economically consequential dimension of hegemonic power is regulatory extraterritoriality: the application of domestic law to transactions and actors outside the national territory, using access to the domestic market as enforcement leverage.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been applied to foreign firms operating in third countries, with billion-dollar fines for conduct that never touched US territory. GDPR compliance requirements apply to any firm worldwide that processes personal data of EU residents, effectively making EU privacy law a global standard for digital services. The CBAM imposes carbon pricing obligations on exporters to the EU market regardless of those exporters’ domestic regulatory choices. In each case, market access creates legal jurisdiction beyond territorial sovereignty.
The CBAM is Morocco’s most immediate exposure to regulatory extraterritoriality. As analysed in Chapter 10, OCP’s fertiliser exports to the EU face carbon cost obligations from 2026 based on their production carbon content. This creates an incentive structure that is simultaneously a coercion (comply with EU environmental standards or pay a carbon tariff) and an opportunity (Morocco’s renewable energy advantage makes decarbonation commercially viable and competitively advantageous).
The broader principle: middle-power countries like Morocco do not merely face the international rules as passive recipients. They can choose which regulatory regimes to align with, negotiate for rule adaptations in areas of comparative advantage, and use regulatory alignment as leverage in trade and investment negotiations. Morocco’s progressive alignment with EU environmental and regulatory standards, accelerated by the ALECA negotiations and association agreement implementation, represents a deliberate choice to use regulatory convergence as a strategic asset.
21.4 Wallerstein and world-systems analysis
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory provides a complementary analytical framework to Arrighi’s hegemonic cycles. Wallerstein categorises economies into core, semi-periphery, and periphery based on their position in the international division of labour. Core economies concentrate high-skill, capital-intensive, high-wage production and capture disproportionate value from the world economy. Peripheral economies concentrate low-skill, labour-intensive, low-wage production and export to the core at structurally unfavourable terms. Semi-peripheral economies occupy an intermediate position, simultaneously exploited by the core and exploiting the periphery, providing a political buffer that stabilises the system.
Morocco’s position is analytically semi-peripheral: it exports raw materials (phosphates) and low-to-medium-value manufactures (automotive assembly, aerospace subcontracting) to the European core, while positioning itself as a regional hub toward the African periphery. This double positioning is characteristic of the semi-periphery: Morocco is simultaneously subject to European industrial policy conditionality and the initiator of economic relationships with Sub-Saharan African economies.
Wallerstein’s framework is most useful as a diagnostic of what structural transformation means in world-system terms: upgrading from the periphery toward the semi-periphery (Morocco has achieved this) and from the semi-periphery toward the core requires not just productive capability accumulation but the institutional power to rewrite the terms of international economic integration, exactly what Chang’s analysis of “kicking away the ladder” and the historical developmental states achieved.
21.5 The transition toward multipolarity: implications for small and middle powers
The transition from American unipolarity toward multipolarity does not mean the emergence of a smooth multilateral order. It means a period of competitive coexistence between multiple great powers, each seeking to extend its rule-making influence, each offering different terms to middle and small powers in exchange for alignment or neutrality.
For Morocco, the practical implications are concrete. In commercial policy: the simultaneous pressure to align with EU digital regulations (GDPR, AI Act), American financial sanctions regimes, and Chinese Belt and Road terms creates a complex compliance landscape where the most commercially integrated arrangements carry the highest regulatory costs. Negotiating differentiated terms, aligning with EU standards in domains where EU market access is valuable, maintaining flexibility in domains where other partners are important, requires diplomatic capacity that Morocco is only beginning to develop. In financial policy: the gradual diversification of Morocco’s sovereign debt toward Gulf investors, Chinese renminbi-denominated instruments, and African capital markets alongside the traditional euro and dollar instruments reduces dollar system dependency while creating new currency management challenges. In technology policy: the 5G infrastructure decision (Huawei vs Western vendors), the semiconductor supply chain positioning, and the AI governance regime choices are simultaneously technological and geopolitical decisions with long-run lock-in effects.
The most important strategic principle for navigating multipolarity: Morocco’s leverage comes from what it can offer, not only from what it avoids. A Morocco with world-class renewable energy, a sophisticated phosphate chemistry complex positioned in the battery supply chain, and a logistics hub that genuinely reduces the cost of Africa-Europe trade has more leverage in all relationships than a Morocco dependent on geographic proximity alone.
The lesson from Arrighi’s long cycles for middle powers in transitions is clear: the transition period is when positioning choices matter most. During stable hegemonic periods, the rules are fixed and middle powers adapt to them. During transitions, rules are contested and middle powers with productive assets and credible governance can negotiate their terms of integration. Morocco’s window for repositioning, building the renewable energy infrastructure, deepening the industrial capability base, constructing the African economic partnerships, coincides precisely with the hegemonic transition window. What is done in the next decade will determine Morocco’s position in whatever systemic arrangement consolidates in the 2030s and 2040s. The analytical framework of this chapter, Braudel’s distinction between market and capitalism, Arrighi’s cycles, the weapons of interdependence, is not academic history. It is the strategic intelligence needed to make those positioning choices wisely.
One concrete implication deserves emphasis. Morocco’s participation in the AfCFTA is not only a commercial opportunity; it is a sovereignty project. A Morocco that is economically integrated with a dynamic Sub-Saharan Africa, that has built genuine productive partnerships through supply chain development and financial services, and that plays a governance role in African continental institutions, is a Morocco whose geopolitical weight is independent of its relationship with any single external patron. Multipolarity does not benefit middle powers automatically; it benefits middle powers that have built genuine productive assets and genuine regional influence. The strategic question is not whether to choose between Europe, China, and America, but how to build the domestic capabilities and regional relationships that make Morocco’s choice genuinely sovereign rather than merely reactive.
22 Part IV — Morocco in the Hegemonic Transition
22.1 Morocco’s double insertion
Morocco occupies an analytically interesting position in the hegemonic transition: deep integration with both principal poles of the emerging bipolar system, without full alignment with either.
The EU dimension is structural and primary: approximately 60-70% of Morocco’s exports go to EU markets; European foreign direct investment is the largest source of productive capital inflows; the EU-Morocco Association Agreement frames regulatory convergence, market access, and political cooperation across a wide range of domains. This integration is not merely commercial; it is institutional, through the approximation of Moroccan law and regulation to EU standards, cultural, through language (French as the primary business and higher education language), and geopolitical, through Morocco’s participation in EU security cooperation frameworks.
The China dimension is growing and diversifying: Chinese infrastructure investment (the high-speed rail extension, port development), industrial partnerships, and increasingly technology cooperation represent a second engagement axis. Chinese investment in Morocco is primarily state-directed, following the Belt and Road logic of infrastructure finance in exchange for long-term commercial access. The terms are different from European investment, less conditioned on governance and regulatory alignment, more focused on infrastructure and natural resources, offering Morocco a complementary rather than competitive financing source.
The Gulf dimension, Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari investments in Moroccan real estate, finance, and infrastructure, and the sub-Saharan African dimension, through which Morocco positions itself as a continental hub in infrastructure, banking (Attijariwafa Bank in 30 African countries), and agricultural services (OCP in African fertiliser markets), complete Morocco’s external engagement diversification.
22.2 The strategic logic of diversified dependence
Morocco’s multi-directional international engagement is not diplomatic incoherence, it is strategic hedging in a period of hegemonic transition. The strategic logic: in a world moving from American unipolarity toward multipolarity, a country that concentrates its external economic relationships in a single pole accepts asymmetric dependence and exposure to that pole’s strategic choices. Diversification of commercial, financial, and diplomatic relationships reduces any single partner’s leverage while maintaining beneficial access to multiple markets and capital sources.
This strategy has precedents. Finland during the Cold War maintained trading relationships with both the West and the Soviet Union, successfully avoiding forced alignment without sacrificing economic development. Singapore has consistently maintained commercial and diplomatic relationships with both Washington and Beijing, leveraging its strategic position to extract benefits from both without subordinating itself to either.
22.3 The ALECA question: sovereignty versus integration
The negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (ALECA) between Morocco and the EU represent the most consequential pending commercial policy decision Morocco faces. The EU’s ambition extends beyond industrial goods liberalisation (already accomplished through the Association Agreement) to services, public procurement, intellectual property, data flows, and investment, domains that include the core of Morocco’s industrial policy instruments.
The potential gains are real: access to EU service markets, especially in digital services, financial services, and professional services, could generate significant export earnings and productivity improvements. The potential costs are also real: TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules could raise the cost of pharmaceutical access; public procurement disciplines could limit Morocco’s ability to use state contracts as industrial policy instruments; financial services liberalisation could expose the banking system to competitive pressures before it has built adequate resilience.
The Rodrik trilemma applies directly: deep integration with the EU (accepting EU rules in these sensitive domains) would significantly constrain Moroccan sovereign economic policy choices. The EU’s own experience, in which peripheral member states (Greece, Portugal) found themselves with limited policy space during the 2010-2012 crisis, illustrates what deep rule-based integration can mean for policy autonomy in crisis periods.
Morocco’s negotiating position should be informed by what the East Asian developmental states achieved in comparable negotiations: accepting disciplines on clearly beneficial dimensions (transparency, regulatory quality, intellectual property for exported products) while insisting on temporary exceptions for industrial sectors requiring learning-period protection, on transition periods calibrated to productive capability timelines rather than political deadlines, and on symmetric commitments that require the EU to open its own markets, particularly in agriculture and labour mobility, not just to discipline Moroccan industrial policy.
22.4 Morocco’s green economy as geopolitical asset
Morocco’s renewable energy positioning, exceptional solar irradiation, strong Atlantic winds, proximity to European markets, creates what may be the country’s most significant geopolitical asset for the coming decade. It connects Braudel’s longue durée (the geography is permanent), Arrighi’s conjuncture (the energy transition is the defining industrial transformation of the 2020s-2030s), and Morocco’s strategic positioning in the hegemonic transition.
The EU’s REPowerEU initiative, explicitly targeting Morocco as a priority green hydrogen supply partner, frames this positioning as both economically significant and politically strategic: the EU’s energy security interests align with Morocco’s development interests in a way that creates genuine partnership rather than dependency. If Morocco can position itself as a reliable, cost-competitive supplier of green hydrogen and green ammonia to European industry, it acquires a structural role in European energy security that transforms the relationship from pure market access (what the Association Agreement primarily provided) to strategic partnership (what energy interdependence implies).
The political economy of this positioning: unlike most of Morocco’s productive assets, the renewable energy advantage is not extractable by multinationals and repatriated elsewhere. The solar and wind resources exist in Morocco and can only be harvested by investing there. This gives Morocco unusual bargaining power in negotiations with European energy companies: they need the resource that only Morocco’s geography provides, which changes the terms of the negotiation from “what concessions will you offer to attract our investment?” to “what technology transfer, local content, and capability development do we require as conditions for access?”
This is the geopolitical implication of Morocco’s energy endowment: it provides not just export revenue but negotiating leverage in exactly the domains, technology, capability, terms of integration, where Morocco’s structural position has historically been weakest.
22.5 The institutions of hegemonic transition: the G20, AIIB, and new multilateralism
The hegemonic transition generates institutional competition alongside geopolitical rivalry. The BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank represent the first serious institutional alternatives to the post-Bretton Woods architecture since 1944. They offer developing country infrastructure financing without the governance conditionality requirements of the World Bank and IMF, a commercially attractive proposition for governments that find Western conditionality intrusive.
For Morocco, these alternative institutions provide financing diversification without necessarily representing an ideological choice. Morocco is a founding member of the AIIB and has used it for infrastructure financing alongside EIB and World Bank resources. This pragmatic approach, accessing financing from multiple institutional sources based on terms rather than alignment, is consistent with the strategic diversification logic this chapter has developed.
The more complex institutional question concerns the governance reform of existing multilateral institutions. The G20 has partially shifted the centre of gravity of global economic governance, providing China, India, Brazil, and other large emerging economies a voice that the G7 denied them. Morocco, as a middle-power active in both African Union governance and Mediterranean partnership frameworks, is positioned to participate in building the regional institutional architecture, MENA and African continental integration, that a multipolar world requires if it is to avoid the Kindleberger trap of insufficient global public goods provision.
The most consequential institutional choice Morocco faces in the coming decade is not bilateral relationship management but its contribution to regional economic integration. Deep, reciprocal integration with Sub-Saharan Africa through the AfCFTA, effective engagement with the Arab Maghreb Union (currently moribund but potentially transformative), and deepened Mediterranean economic partnership through the EU association: these regional institutional architectures are where Morocco’s long-run geopolitical influence will be built or forfeited.
23 Conclusion: Reading the Present through the Long Run
This chapter has provided three analytical instruments for reading Morocco’s international position.
Braudel’s market-capitalism distinction reminds us that international trade and investment flows are not simply exchanges among market participants: they involve capitalist actors positioned at circuit nodes who extract disproportionate value through information, finance, and political alliance. Understanding which actors are in the market versus which are above it is the precondition for designing trade and industrial policies that improve Morocco’s position rather than merely inserting it more deeply into existing value extraction circuits.
Arrighi’s hegemonic cycles situate the current moment, the transition from American unipolarity toward multipolarity, as a structural rather than cyclical phenomenon. The geopolitical competition over semiconductor supply chains, payment systems, green energy infrastructure, and AI standards is the material dimension of a hegemonic transition that has a multi-decade trajectory. Morocco’s strategic choices in this decade will position it either to capture value from the transition or to remain subject to whichever new hegemonic arrangement consolidates.
The interdependence-as-weapon framework provides the practical toolkit: understanding which instruments the powerful use to convert commercial relationships into political leverage, and how middle powers like Morocco can maintain beneficial integration while limiting unilateral dependence.
24 Further Reading
Arrighi, G. (1994). The Long Twentieth Century. Verso. The foundational text on systemic cycles of accumulation. Dense but essential.
Braudel, F. (1985). The Dynamics of Capitalism. John Hopkins University Press. The short accessible distillation of Braudel’s market-capitalism distinction.
Kindleberger, C.P. (1973). The World in Depression 1929-1939. University of California Press. The origins of hegemonic stability theory.
Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox. Norton. The trilemma and the political limits of hyperglobalisation. Essential for the ALECA analysis.
Pistor, K. (2019). The Code of Capital. Princeton University Press. How legal institutions create and protect wealth at the international level.
Farrell, H. and Newman, A. (2019). “Weaponized Interdependence.” International Security. The systematic analysis of how the US uses network centrality in the dollar system and internet infrastructure as coercive instruments.
Commission Spéciale sur le Modèle de Développement (2021). Libérer les énergies et restaurer la confiance. The NMD’s international positioning analysis.