7 Chapter 5 — Regulation, Competition Policy, and the State
When markets fail and how public action corrects them
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” — Louis Brandeis, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
“As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” — George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)
The Map
Chapter 4 showed how market structures create and distribute power. This chapter examines the institutional responses: competition policy, sectoral regulation, and the theory of the state as economic actor. These are not peripheral topics. They are the architecture within which all of Chapter 4’s mechanisms actually operate.
The chapter proceeds in four movements. First, the analytical foundations of competition policy: why market power is costly, how to measure it, and which doctrines guide its treatment. Second, the toolkit: relevant market definition, concentration indices, the typology of abuses, and merger control, with the Moroccan institutional landscape throughout. Third, the economics of network industries, where competition is structurally impossible and regulation must replace the market as the organising principle. Fourth, the broader theory of the state: market failures, the instruments of public intervention, and the state’s own failure modes, with a sustained focus on Morocco’s specific configuration.
8 Part I — The Economics and Politics of Competition Policy
8.1 Market power: definition, sources, and social costs
Market power is the capacity of a firm to maintain a price durably above marginal cost without losing all its customers. This is the symptom: the gap P > MC. But understanding it requires going beyond the symptom to the mechanisms that make it possible.
A useful taxonomy distinguishes three levers. The strategic lever is active: the firm adopts deliberate behaviours to exclude or weaken competitors. Intel offered conditional rebates to distributors conditional on not purchasing AMD processors above a certain threshold, a practice the EU Court of Justice sanctioned in 2017. Microsoft tied its Internet Explorer browser to Windows to exclude Netscape. These behaviours do not reflect earned competitive superiority; they represent deliberate exclusion strategies.
The structural lever is passive: the firm benefits from an advantageous position it did not create but has no incentive to correct. Maroc Telecom controls the local loop, the last kilometre of copper cable connecting households to the telephone network. Neither Orange nor Inwi can bypass this inherited asset. Even with political will for competition, physical network access is conditioned on Maroc Telecom’s cooperation. This is structural power.
The informational lever is cognitive: the firm exploits opacity, complexity, or habitual dependence to make substitution difficult or invisible. Google organises search results to favour its own services (Google Maps over TripAdvisor, Google Shopping over independent price comparators). The user does not perceive the manipulation; she follows the top results because she trusts the algorithm. This is power exercised through control of the cognitive interface.
The distinction between these three levers is essential for competition policy because it determines the appropriate remedy. A strategic lever calls for a behavioural remedy: prohibition of the practice, a fine. A structural lever calls for a structural remedy: unbundling obligation, functional separation. An informational lever calls for transparency regulation and interoperability obligations , typically ex ante rules rather than ex post sanctions.
8.2 Three forms of inefficiency
Market power generates three types of social cost with very different empirical magnitudes.
Allocative inefficiency is the most formalised: the Harberger triangle of lost surplus from transactions that would have occurred under competition but do not under monopoly. Empirical estimates of this triangle tend to be modest (a few percent of GDP), which led some economists to dismiss competition policy as economically marginal. This modesty partly reflects the difficulty of estimating counterfactual competitive markets, and partly reflects a real limitation: Harberger’s triangle is not the main social cost of monopoly.
Productive inefficiency (Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency, 1966) is less formalised but often more important in practice. An uncontested monopoly has no strong incentive to minimise costs, improve processes, or invest in training. Managerial slack accumulates. Studies of public enterprises in monopoly situations, liberalised by competitive reforms, have consistently documented productivity gains of 10 to 30% from exposure to competition alone, far exceeding Harberger triangle estimates. The welfare loss from an unchallenged cement or telecom monopoly is not primarily the deadweight triangle; it is the stagnation of productivity, the quality plateau, and the absence of process innovation that competitive pressure would have forced.
Dynamic inefficiency is the most contested. Does an uncontested monopoly have the right incentives to innovate? Kenneth Arrow (1962) argued no: competition is the motor of innovation because it creates permanent pressure for improvement. A monopolist already earning maximum profits from existing technology has less incentive to cannibalise those profits with a new product. Schumpeter argued the opposite: monopoly rents finance the R&D that atomised markets cannot generate. This debate still structures decisions on patents, technology mergers, and industrial policy. The practical lesson is that competition policy must be sector-specific: sanctioning cement cartels (where innovation is marginal and price competition directly beneficial to consumers) obeys a different logic from evaluating a pharmaceutical merger where R&D incentives matter more than short-run prices.
8.3 Doctrines of competition policy
Competition policy tools are not politically neutral. The doctrine adopted determines what counts as harm, what counts as evidence, and what remedy is proportionate.
The Chicago School has dominated American antitrust since the 1980s. Its core principle: the sole objective of competition policy is consumer welfare, measured by prices. Any practice that does not immediately reduce consumer welfare (does not raise prices) must be tolerated, even if it concentrates market power. This approach drove massive deregulation in American air transport, telecoms, and energy in the 1980s, and produced relative passivity toward the major mergers of 1990-2010 on the theory that large firm efficiency offsets concentration risk.
The European approach has been more resistant to pure consumerism. It gives greater weight to market structure (competition as an institution to protect in itself), effects on small businesses and suppliers, and long-run dynamics (innovation, diversity, resilience). This doctrinal difference explains divergent decisions like GE-Honeywell (2001), and the repeated condemnations of Google by the European Commission (2017, 2018, 2019, totalling over 8 billion euros in fines) for behaviours the American authorities did not sanction.
The New Brandeis School, emerging forcefully since 2016, challenges Chicago’s hegemony. Named after Justice Louis Brandeis, famous for his opposition to concentrations of economic power at the turn of the 20th century, the movement argues that competition policy must account for labour market monopsony, the political power of large firms, economic diversity, and long-run innovation, not just short-run consumer prices. This evolution is reflected in antitrust actions against Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple in the United States since 2020, and in Europe’s Digital Markets Act (2022), which imposes ex ante obligations on digital “gatekeepers” without waiting for proof of a specific abuse.
9 Part II — The Toolkit: Defining Markets, Measuring Concentration, Qualifying Abuses
9.1 Relevant market definition
Every competition case begins with the same question: what is the market at issue? Without a precise market definition, it is impossible to measure concentration, evaluate market power, or judge whether a behaviour is anticompetitive.
The relevant market has two dimensions. The product market asks: which goods and services constitute a coherent competitive space? Products are in the same market if consumers regard them as sufficiently close substitutes that a price increase in one diverts significant demand toward the other. The geographic market asks: over what territory does competition actually operate? Cement is not a national market in Morocco, it is a regional market, because the high transport cost relative to unit value means that a cement plant in Settat does not effectively compete with one in Agadir.
The standard tool for market definition is the SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price). The question posed: if a hypothetical monopolist raised the price of this product by 5-10% permanently, would this increase be profitable? If yes, consumers have no easy substitutes and the product constitutes a market by itself. If no, enough consumers would switch to substitutes to make the increase unprofitable, and those substitutes must be included in the relevant market. The process is repeated, progressively expanding the product set, until a hypothetical monopoly price increase becomes profitable. The relevant market is then defined.
Applied to cement in Morocco: if LafargeHolcim raised prices by 8% in the Casablanca region, would regional clients (real estate developers, wholesalers, artisans) turn to cement from Settat or Meknès? Given transport costs, probably not, unless the price difference is very large. Conclusion: the relevant market for cement in Morocco is regional, not national. Each cement plant is quasi-monopolistic in its natural zone of influence. National concentration measures (HHI ~3,300) underestimate the actual concentration on regional markets, the precise reality the Conseil de la Concurrence should integrate into its sectoral analyses.
9.2 The HHI: measuring concentration
Once the market is defined, concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): the sum of the squares of all firms’ market shares.
\[HHI = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 \qquad \text{(in %, ranging from 0 to 10,000)}\]
Standard thresholds from the American Horizontal Merger Guidelines: below 1,500 is unconcentrated; 1,500 to 2,500 is moderately concentrated; above 2,500 is highly concentrated. The change in HHI from a merger matters as much as the level: a merger that increases HHI by more than 200 points in an already concentrated market systematically triggers a detailed review.
The HHI weights large firms more heavily (by squaring shares), capturing asymmetry better than simple top-three share measures. A market with one firm at 50% and ten others at 5% (HHI = 2,750) is very different from ten firms each at 10% (HHI = 1,000), even though a superficial analysis might treat them similarly.
9.3 Cartels and anticompetitive agreements
The most clear-cut violation of competition law is the cartel: an agreement between competitors to fix prices, allocate markets, or restrict output. Cartels produce the same welfare loss as monopoly, prices above marginal cost, deadweight loss, without even the potential justification of economies of scale or innovation rents.
The analytical difficulty is the distinction between explicit collusion (which is illegal and prosecuted) and tacit coordination (which produces similar outcomes but through parallel rational responses to common market signals, without provable communication). Two telecom operators do not need to telephone each other to maintain similar prices on premium packages. They observe each other’s publicly announced tariffs, know that price cuts will provoke an immediate response, and value their future profit streams enough not to trigger a destructive price war. This parallel behaviour is the Nash equilibrium of a repeated game, economically equivalent to coordination, legally very difficult to prove as an agreement.
Leniency programmes address this prosecutorial difficulty by offering partial or complete immunity from fines to the first participant who confesses and cooperates. The mathematical logic is compelling: if a cartel member knows that one of her partners might confess and receive immunity, her incentive to confess first increases sharply. This creates a prisoner’s dilemma within the cartel, destabilising the collusion from within. The European Commission’s leniency programme, introduced in 1996, triggered a wave of cartel disclosures and fines that have collectively exceeded 10 billion euros — the most effective anti-cartel instrument ever deployed. The Conseil de la Concurrence introduced a leniency programme in Morocco with Law 104-12, though it has not yet produced major cartel disclosures, in part because the legal culture of approaching competition authorities with self-incriminating evidence is still developing and the programme’s protections are not yet fully tested in adversarial proceedings.
The most instructive Moroccan case study for cartel analysis is the hydrocarbons fuel distribution sector. The Conseil de la Concurrence’s 2013 inquiry found that the pricing structures of the major fuel distributors (Afriquia/Akwa, TotalEnergies, Shell/Vivo Energy) exhibited a remarkable degree of price parallelism that its economic analysis found difficult to explain solely through common cost structures. The distributors set prices simultaneously, with near-identical changes on the same dates, despite having different logistics networks, different import arrangements, and different geographic footprints. The Conseil stopped short of proving explicit coordination — the evidence threshold for explicit cartel finding is high — but recommended structural remedies including price transparency obligations and closer monitoring of price formation mechanisms. The case illustrates both the analytical power of the relevant market and HHI framework applied to a concentrated distribution market, and the institutional limits of a young authority still building its evidentiary toolkit.
9.4 Abuse of dominant position
Where a cartel is an agreement between competitors, an abuse of dominant position is a unilateral behaviour by a firm that exploits its market power to harm competition. The legal framework in Morocco (Article 7 of Law 104-12) broadly follows Article 102 of the TFEU: prohibiting the abuse, not the dominant position itself.
Predatory pricing involves accepting temporary losses to eliminate an existing competitor, then raising prices once the competitor has exited. Legal qualification requires demonstrating both that prices were below a relevant cost measure and that post-exit recoupment was realistically anticipated. The American Airlines/Braniff case is the paradigmatic documented instance: AA reduced prices on contested routes to below variable cost until Braniff went bankrupt, then restored prices. The internal communications of AA, explicitly referencing “putting Braniff out of business,” provided the strongest evidence.
Conditional rebates grant substantial discounts to customers who supply themselves exclusively (or near-exclusively) from the dominant firm. In appearance, this rewards loyalty. In reality, if the rebate is calibrated to make it unprofitable for the customer to source even part of its needs from a competitor, it functions as an imposed exclusive dealing arrangement. This is the precise behaviour for which Intel was condemned in Europe.
Margin squeeze occurs in vertically structured markets when a dominant firm controls an upstream infrastructure and sets access prices to that infrastructure at levels that make downstream competition from efficient rivals impossible. Maroc Telecom was sanctioned by the ANRT in January 2020, a fine of 3.3 billion dirhams, precisely for practices of this type: the terms on which it provided access to its copper local loop made effective ADSL market entry by Inwi and Orange economically unviable.
9.5 Merger control
Mergers between firms can be pro-competitive (economies of scale, technological complementarities, improved distribution) or anti-competitive (eliminating a competitor, raising entry barriers, facilitating tacit coordination). The logic of merger control is a comparative welfare analysis: authorise mergers where efficiency gains outweigh competitive harms; block or condition those where the net effect on consumers is negative.
The European standard, Significant Impediment to Effective Competition (SIEC), asks whether the merger would create or reinforce a dominant position liable to significantly impede effective competition.
Mergers harm competition through two distinct mechanisms. Unilateral effects arise when the merged entity can profitably raise prices without triggering a competitive response from remaining rivals, because the two merging firms competed most closely and their combination removes the constraint they exerted on each other. Coordinated effects arise when the merger makes tacit coordination among the remaining competitors more stable, by increasing symmetry in market shares or costs, reducing the number of independent decision-makers, or eliminating a competitive “maverick” whose independent behaviour had disciplined pricing.
When a merger raises competition concerns but delivers genuine efficiencies, authorities may approve it subject to remedies. Behavioural remedies impose ongoing obligations on the merged entity (access obligations, non-discrimination requirements, licensing commitments). Structural remedies, specifically divestiture of assets or businesses, are generally preferred because they are self-executing rather than requiring continuous monitoring by a regulator. The LafargeHolcim global merger (2015) required the divestiture of several country operations to obtain European approval; the Moroccan operations were part of this global restructuring, demonstrating that mergers decided at global corporate level carry regulatory implications for the Moroccan market.
For Morocco, the most significant structural gap in merger control is the notification threshold. Law 104-12 requires merger notification when combined Moroccan turnover of the parties exceeds 750 million MAD. This threshold may be too high to capture acquisitions that are significant in Moroccan market terms but fall below it. A private equity fund acquiring a mid-sized regional food distribution chain may create a dominant position in its local market while remaining under the radar of merger review. The Conseil de la Concurrence has noted the importance of threshold calibration and sector-specific review mechanisms for highly concentrated markets. Without these tools, concentrated market structures can solidify before the regulatory framework develops the capacity to address them.
9.6 Vertical restraints: ambivalent instruments
Competition policy typically focuses on horizontal behaviours between competitors. But a large share of market power operates in a different dimension: the vertical relationship between actors at different levels of the supply chain: manufacturers and distributors, producers and retailers, platforms and merchants.
Vertical restraints are contractual clauses that limit the commercial freedom of upstream or downstream partners. A manufacturer who imposes a minimum resale price on distributors. A car importer who forbids dealerships from selling other brands. A platform that imposes its pricing terms on merchants who operate through it. These clauses are neither agreements between competitors nor mergers; they have their own analytical logic.
The difficulty is their fundamental ambivalence: the same vertical restraint can be pro-competitive in one context and anticompetitive in another. This is why competition doctrine has progressively abandoned the per se approach (illegal by nature) in favour of case-by-case effects analysis.
Two foundational incentive failures explain why vertical restraints exist. The hold-up risk: a Moroccan component manufacturer who invests 50 million dirhams in a production line dedicated to a single automotive assembler faces a structural vulnerability once the investment is made. The assembler can then renegotiate prices downward, knowing the supplier has no alternative use for the specific assets. Without contractual protection, anticipating this risk would deter the initial investment, with negative consequences for the entire supply chain. Long-term supply exclusivity contracts secure the specific investment against hold-up. The free-rider problem: a distributor who exploits the brand reputation created by competing distributors who invested in showrooms, training, and after-sales service, without bearing those costs, destroys the incentive for service investment that benefits the entire distribution network. Territorial exclusivity and minimum resale price maintenance protect those who make service investments from those who would free-ride on them.
The limit between a legitimate vertical restraint and an anticompetitive one is never obvious a priori. Two analytical criteria help draw it. The necessity criterion: is the restraint necessary to achieve the stated objective, or does it go beyond necessity? Territorial exclusivity to protect a dealership’s investment in its local zone is legitimate. Exclusivity extending to an entire region and preventing customers from purchasing elsewhere goes beyond necessity. The substitutability criterion: does the restraint deprive consumers of real alternatives? If all suppliers in a sector simultaneously adopt minimum resale price maintenance, the aggregate effect is equivalent to retail price coordination, regardless of whether each individual RPM is individually justified.
9.7 State aid and industrial policy: the competition-development tension
Competition policy in developed economies typically prohibits state aid that distorts competition on common markets. But for developing economies, the relationship between competition policy and industrial policy is more complex. State support for industrial development, precisely because it confers advantages on certain firms, creates competitive distortions that the standard framework would condemn.
This tension is not abstract. Morocco’s automotive and aeronautics industrial strategy rested on targeted incentives: free zones with tax holidays, subsidised land at Tanger Med and Kenitra, investment premiums, training subsidies for new entrants. These are, technically, state aids that give recipient firms advantages over competitors who did not receive them. Were they anticompetitive? Yes, in the narrow sense. Were they beneficial for Morocco’s industrial development? Also yes, if the result is a productive ecosystem that would not have emerged without the initial support.
The standard economic resolution distinguishes between aids that correct genuine market failures (financing learning curves during the infancy period of new industries, when private capital cannot be assembled because the risk is too high) and aids that simply redistribute rents to politically connected incumbents. The former has an efficiency justification even in competition law terms; the latter is pure rent protection. The practical difficulty is that the distinction is genuinely hard to make in real time , which is why conditional performance discipline (export requirements, domestic content escalation, sunset clauses on preferences) is essential to prevent infant industry support from becoming permanent protection.
10 Part III — Network Industries: Where Competition Is Structurally Impossible
10.1 The natural monopoly problem
Competition policy assumes that competitive market structures can be maintained or restored. In certain sectors this assumption is structurally false: the economics of the industry make competition impossible or socially undesirable.
A natural monopoly exists when a single firm can supply total market demand at lower cost than two or more firms could. The condition is sub-additivity of costs: \(C(q_1 + q_2) < C(q_1) + C(q_2)\). This typically holds when fixed costs are very high and marginal costs are very low, the precise situation of infrastructure networks in transport, energy, water, and telecoms.
The regulatory dilemma is structural: forcing the natural monopoly to price at marginal cost achieves allocative efficiency but produces deficits (marginal cost is below average cost when fixed costs are large). Allowing monopoly pricing produces a deadweight loss. Neither pure solution is satisfactory.
The Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule resolves this dilemma for multi-product regulated firms by minimising total deadweight loss subject to a financial viability constraint: set markups over marginal cost inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand of each segment.
\[\frac{P_i - MC_i}{P_i} = \frac{\lambda}{|\varepsilon_i|}\]
The intuition: to cover fixed costs, prices must exceed marginal cost somewhere. Distribute that excess across segments to minimise the total quantity of transactions lost. Tax inelastic segments (which will not much reduce consumption in response to higher prices) and spare elastic segments (which would reduce consumption sharply). Morocco’s ONEE applies a rough version of this logic in electricity: low initial tariff blocks for small consumers (social access goal combined with low demand elasticity among the poor), higher tariff blocks for larger consumers.
10.2 The local loop as a regulatory laboratory
Morocco’s fixed telecommunications market offers one of the richest case studies available for the economics of network regulation. It illustrates how infrastructure inherited from a public monopoly becomes the source of durable structural market power, and how regulatory tools attempt, with variable success, to restore competitive conditions.
A fixed telephone network is a hierarchically layered infrastructure. The core network carries long-distance traffic, relatively cheap and already broadly interconnected internationally. The backhaul (collection network) links local nodes to the core, more expensive but technically accessible to multiple actors. The local loop, the last kilometre connecting each household or business to a local exchange, is the decisive layer. This is what economists call a structural bottleneck: expensive to deploy, not economically duplicable, and historically controlled by the heir to the public monopoly.
Maroc Telecom inherited the entire Moroccan copper network built during the decades of the public monopoly. No competitor can reasonably build a parallel copper network: the civil engineering alone (trenches, conduits, cabling) would represent several dozen billion dirhams of investment in a technology already technologically superseded. This is the essence of network natural monopoly.
Unbundling is the regulatory obligation requiring the dominant operator to lease access to its local loop to alternative operators at regulated prices and technical conditions. Orange and Inwi can install their own equipment in Maroc Telecom’s exchanges and offer ADSL services directly to end customers, without using Maroc Telecom’s retail services. This is the model that enabled alternative operators to emerge in Europe from the 2000s.
Functional separation goes further: it imposes an organisational separation between the infrastructure management unit and the commercial entities selling services to end customers, eliminating the incentive to discriminate internally against competitors. The paradigmatic case is Openreach in the UK: British Telecom was required to create Openreach as a distinct entity managing network access in a non-discriminatory way for all operators, including BT’s own retail subsidiaries. The UK broadband market became one of the most competitive in Europe as a result.
10.3 The ANRT case: a political economy of regulatory capture
The evolution of Morocco’s telecommunications regulator from 1999 to 2009 is a textbook illustration of regulatory capture theory, and one of the richest documented cases of institutional degradation in African regulatory history.
Act I (1999): Credible regulation. The creation of the ANRT under the management of Mustafa Terrab represented a genuine institutional rupture. The second mobile licence auction, competitive, transparent, internationally open, raised 1.1 billion dollars, signalling to investors worldwide that Morocco had built a credible regulator willing to enforce rules even against the incumbent. Meditel entered the market, prices fell 30-50%, penetration accelerated. Regulatory credibility had measurable economic value.
Act II (2001): The erosion begins. Terrab’s resignation in 2001, under political pressure after decisions imposing asymmetric obligations on Maroc Telecom, was not merely an individual episode. In the language of capture theory, the ANRT had become too effective at its mission of contestability: too credible in its willingness to threaten incumbent rents. The response of entrenched interests was not to contest individual ANRT decisions but to modify the institutional rules giving the agency its independence. The ANRT preserved its formal powers; it lost the political backing to exercise them.
Act III (2009): Regulatory façade. The attribution of the third mobile licence to Wana Corporate (linked to the ONA group) in February 2009 stood in stark contrast to the 1999 process. The call for tenders was launched in November 2008, in the depths of the global financial crisis, when international telecom operators lacked capital to invest. Only one candidate emerged. The procedures were formally observed; their substance was hollowed out. The ANRT had become the notary of a political decision already made, not the architect of competitive market rules.
George Stigler’s 1971 theory of regulatory capture predicted this outcome with uncomfortable precision: regulation tends to be acquired by the industry it governs, designed primarily for that industry’s benefit. The capture mechanism does not require corruption. It operates through entirely legal channels: strategic appointments, budget control, legislative revision, the professional revolving door between regulated industry and regulatory agency. These legal forms of capture are the most difficult to combat precisely because they are difficult to name.
Peter Evans (Embedded Autonomy, 1995) identified the solution: a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong professional identity, a clear national project, and mechanisms that prevent durable personal affiliations with regulated industries. Morocco’s challenge, building regulatory institutions that are simultaneously close enough to their sectors to understand their technical constraints and independent enough to resist their political pressure, is a generational project, not a legislation project.
11 Part IV — The State as Economic Actor: Foundations, Instruments, and Limits
11.1 Beyond the false dichotomy
The public debate on the state in the economy is almost always badly framed. One side sees government intervention as a source of distortions, rents, and inefficiency, prescribing “let the market work.” The other sees the market as an inequality machine, prescribing expanded public prerogatives. These are caricatures that conceal the real question.
Markets do not operate in a vacuum. They operate in legal institutions, property rights, contract enforcement systems, competition rules, and infrastructure that someone must build and maintain. That someone is, in the last instance, the state. The real question is not quantitative (more or less state) but qualitative: which state, for which problems, with what capabilities, at what cost, and with what distributional effects?
Richard Musgrave’s (1959) three-branch framework provides the analytical organisation: the allocative branch corrects market failures in resource allocation; the redistributive branch modifies the primary income and wealth distribution produced by markets; the stabilisation branch conducts macroeconomic policy to attenuate business cycle fluctuations. These three branches have different instruments, different time horizons, and different theoretical justifications.
11.2 The four market failures and their instruments
Externalities are effects of an economic decision on third parties not involved in the transaction, without compensation. They justify intervention not to redistribute but to align private and social incentives.
The Pigouvian response is a corrective tax: set the tax equal to the marginal social damage, making the firm internalise the full social cost of its activity. Morocco’s water stress makes this particularly concrete. Intensive irrigation in the Souss-Massa generates a severe negative externality on shared aquifers: each farmer extracts from a common water table without internalising the depletion cost imposed on neighbours and future generations. Moroccan agricultural water prices, heavily subsidised, systematically undervalue the scarcity that intensive agriculture is creating. The result is a trajectory toward aquifer exhaustion that no individual rational farmer has an incentive to halt, because the private cost of conservation exceeds its private benefit even though the social cost of depletion far exceeds the social benefit of current extraction.
Ronald Coase proposed an alternative response in The Problem of Social Cost (1960): if property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low, parties can negotiate a private solution without state intervention. Assign the downstream farmers the right to clean water, and the upstream factory will be forced to compensate them or invest in depollution. The Coase theorem says the outcome will be efficient regardless of the initial rights allocation, provided transaction costs are negligible. The practical implication is not “let markets self-regulate”: it is “define property rights carefully to enable negotiation.” The state remains indispensable for defining and enforcing those rights.
The Pigou-Coase debate is not definitively resolved in favour of either approach — the choice depends on the specific context. Pigouvian taxes work well when damage is measurable and the number of emitters is large (carbon pricing, water extraction fees). Coasian bargaining works when the number of parties is small, damages are localised, and property rights can be precisely defined. In practice, most effective environmental policies combine both: establish the property rights framework (the cap in cap-and-trade systems), then let market bargaining distribute the adjustment burden efficiently (the trading mechanism). For Morocco, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), applicable from 2026, will tax Moroccan exports of cement, steel, aluminium, and fertilisers by their carbon content. This creates a strong incentive for Morocco to introduce domestic carbon pricing before the CBAM levy falls entirely to the EU’s budget rather than Morocco’s own fiscal revenues , a question of national economic sovereignty as much as environmental policy.
Public goods are non-rival (one person’s consumption does not reduce availability for others) and non-excludable (once produced, consumption cannot be prevented even for those who did not contribute to financing). Because private firms cannot capture the returns from non-excludable goods, they are systematically under-provided by markets. Morocco’s hydroelectric dam network (over 150 major dams, total capacity roughly 19 billion cubic metres) is an example of a public good whose long time horizon, combined with non-excludability from flood control benefits downstream, justifies purely public financing.
Information asymmetries arise when one party knows structurally more than the other about the quality of what is being exchanged or the behaviours that will follow the transaction. Akerlof’s lemons problem, Spence’s signalling theory, and Stiglitz’s screening models (collectively awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize) demonstrated that these asymmetries can produce adverse selection (bad risks crowd out good ones) and moral hazard (protection changes behaviour). In Morocco, the credit market for SMEs without documented financial histories exemplifies adverse selection in its purest form: banks cannot distinguish viable from risky projects, apply an average risk rate that is too high for good projects (which withdraw), and too low for the remaining risks (which accept). The result is credit rationing and underinvestment that is not caused by lack of banking liquidity but by a fundamental information failure. Morocco’s credit reporting bureau and Tamwilcom’s guarantee schemes are the institutional responses.
Common pool resources occupy an intermediate position between private and public goods: they are rival (overuse is possible) but non-excludable (access is difficult to restrict). Fisheries, pastures, shared aquifers, and forest resources all exhibit this structure. Without governance rules, Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (1968) predicts inevitable overexploitation: each individual has an incentive to extract as much as possible before others do, resulting in collective exhaustion. The standard solutions are privatisation (assign property rights) or centralised state control.
Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize-winning work (Governing the Commons, 1990) demonstrated a third path: communities can develop effective institutional rules for managing common resources collectively, without either privatisation or state imposition. Her design principles for successful commons governance (clearly defined user boundaries, rules adapted to local conditions, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions) describe institutions that already exist in many forms. Morocco’s southern oasis irrigation systems, the khettaras and their associated communal water sharing rules, are examples of effective informal institutions managing a common pool resource that neither market nor state constructed, maintained over generations by communities with direct stakes in their survival.
Natural monopolies require continuous regulation where competition policy’s case-by-case enforcement is insufficient. This is the subject of Part III above.
11.3 Redistribution and the Moroccan social contract
The redistributive function of the state addresses a different question from allocation: not where the market fails to maximise the size of the pie, but how the pie is divided. These are logically independent questions. A perfectly efficient market can produce a very unequal distribution. The correction of that inequality is not a market failure correction; it is a social and political choice about the acceptable range of outcomes in a given society.
Morocco’s redistributive instruments include direct taxation (income tax, corporate tax), indirect taxation (TVA, excise taxes), transfers (AMO health insurance, family allowances, Ramed, Tayssir conditional cash transfers), and in-kind services (free public education, subsidised water and electricity). The recent 2021-2025 social protection reform, generalising health insurance, family allowances, and expanded unemployment coverage, represents Morocco’s most significant expansion of its redistributive capacity in a generation, moving from a relatively narrow system covering primarily formal employment toward a more universal coverage model.
The ambition is real, but implementation faces the fundamental challenge of a high-informality economy: how do you extend social insurance to workers whose employment relationship is not documented and whose incomes are not reported to tax authorities? The Registre Social Unifié (RSU), a centralised household database designed to enable targeted social transfers, is the institutional response. Its practical coverage remains incomplete, its updating mechanisms slow, and the political economy of means-testing in a society where informal income is genuinely hard to verify creates systematic under-coverage of the most vulnerable. Morocco’s fiscal structure compounds the redistribution challenge: the income tax base is narrow, most fiscal revenue comes from formal wage earners and the TVA, which is regressive, while the informal economy largely escapes both. The result is that the formal worker bears a disproportionate fiscal burden relative to informal operators at the same income level, creating the systemic incentive for informality that tax policy must simultaneously finance social protection and reduce. This circularity, where informality reduces the fiscal base funding the social services whose absence makes informality attractive, is one of Morocco’s deepest structural economic tensions.
11.4 Stabilisation: managing cycles in a constrained economy
Musgrave’s third branch of public finance addresses the management of macroeconomic cycles. Markets have no automatic mechanism for correcting demand shortfalls: a contraction can become self-sustaining through the paradox of thrift: each actor rationally cuts spending in response to uncertainty, but the simultaneous spending reductions of all actors deepen the recession, validating the pessimistic expectations that triggered the cuts. The state can break this spiral through active fiscal policy (public spending increases, tax reductions) or through automatic stabilisers (unemployment insurance, progressive taxation that reduces revenues faster than activity falls without any new political decision).
Morocco’s stabilisation capacity is structurally constrained. Automatic stabilisers are weak: unemployment insurance covers less than 10% of the workforce (the formal sector minority), income tax progressivity operates on a narrow base, and the informal economy is largely outside the automatic stabiliser circuit. Discretionary fiscal policy faces an external constraint: borrowing on international markets in dollars or euros exposes Morocco to global interest rate fluctuations and to the evaluations of credit rating agencies (Ba1/BB+ in 2023). Each rating downgrade raises the cost of sovereign borrowing by dozens of basis points, limiting the fiscal space for counter-cyclical spending.
The COVID-19 crisis illustrated both Morocco’s responsiveness and its structural limits. The Special COVID Fund (33 billion MAD), guarantees to enterprises (Damane Relance, Damane Oxygène), and the extension of emergency aid to informal workers were deployed faster than many observers expected. But under-coverage of the informal sector (50% of employment) and imprecise targeting of transfers revealed the absence of the real-time social information system that effective crisis stabilisation requires. These lacunae are now the main drivers of the 2021-2025 social protection reform: RSU, generalised AMO, and expanded unemployment insurance are not merely redistribution instruments — they are the infrastructure for future stabilisation capacity.
11.5 The state as entrepreneur: OCP, CDG, MASEN
Morocco’s state is not primarily a regulator and redistributor, it is also a direct economic actor of the first importance. Understanding this role requires moving beyond the standard market-failure correction framework.
The Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) is the largest institutional investor in Morocco, managing long-term savings from public pension funds, civil servant retirement, and notarial deposits. With assets exceeding 200 billion dirhams, the CDG deploys capital in infrastructure, real estate, tourism, and financial markets with investment horizons inaccessible to private capital markets. It has funded projects, including major tourism zones, university infrastructure, and urban renewal, that private financing could not have assembled at the required scale and horizon.
OCP is the world’s largest phosphate exporter and a quasi-sovereign enterprise that captures national rents from a geological endowment. Its strategic pivot from raw rock extraction to integrated fertiliser production, the Jorf Fertilizer Hub, the African agri-nutrition development strategy, is not a private firm diversifying; it is a national institution deciding how to transform a finite resource endowment into durable productive capabilities. Mazzucato’s framework (Chapter 3) applies precisely here: the public risk-bearing that built OCP’s chemical processing capacity created the conditions for private value capture downstream.
MASEN (Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy) has driven the deployment of Noor Ouarzazate (580 MW solar, among the world’s largest concentrated solar plants), Tarfaya (300 MW wind, the largest in Africa at inauguration), and subsequent renewable energy projects across Morocco’s exceptional solar and wind resource base. Morocco’s commitment to 52% renewable electricity by 2030 is not market-driven innovation, since the economics of solar and wind were initially unfavourable without public support. It is state-directed industrial transformation, financing learning curves that make new technologies commercially competitive while simultaneously reducing energy import dependency (Morocco imported approximately 85% of its energy in hydrocarbons) and preparing for the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism that will tax exported goods by their carbon content from 2026. The deeper question for all three institutions is the one Mazzucato raises: when public risk-bearing creates the conditions for private value capture, what mechanisms ensure the gains return to public purposes? Morocco’s renewable energy strategy could, if complemented by green hydrogen infrastructure investment, transform the country from a chronic energy importer to a net exporter of clean energy to Europe , one of the most significant potential economic transformations in Morocco’s modern history.
12 Conclusion: Institutions That Must Be Built
This chapter has established three foundational points that run through all subsequent analysis.
Competition is not a natural state of markets, it is an institution to be built and maintained. Firms rationally seek to escape competition through strategic, structural, and informational levers. The tendency toward concentration is not an accident; it is a structural feature of capitalism that requires continuous institutional counterweight. The Conseil de la Concurrence’s decisions, on Lafarge-Holcim, hydrocarbons, the Pharmacists’ Order, and Maroc Telecom, represent the construction of that institutional counterweight, however imperfect and incomplete.
Network industries require a different framework from competition policy. Where competition is structurally impossible, continuous regulation must replace market discipline. The ANRT’s 2020 decision against Maroc Telecom, arriving fifteen years after regulatory credibility had been undermined, illustrates both that reconstruction is possible and that it is costly in lost competitive dynamism.
Market failure justifies public intervention, but state failure is equally real. The Musgrave framework organises the state’s legitimate economic roles, allocation, redistribution, stabilisation, without assuming that the state always executes these roles well. For Morocco, the relevant question is not whether the state should intervene, it does, massively, but how to improve the quality, efficiency, and equity of that intervention: building regulatory institutions with genuine independence, tax systems that do not systematically penalise formality, social protection that reaches the informal majority, and industrial policy instruments that are disciplined by performance rather than insulated by political connection.
13 Further Reading
Stigler, G. (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics. The founding paper of capture theory. Short, provocative, and still unsurpassed as a statement of the basic mechanism.
Tirole, J. (2017). Economics for the Common Good. Princeton University Press. The most accessible synthesis of Tirole’s work on regulation, competition, financial markets, and climate. Written for a general educated audience without sacrificing rigour.
Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton University Press. The analysis of how developmental states manage the tension between embeddedness in industrial sectors and autonomy from their interests. Essential for understanding the OCP, CDG, and MASEN model.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press. The technical foundation of modern regulatory economics: how to design regulatory contracts that reveal private information and align incentives when regulators cannot observe firm behaviour directly.
Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State. Anthem Press. The argument that public risk-bearing creates the conditions for private value capture, and the implications for how innovation gains should be distributed.
Musgrave, R.A. (1959). The Theory of Public Finance. McGraw-Hill. The foundational framework of the three branches of public finance. Still the clearest analytical organisation of the state’s economic functions.
ANRT. Décision n° 01/2020. The primary source on the Maroc Telecom unbundling case. Available at anrt.ma.
Conseil de la Concurrence du Maroc. Annual Reports. Sectoral competition analysis, merger decisions, and the developing Moroccan jurisprudence.