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9  Chapter 7 — Money, Credit, and Monetary Sovereignty

How money is created, governed, and weaponised

“There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency.” — John Maynard Keynes (1919)

“When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” — John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory (1936)

The guiding thread of this chapter
  1. Money is not a veil — it is a social institution. Its value rests on collective confidence, not on any intrinsic material property. Aglietta’s triple confidence: in value, in rules, and in the issuer, is the real substance of every monetary system.
  2. Banks create money by granting credit. The standard image of banks as intermediaries that lend depositors’ savings is wrong. Credit creates deposits. The monetary supply is endogenous: it follows demand and does not precede it.
  3. The money multiplier is a useful fiction. It describes an accounting constraint, not a causal mechanism. Central banks target interest rates, not monetary aggregates, because the multiplier is unstable.
  4. Credit does not go everywhere equally. The allocation of financing has a political economy: it structurally favours large firms with collateral over SMEs and rural households, and tends to finance real estate over productive industry.
  5. Financial markets are promise markets, not goods markets. An asset is a claim on future flows. This makes markets sensitive to collective narratives, and structurally prone to the Minsky cycle of boom and bust.
  6. Stability engenders instability. Minsky’s central insight explains why financial crises are not accidents but the endogenous product of periods of apparent calm.
  7. Morocco’s monetary and financial architecture reflects specific choices and constraints: the dirham’s semi-fixed regime, BAM’s hard-won independence, a concentrated banking system, and a shallow stock market whose allocative inefficiency is now the binding constraint on productive investment.

The Map

The preceding chapters built the microeconomics of firms, markets, and territory in a world that largely abstracted from money. This chapter restores money to its central place. Without it, even the most well-organised market is paralysed, like the village where every inhabitant owes money to his neighbour but nobody can pay for lack of a banknote to circulate.

The chapter advances in four movements. First, what money is: its functions, its forms, and the confidence that holds it together. Second, how money is created: not in the vaults of the central bank but in the offices of commercial banks with each credit granted. Third, how it is governed: Bank Al-Maghrib’s instruments, the transmission channels, the political economy of credit allocation, and Morocco’s 2022 inflation episode as a diagnostic exercise. Fourth, financial markets: the architecture of promises, the Minsky instability cycle, and Morocco’s three capitalisms as a framework for reading the Casablanca financial system.


10 Part I — What Money Is: Functions, Forms, and the Foundations of Confidence

10.1 Money is a collective promise

A 200-dirham banknote is a piece of paper. It cannot be eaten, worn, or lived in. Yet the grocer accepts it without hesitation. Why? Because he knows the baker will accept it from him, who knows his supplier will accept it, and so on. Money is a collective promise: each person accepts it because he is certain others will accept it. The day this confidence collapses (as in hyperinflations), the same note becomes worthless, not because the paper has changed, but because the promise has been broken. Bank Al-Maghrib does not manage paper; it manages confidence.

This is what economists call fiat money (from the Latin fides, confidence), a currency whose value rests on no material counterpart but on the institutional order that institutes it. Article 54 of Morocco’s Law 40-17 governing Bank Al-Maghrib translates this into legal terms: banknotes and coins in dirhams have unlimited legal tender on the Kingdom’s territory. It is this act of political sovereignty, not any intrinsic value of the substrate, that makes money.

In Michel Aglietta and André Orléan’s institutionalist framework, money is not a thing but a codified social relation. Holding 1,000 dirhams means holding a title on part of society’s production, exercisable at any moment. This is what distinguishes money from all other goods: it is worth nothing in itself, and everything in the system.

The grandmother’s gold: the money that does not betray

At every wedding, the grandmother brings out her gold bracelets. This is not mere vanity: for generations of Moroccan women without bank accounts, gold was savings. Why gold rather than banknotes under the mattress? Because banknotes lose value with inflation, while gold holds it and gains when the currency weakens. A woman who could not easily inherit, open an account, or sign a contract found in bracelets a store of value of her own: discreet, liquid, transmissible to her daughter. Gold at the wrist was a private bank nobody could confiscate. Official currency is only one of the forms humanity has given to value, and not always the one that those excluded from the formal system trusted most.

10.2 The four functions — and the one thing money does not do

Standard theory identifies four functions of money, each real and each with its limits.

Medium of exchange is the oldest function historically. It eliminates the double coincidence of wants that barter requires: the need to find someone who wants exactly what you offer and offers exactly what you want. Jevons illustrated this in 1876 with the story of Mademoiselle Zélie, a French singer paid in pigs and coconuts after a concert in Polynesia, forced to feed the pigs with the fruit while waiting to convert everything: a vivid lesson on what barter costs in time, transport, and spoilage.

Unit of account provides a common standard that allows the comparison of incomparable things. Without a common denominator, there is no economic calculation and no national accounting. Store of value allows the deferral of purchase: sell today, buy tomorrow. This function assumes money maintains its value, never guaranteed. A high inflation erodes this store, pushing agents to spend as fast as possible, which amplifies inflation. Standard of deferred payment allows the denomination of future contracts: wages, rents, loan repayments. Without a stable unit through time, no long-term lending would be possible.

These four functions interact and sometimes conflict. A currency can be an excellent unit of account while being a poor store of value, exactly what happens during inflationary episodes. Bitcoin may serve as a (speculative) store of value, but its extreme volatility makes it a poor medium of exchange and a non-existent unit of account in daily life.

The thing money does not do is what is most often forgotten: create wealth. A society’s real wealth consists of its production, roads, factories, doctors, engineers, harvests. Money is the lubricant, not the substance. Doubling the quantity of money without increasing production makes nobody twice as rich: prices double and each unit buys half as much. This confusion between money and wealth is the source of disastrous policies, from Weimar’s printing press to poorly calibrated stimulus plans.

10.3 The forms money has taken

The history of money is a history of progressive simplification: from heavy, cumbersome goods (livestock, salt, metals) to increasingly light and abstract representations, down to scriptural money that exists only as a digital entry.

Commodity money was the oldest form: goods with their own use value, cattle, shells, salt, then precious metals. Gold and silver imposed themselves through durability, divisibility, and relative scarcity. The dirham we use today takes its name from the silver coin that circulated in medieval Morocco, a reminder that monetary history is not merely technical but cultural and political.

Fiduciary currency, banknotes and coins with no intrinsic value, initially astonished Western observers. Marco Polo, returning from 13th-century China, described with incredulity a paper money made of mulberry bark that no one could refuse under pain of death. China practised purely fiduciary money several centuries before Europe: proof that it is not the material but the authority that makes money.

Scriptural money is the dominant form today. It exists only as a recording in bank accounts. When your employer transfers your salary, no banknote moves, numbers increase on your account and decrease on the firm’s. This money represents over 90% of the monetary mass in developed economies. Its creation does not belong to the central bank but to commercial banks, the subject of the next section.

Financial exclusion and its cost

In Morocco, approximately 60-65% of the adult population is banked, above the MENA average of 55% but well below southern European levels (90%+). The aggregate masks deep structural disparities: the rate exceeds 80% in major cities but falls below 40% in rural areas, with a 15-20 point gender gap in rural zones reflecting cultural factors, lower formal employment, and physical distance from bank branches. What the excluded find in place of formal credit is informal lending, at rates that would be considered usurious in any formal system. The access to credit is therefore not only an economic issue: it is an issue of dignity and justice. Financial exclusion locks households into costly debt circuits that reproduce poverty. Bank Al-Maghrib’s efforts to expand financial inclusion, Al Barid Bank’s postal network, Islamic banks since 2017, the M-Wallet mobile payments system (over 6 million active wallets in 2023), are responses to this structural failure of the market allocation of financial services.

10.4 Aglietta: money as political institution

The dominant narrative presents money as a spontaneous market invention, agents who tired of the inconveniences of barter collectively invented a medium of exchange for efficiency. Aglietta overturns this narrative: it is political sovereignty that institutes money, by imposing a unit of account, requiring taxes to be paid in that unit, and guaranteeing its legal tender by force.

Money rests on what Aglietta calls triple confidence: confidence in value (purchasing power stability, the central bank’s role), confidence in rules (legal tender, the rule of law), and confidence in the issuer (institutional credibility). Every monetary crisis is first a crisis of political legitimacy, a collapse of one of these three layers of confidence. Morocco’s reconquest of monetary sovereignty in 1959, with the creation of Bank Al-Maghrib replacing the colonial Banque du Maroc, was not an administrative detail. It was a reconquest of the capacity to institutionalise the Moroccan economy according to Moroccan rules, a political act with structural economic consequences that were felt for decades.

The exchange rate regime is the institutional choice that most visibly constrains monetary sovereignty. Morocco’s current semi-fixed regime (the dirham fluctuating within a ±5% band around a basket of approximately 60% euro and 40% dollar) represents a deliberate halfway point between a fixed peg and free float. The basket weights reflect the geographic structure of Moroccan trade: the EU absorbs approximately 60-70% of Morocco’s exports and supplies a comparable share of imports, making the euro the dominant commercial reference. The dollar matters primarily through commodity prices (oil, phosphate, wheat) and as the denominator of many international financial transactions.

This regime choice involves a classic trilemma (the Mundell-Fleming impossible trinity): a country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows, and an independent monetary policy. Morocco has chosen to partially sacrifice exchange rate flexibility (maintaining some peg) and capital mobility (maintaining capital controls on financial flows, though current account transactions are liberalised) in order to preserve some monetary policy autonomy. The progressive liberalisation of the exchange rate band is part of a trajectory toward greater monetary autonomy and deeper financial integration, but the sequencing is deliberate: expanding the band before financial sector deepening is complete, before currency hedging instruments exist for Moroccan exporters, and before the fiscal consolidation that prevents speculative pressure on sovereign debt, would risk the destabilising capital flow dynamics that the Asian crisis of 1997 illustrated.

The political consequence of Aglietta’s analysis is direct and disturbing: to renounce one’s currency is to renounce a part of economic democracy. The Greek crisis of 2010-2015 illustrated this brutally. Athens could neither devalue to restore competitiveness nor issue money to finance its debt. It was trapped in an institutional cage without the instruments to escape, constrained to apply devastating austerity to satisfy foreign creditors. No monetary sovereignty, no democratic choice over economic policy. For Morocco, which has its own currency and a central bank with operational independence, this lesson is not academic, it is the institutional asset whose maintenance is one of the most important long-run policy choices the country makes.

10.5 Graeber: debt before money, money before markets

David Graeber, in Debt: The First 5,000 Years (2011), challenges the founding myth of money even more radically. His central argument: money was not born from barter. The liberal myth, primitive individuals who bartered axes for sheep before inventing money to simplify exchange, is a fiction. Adam Smith invented it as a thought experiment in The Wealth of Nations (1776), and economists have reproduced it as historical fact for two centuries. Anthropologists have shown that pre-monetary societies operated through networks of obligations, mutual debts, ceremonial gifts, and counter-gifts: reciprocity and hierarchy, not market exchange.

What precedes money is debt, moral, political, religious before it is financial. In classical Greece and Rome, a debtor who could not repay could be enslaved. Solon’s seisachtheia of 594 BCE, the general cancellation of debts and liberation of debt slaves, was a social revolution as much as an economic one. Without it, Athenian democracy could not have been born: half the population was already in debt servitude to the aristocracy. This is not a historical detail; it demonstrates that a society’s financial structure determines its political structure.

Morocco and the colonial debt spiral: money as domination

The connection between Graeber’s analysis and Moroccan history is direct and documented. At the end of the 19th century, Sultan Hassan I and then Abdelaziz borrowed from European banks (British, French, Spanish) to finance the army, public works, and the growing deficits of an empire weakened by external pressure and internal revolts. These loans carried usurious rates and conditions on customs revenues, and each rescheduling brought new servitudes. The Conference of Algeciras in 1906, ostensibly to resolve the “Moroccan question,” created the Banque d’État du Maroc with predominantly French capital: the issuance of Moroccan currency passed under foreign control. Six years later, the Protectorate was established. Morocco’s political sovereignty was lost through money and debt before it was lost through arms. The Chartaliste reading, that states monetise economies by imposing tax obligations in their own currency, applies here in reverse: the colonial power monetised Morocco by imposing obligations that directed the surplus toward the metropole.

Aglietta and Graeber arrive at a convergent conclusion from opposite intellectual traditions: money is not a neutral instrument born spontaneously from the market. It is a power relation, historically constructed, politically maintained, and sometimes imposed by force, whether military, financial, or institutional. The table below crystallises the comparison:

Aglietta Graeber
Discipline Institutional economics Critical anthropology
What precedes money Political sovereignty Debt and social hierarchy
Role of the state Institutes the monetised market Creates money demand through taxation
Debt today Mechanism to regulate Instrument of domination to interrogate
Proposed remedy Democratise monetary governance Debt cancellations, structural rupture

11 Part II — How Money Is Created: Credit Creates Deposits

11.1 The standard image is wrong

Here is perhaps the most counter-intuitive idea in this entire course. Most people, if asked where the money in their bank account comes from, answer: from other people who deposited their savings, which the bank then lends to borrowers. This picture is false. Understanding why changes radically how one thinks about the economy.

The bank does not lend other people’s money

When a bank grants a mortgage of 300,000 dirhams for a flat in Rabat, it does not go searching in a vault for this money. It inscribes it, with one click, on the borrower’s account. This deposit did not exist the day before, the bank has just created money by granting the credit. This is counter-intuitive but central: it is credits that make deposits, not the reverse. This is why Bank Al-Maghrib’s monetary policy acts on credit: by making credit more expensive or scarce, it slows money creation itself.

When Marjane Holding borrows 500 million MAD from Attijariwafa Bank to finance two new commercial centres, the bank does not use previously collected savings. It simultaneously records in its balance sheet: on the asset side, a claim of 500 million MAD on Marjane; on the liability side, a current deposit of 500 million MAD credited to Marjane’s account. The money did not exist before the lending decision, it is created ex nihilo. When Marjane repays in seven years, those 500 million MAD will be destroyed. The volume of money in circulation at any given moment is therefore the result of commercial banks’ lending decisions, not a centralised decision by BAM.

11.2 The bank’s balance sheet

Before explaining money creation, one must look inside a bank’s balance sheet. Like any enterprise, it records on one side its assets (what it owns or is owed) and on the other its liabilities (what it owes others). The accounting rule is immutable: the two columns always balance.

When Attijariwafa grants a 300,000 MAD mortgage: on the asset side, a new entry appears, “mortgage loan, 300,000 MAD.” Simultaneously, on the liability side: “client current account, +300,000 MAD.” The bank has created a deposit for the borrower. This deposit is money, it can be used immediately for payments. The money creation is instantaneous, bilateral, and requires no prior savings. The bank has not transferred existing wealth; it has created a new liability (the deposit, which it owes the client) matched by a new asset (the loan, which the client owes the bank).

When the borrower repays, after twenty years, say, the loan disappears from the asset side, and the deposit is debited on the liability side. The money is destroyed. The money supply in a modern economy is therefore continuously created and destroyed through the credit-repayment cycle of millions of commercial banks. At any moment, the existing money stock reflects the accumulated net balance of credit decisions.

11.3 The money multiplier: useful accounting, poor causal mechanism

The textbook money multiplier presents monetary creation as a cascade initiated by the central bank: the central bank creates base money (M0), which commercial banks “multiply” through successive deposits and reserves. If the reserve requirement is 10%, a 100 MAD injection of base money supposedly creates 1,000 MAD of M1 (money multiplier = 1/reserve requirement = 10).

This framework is useful as an accounting description of the relationship between M0 and M1 in steady state. It fails as a causal mechanism for two reasons that the 2008 crisis made unmistakably visible.

First, the multiplier is unstable. In a financial crisis, agents flee to cash (the cash-to-deposit ratio rises), and banks hoard excess reserves for precautionary purposes (the effective reserve ratio rises). Both effects collapse the multiplier. After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, the US Federal Reserve quintupled its monetary base from 900 billion to 4,500 billion dollars through quantitative easing programmes. The result was disconcerting: M1 increased only modestly. Banks parked the injected reserves rather than transforming them into credit. The multiplier, which had been approximately 9 before the crisis, fell below 3.

Second, causality runs from credit demand to money supply, not the reverse. The endogenous money view, developed notably by Basil Moore (Horizontalists and Verticalists, 1988) and now accepted by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and the IMF in their operational frameworks, holds that commercial banks extend credit when creditworthy borrowers demand it and when the expected return exceeds the funding cost. The central bank then accommodates the resulting demand for reserves. Money supply follows demand; it does not precede it.

A major paradigmatic reversal — and why it matters

This reversal explains everything one reads today about monetary policy. Why central banks target interest rates rather than monetary aggregates. Why quantitative easing disappointed in 2008-2015: you cannot force banks to lend by injecting reserves. Why the creation of money depends on the confidence of enterprises and households as much as on central bank decisions. Understanding endogenous money means understanding why monetary policy has limits that the textbook mechanics conceal. For Morocco, it explains why BAM’s rate decisions transmit imperfectly to SME lending rates: the binding constraint is not the cost of central bank reserves but the banking system’s risk assessment of Moroccan SMEs, a structural problem that monetary policy alone cannot solve.

The credit rationing mechanism (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) deepens this point. Why do banks ration rather than raise rates? A rate increase adversely selects borrowers: safe projects with moderate returns exit the market, risky projects remain. The bank ends up with a riskier portfolio. The optimal equilibrium is a moderate rate with quantitative rationing. This mechanism structurally explains the exclusion of Moroccan SMEs from formal credit even when they are willing to pay higher rates.

11.4 Monetary aggregates and BAM’s measurement framework

To conduct monetary policy, a central bank must measure what it seeks to influence. Money takes several forms of unequal liquidity, banknotes in wallets, current account deposits, term deposits, near-monetary instruments, requiring a hierarchy of aggregates.

The monetary base (M0) is money created directly by Bank Al-Maghrib: banknotes and coins in circulation plus the reserves that commercial banks hold in their accounts at BAM. This is “bank money”, the public does not hold reserves. M1 extends to immediately usable public money: banknotes, coins, and sight deposits (current accounts). M2 adds less liquid but quickly mobilisable instruments: savings accounts, term deposits, passbook accounts. M3, the broadest aggregate monitored by BAM, adds quasi-monetary instruments including money market mutual funds.

The choice of monitored aggregate is not trivial. In the 1970s-1980s, central banks targeted M1 or M2, assuming the money supply was controllable and mechanically determined inflation. The failure of these policies, the multiplier proved unstable, drove the shift toward interest rate targeting. Bank Al-Maghrib monitors M3 as a diagnostic indicator but its operational instrument is the policy rate, not an aggregate. This conceptual shift is itself a revolution: it acknowledges that the quantity of money is endogenous and that the central bank can only control the price of the central bank’s own liability.


12 Part III — How Money Is Governed: BAM, Monetary Policy, and the Political Economy of Credit

12.1 Bank Al-Maghrib: architecture and mandate

Bank Al-Maghrib occupies a unique position in Morocco’s monetary system. It is not the primary creator of money in circulation (commercial banks are) but it determines the conditions of that creation. It serves as banker to the banks, all interbank settlement passes through BAM’s reserve accounts, and as lender of last resort, the institution that can inject liquidity into a system experiencing a confidence collapse.

Law 40-17 (2017) codifies BAM’s mandate with precision. Article 13 guarantees operational independence: BAM neither solicits nor accepts government instructions. Article 6 defines the primary mission: price stability. Article 69 prohibits direct financing of the public deficit beyond a temporary overdraft facility capped at 5% of fiscal revenues for 120 days. Article 67, less celebrated but important, provides that BAM can supply emergency liquidity to credit institutions in difficulty, with or without state guarantee depending on the gravity of the situation, the legal foundation of the lender of last resort role.

These provisions translate a specific institutional choice: anti-inflationary credibility coupled with financial stability. The decision to make BAM operationally independent was not technically inevitable, it reflected political and economic judgements about the cost of monetary credibility versus the cost of losing it. Turkey’s experience in 2018 and 2021-2022, when central bank credibility was deliberately undermined by political interference, illustrates the cost of the alternative: sovereign borrowing rates on Turkish debt reached 20-25% when Morocco’s remained at 4-5%. The difference is not that Morocco is richer or less indebted; it is that BAM is perceived as credible and independent.

12.2 The historical construction of BAM’s credibility

Bank Al-Maghrib’s current credibility is not a bureaucratic default; it is the product of a specific historical trajectory that deserves to be named, because it explains both the institution’s strengths and the limits it inherited.

The colonial period created the Banque d’État du Maroc in 1907, following the Algeciras Conference, with predominantly French capital and a mandate to manage Morocco’s monetary system in ways that served European commercial and financial interests. The BEM was not a central bank in any modern sense; it was a commercial institution with note issuance privileges that organised the monetisation of the Moroccan economy to facilitate colonial extraction. The dirham replaced the franc marocain in 1960, one year after independence, and Bank Al-Maghrib was founded with the explicit mission of reconstituting monetary sovereignty, a political act with immediate economic consequences.

The 1970s and early 1980s saw a period of directed credit in which the Moroccan state used the banking system as an instrument of development policy, allocating credit to priority sectors at subsidised rates through mechanisms analogous to those used by East Asian developmental states. This model supported early industrialisation but also generated fiscal and balance of payments pressures that proved unsustainable when the external environment deteriorated sharply in the early 1980s.

The debt crisis of 1983 forced Morocco to negotiate with the IMF. The Structural Adjustment Programme (PAS) imposed conditions that directly reshaped monetary policy: dirham devaluation, elimination of food subsidies, public wage freezes, privatisations, and import liberalisation. The “bread riots” of January 1984 in Marrakech, Nador, Tétouan, and Al-Hoceima, which left dozens dead and prompted a declaration of emergency, were the direct human consequence of the subsidy removals imposed by creditors. As with Graeber’s analysis, the debt was the instrument: Morocco’s policy autonomy was constrained by the terms on which it could access emergency financing. The PAS stabilised public finances and created the institutional conditions for a market economy, but it also terminated the directed credit model that, in other contexts (Korea, Taiwan), had produced industrial miracles. Morocco did not have the latitude to choose its development model; it had to adopt the model of its creditors.

Post-PAS reform progressively built BAM toward its current configuration: the 2006 Banking Law, the 2012 revised charter, and the 2017 Law 40-17 each deepened operational independence, expanded the prudential supervisory mandate, and formalized the inflation targeting framework. The 2017 exchange rate regime reform, widening the fluctuation band from ±0.3% to ±2.5% then ±5%, represents a further step toward the flexibility that a full inflation targeting framework would require. This trajectory is not complete: full exchange rate flexibility, which would require Morocco’s private sector and sovereign debt to be fully hedged against currency risk, remains a medium-term objective rather than current reality.

12.3 The policy rate corridor and transmission channels

The policy rate is the rate BAM targets for interbank reserve exchanges in the very short term, the pivot around which all other rates orbit. It is not the rate at which firms borrow; it is the anchor from which all rates derive.

BAM maintains this target through open market operations, primarily repos (pension livrées): it injects reserves by temporarily purchasing securities from banks when the interbank rate rises above target, and withdraws reserves by selling securities when it falls below. Around the policy rate operates a corridor: a lending facility (banks can borrow from BAM at a penalty rate, the ceiling) and a deposit facility (banks can park excess reserves at BAM at a floor rate). In normal times, the interbank rate oscillates around the policy rate without touching the corridor’s edges.

A critical relationship underlies all central bank operations: interest rates and asset prices move inversely. A bond paying 5 MAD per year trading at 100 MAD offers a yield of 5%. If its price rises to 110 MAD, its yield falls to 4.55%. When BAM buys securities massively (quantitative easing), it drives up their prices and therefore drives down yields. This is the mechanism by which monetary policy compresses long rates even when the policy rate is already at its floor.

Monetary policy decisions travel to the real economy through four transmission channels. The credit channel operates directly: a policy rate increase raises banks’ funding cost, which is passed through (incompletely and with delay) to lending rates, reducing credit demand and investment. The asset price channel operates through valuation: lower rates raise real estate and equity prices, generating wealth effects that stimulate consumption, and reducing the cost of equity capital for firms. The exchange rate channel operates through relative returns: higher Moroccan rates attract foreign capital inflows, appreciate the dirham, and reduce the price of imports, compressing imported inflation. The expectations channel is the most subtle: if BAM announces a rate increase, and if agents believe BAM will sustain this trajectory, long-term market rates adjust immediately without waiting for successive rate decisions. Forward guidance, communicating future rate intentions, is therefore an instrument in its own right.

These channels operate at different speeds and magnitudes, and their relative importance varies with structural features of the economy. Morocco’s credit channel operates imperfectly because of the segmentation of the credit market: monetary policy transmission is weaker for SMEs (which face rationing regardless of rate levels) than for large firms and mortgage borrowers.

12.4 The political economy of credit allocation

Banks create money through credit. But a question that standard textbooks avoid must be posed: to whom does this credit go? This is not a technical question, it is a question of power.

Banks do not lend indifferently. Their selection logic structurally favours borrowers with the best collateral (real estate, transparent financial statements), projects with short maturity (commerce over heavy industry), and clients already integrated in the formal system. On the other side, SMEs without collateral, rural farmers, informal workers, and long-horizon industrial project sponsors hit a wall.

The liberal reading is familiar: banks allocate credit according to risk, and this selection is economically efficient. The Keynesian-Minskyan reading is more nuanced: banks follow collective conventions about what is fundable. These conventions loosen during periods of euphoria and tighten brutally in crisis. Credit is therefore procyclical, it amplifies cycles rather than smoothing them. The political economy reading goes further: Gary Dymski and others have shown that non-economic factors (geography, social origin) influence credit access even at comparable risk levels.

In Morocco, these dynamics are particularly visible. The banking sector is highly concentrated: Attijariwafa Bank, Banque Populaire, and BMCE Bank of Africa together hold approximately 65% of total banking assets. This oligopolistic structure has direct effects on monetary policy pass-through: banks transmit policy rate decreases slowly and partially to SME lending rates, but transmit increases much faster. The asymmetry is documented and preserves banking margins at borrowers’ expense. The structural result is that SMEs, representing 95% of Morocco’s productive fabric, receive a disproportionately small share of bank credit. A large fraction of credit concentrates in residential real estate, whose profitability is high and collateral secure, at the expense of productive industrial finance. This is one of the deep reasons why Morocco’s structural transformation challenge has been so persistent since the 1990s.

12.5 Morocco’s 2022 inflation: a diagnostic exercise

Morocco experienced in 2022-2023 its most severe inflationary episode since the 1990s. The inflation rate reached a peak of 8.9% in February 2023, against an average of 1-2% in the 2010s. Analysing this episode through the three faces of inflation, demand-pull, cost-push, and markup, is a first-rate analytical exercise.

Cost-push inflation was the primary driver. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a surge in global cereal (wheat, barley) and energy (oil, gas) prices. For Morocco, a structural importer of wheat (over 50% of needs in poor years) and hydrocarbons, this external shock transmitted directly into agricultural and industrial production costs, then into consumer prices. With food representing approximately 40% of Morocco’s CPI basket, structural sensitivity is high.

Markup inflation, the Kaleckian reading, is more difficult to establish empirically but analytically plausible. In concentrated sectors (food distribution, dairy processing, industrial milling), firms may have passed through cost increases more than proportionally, expanding margins under cover of the inflationary conjuncture. European Central Bank studies on 2022-2023 European inflation documented this phenomenon (greedflation); equivalent studies are lacking for Morocco, but the oligopolistic structure of Moroccan food distribution makes the mechanism plausible.

BAM’s response: Bank Al-Maghrib raised its policy rate from 1.5% in September 2022 to 3.0% in March 2023, a 150 basis point increase in less than a year, unprecedented since the 1990s. The official justification was anchoring inflation expectations: by signalling determination to combat inflation, BAM sought to prevent a wage-price spiral. The limit of this response is that the policy rate acts primarily on credit demand, whereas Morocco’s 2022-2023 inflation was principally a cost-push inflation driven by imported prices, on which monetary tightening has limited direct effect. Raising rates does not prevent Ukrainian wheat from being expensive; it slows credit to Moroccan enterprises and households. The real short-term response passed through budgetary instruments: maintaining subsidies on subsidised flour, fiscal exemptions on certain products, policy tools, not monetary ones. This episode illustrates a general lesson: diagnosing the source of inflation correctly (demand vs supply vs markup) is the precondition for choosing the appropriate instrument.


13 Part IV — Financial Markets: Architecture of Promises and the Minsky Cycle

13.1 A financial asset is a promise

Before any instrument, before any crisis, before any regulation: what is a financial asset? Not a tangible good. A promise: a contractual commitment on uncertain future flows. Buying a Moroccan Treasury bond means believing the state will repay in 2035. Acquiring an Attijariwafa Bank share means betting the bank will continue distributing dividends. Signing a life insurance policy means trusting the company will still be solvent in twenty years. A derivative on phosphate prices means mutually committing to a future price nobody controls.

This definition has a decisive consequence: financial markets do not exchange present goods. They organise the circulation of promises on future flows. What is bought and sold on a stock exchange is not a kilogram of wheat but a right over something that has not yet occurred. Michel Aglietta captured this precisely: “Finance does not reflect the world; it organises its expectation.” On a goods market, a valuation error costs a missed transaction. On a financial market, it builds a bubble, because collective belief creates prices, and prices in turn influence behaviours. Real estate “that can only rise,” technology “that will revolutionise everything”: these narratives are not mere analytical errors. They are self-fulfilling prophecies that feed on themselves until reality breaks them.

13.2 The architecture of financial systems

Financial systems perform four economic functions, each real, each capable of being perverted. They mobilise savings and channel them toward productive uses, bridging the gap between savers who wish to hold liquid assets and investors who require long-term financing. They allocate risk by distributing it to agents best able to bear it, diversifying idiosyncratic risks while concentrating systemic ones. They produce information through prices that aggregate dispersed expectations about the future value of assets. And they achieve maturity transformation: converting short-term liabilities (demand deposits) into long-term assets (mortgages, industrial loans).

This last function is the most remarkable and the most fragile. A household deposits its savings at-sight (withdrawable at any moment). The bank lends these funds for twenty years to a property buyer. The bank has transformed short-term resources into long-term employment. This transformation is at the heart of the banking model, and at the heart of its fragility: if all depositors demand their money simultaneously, the bank cannot honour this without selling illiquid assets at a loss.

13.3 The five Gereffi governance structures, transposed to finance

Financial instruments fall into three families by their position in the hierarchy of rights. Debt instruments (bonds, Treasury bills, bank loans) are claims: the issuer promises to repay principal and interest on a predetermined schedule. The creditor is prioritised in bankruptcy and paid before shareholders; in return, his return is capped. Capital instruments (shares, equity stakes) are ownership rights: the shareholder is co-owner, votes in general assemblies, receives dividends, and benefits from value appreciation, but his right is residual, paid only after all creditors in a failure. Derivatives (options, futures, swaps, CDS) are contracts whose value derives from an underlying asset without requiring its physical possession. This dissociation between contractual exposure and physical ownership is simultaneously the power of derivatives (fine risk management with little capital) and their danger (massive exposure with little own funds).

Harry Markowitz’s diversification principle (Nobel Prize 1990) formalises the grandmother’s wisdom about not putting all eggs in one basket: a portfolio’s risk is not the sum of its components’ risks but depends on their correlations. Combining assets that move inversely reduces total risk without sacrificing average return. This is why the pension fund managers of Morocco’s public retirement systems (CIMR, RCAR, CMR) build diversified allocations across equities, bonds, and real estate.

The CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model, Sharpe 1964) extends this to equilibrium: if all investors are rational and share the same information, they will all hold the same optimal risky portfolio, the “market portfolio.” The expected return of any asset is then a linear function of its beta (β), measuring its sensitivity to market movements: \(E(r_i) = r_f + \beta_i [E(r_m) - r_f]\). An asset with β = 1.5 amplifies market movements 1.5 times; its risk premium must be 1.5 times the market risk premium. This formula is the foundation of corporate cost of capital evaluation worldwide. Its limitations, the mean-variance framework assumes normally distributed returns and a single-period horizon, do not invalidate its practical utility for portfolio construction; they mean it should not be the only analytical lens used.

13.4 Asset valuation: the present value principle

The analytical foundation of all asset pricing in finance is the present value principle: the value of an asset today equals the sum of all future cash flows it is expected to generate, each discounted at a rate that reflects the risk of not receiving them.

\[V_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{T} rac{CF_t}{(1+r)^t}\]

The discount rate \(r\) incorporates two components: the risk-free rate (the return available on a safe asset, proxied by short-term Treasury bill rates) and a risk premium that compensates for the probability that expected cash flows are not realised. A higher discount rate means future cash flows are worth less today: this is why rising interest rates tend to reduce asset prices. This inverse relationship between rates and prices runs through all of financial markets, from Treasury bonds to real estate to equities.

For bonds, the calculation is direct: a bond pays a coupon each period and returns principal at maturity. Given market interest rates, its price is the present value of these fixed flows. A 5% coupon bond trading at par (face value) when market rates are 5% will fall below par if market rates rise to 6%, because newly issued bonds at 6% are more attractive. This is why bond prices and yields move inversely: not a coincidence but an arithmetic identity.

For equities, the Gordon Growth Model extends this logic: a firm’s value equals next year’s dividend divided by the difference between the discount rate and the expected long-run growth rate of dividends (\(V = D/(r-g)\)). This formula reveals why financial markets are extremely sensitive to growth expectations: a small change in \(g\) (expected long-run growth) produces a large change in valuation. It also reveals a structural tension: if a firm retains earnings (does not distribute dividends) to invest in projects that will increase future earnings, the share price should rise to reflect the higher future \(D\). But financial markets, which evaluate quarterly, may price the near-term dividend cut negatively before recognising the long-term growth payoff. This short-termism bias is one of the structural tensions between financial market logic and productive investment logic that Keynes identified in 1936.

13.5 Minsky: stability engenders instability

Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) is the economist whose work, largely ignored during decades of growth, was rediscovered after 2008. His central thesis holds in a paradoxical formula: stability engenders instability. Periods of prosperity create, by their very dynamics, the conditions for the next crisis.

Minsky structures his analysis around a five-stage crisis cycle that recurs across financial history, and three increasingly fragile financial postures that characterise the participants.

The five stages: Displacement occurs when an external event creates new profit opportunities: a technological innovation, a policy shift, a new market opening. Early investors succeed, attracting imitators. Euphoria sets in as prices rise, debt accumulates, and credit standards loosen. The language of “this time is different” pervades. Overtrading occurs as speculation becomes dominant: assets are bought not for their income but for their expected resale price. Revulsion is triggered by a specific event (a bank failure, a regulatory announcement, an earnings disappointment) that crystallises the realisation that prices have disconnected from fundamentals. Discredit follows as the rush to exit becomes a self-reinforcing panic. Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978) documents this five-stage pattern across two centuries of financial history, from the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the dot-com bust of 2001.

Minsky distinguishes three stages in the progressive fragility-building that stability enables. In hedge finance, the borrower covers both interest and principal from current operating revenues, no dependence on future asset appreciation. In speculative finance, he covers interest but must refinance at each maturity to repay principal, he is exposed to liquidity risk. In Ponzi finance, he can cover neither interest nor principal from current revenues: his only salvation is the continuous rise of held asset prices. If prices fall, he is insolvent.

The system evolves endogenously through these stages without any external shock. During stable growth, profitable borrowers encourage banks to relax credit standards. Banks competing for market share cannot maintain conservative standards without losing to rivals. Each bank is rationally constrained to follow its competitors even as the aggregate result is increasing systemic fragility. Individual rationality produces collective irrationality: this is Minsky’s paradox. The 2007-2008 subprime crisis is the most documented Minsky moment in recent history. Millions of American households held adjustable-rate mortgages covering only interest in early years (speculative finance). Credit enhancers (AIG, Ambac) transformed these risky loans into AAA-rated securities (institutionalised Ponzi finance at global scale). When the Fed raised rates in 2006-2007, the most fragile households shifted into insolvency. The depreciation of real estate assets destroyed bank balance sheets, triggering global panic.

Morocco’s real estate cycle: a Minsky read

Morocco’s residential real estate market in 2007-2013 exhibited the Minsky sequence with remarkable clarity. The displacement: post-2006 Casablanca and Marrakech saw demand surge driven by MRE remittances, urban migration, and developer optimism. The euphoria: prices doubled in several cities between 2006 and 2013, developers Addoha and Alliances expanded massively on debt, banks relaxed mortgage criteria. The speculative-to-Ponzi transition: many developers could not service debt from housing sale revenues at slowing prices, survival depended on continued price appreciation. The correction: prices stagnated and then declined from 2014, developer balance sheets deteriorated, Addoha and Alliances faced acute financial stress. Morocco avoided a systemic crisis partly because the real estate cycle was financed primarily through domestic credit (limiting contagion channels) and partly because Bank Al-Maghrib maintained macroprudential vigilance on banking system capital ratios. But the episode confirms that Minsky dynamics operate at Moroccan scale, even if the amplitudes differ from those of a globally integrated financial system.

13.6 Financial crises: anatomy and Moroccan relevance

Financial crises are not exogenous shocks that hit an otherwise stable system. They are the endogenous product of the dynamics described above. Understanding their anatomy is necessary equipment for any economist.

A bank run occurs when depositors simultaneously demand withdrawals from a solvent but illiquid bank. Diamond and Dybvig formalised the mechanism in 1983: the bank’s structural fragility (short-term liabilities matched against long-term assets) creates two possible equilibria. If depositors trust the bank and withdraw only when genuinely needed, the bank remains solvent. If depositors anticipate that others will rush to withdraw, each has an incentive to be first, triggering the very failure they feared. The equilibrium realised depends on coordinated expectations. Public deposit guarantees (80,000 MAD per depositor in Morocco through BAM’s Fonds Collectif de Garantie des Dépôts) break the bad equilibrium by eliminating the incentive to panic: if deposits are guaranteed regardless of other depositors’ behaviour, the rational strategy is to stay calm.

A liquidity crisis strikes when short-term financing markets close abruptly. Actors who are solvent over the long term cannot roll over short-term obligations. The critical distinction from a solvency crisis matters enormously for policy: a liquidity crisis calls for a lender of last resort; a solvency crisis requires balance sheet restructuring. Confusing the two, injecting liquidity into fundamentally insolvent institutions, delays and amplifies the eventual collapse.

Fisher debt deflation describes the self-reinforcing spiral that converts a financial crisis into a depression. When asset prices fall, agent net worth deteriorates, forcing asset sales to maintain leverage ratios, which drives prices down further, degrading net worth again. Irving Fisher documented this in 1933 during the Great Depression. The spiral is self-sustaining and can convert an ordinary recession into a depression if no public actor breaks it through asset purchases or debt relief.

Morocco’s financial system has not experienced a systemic crisis, partly due to solid prudential regulation (capital ratios above Basel III minimums, liquidity coverage ratios monitored by BAM), and partly because its capital account remains partially closed, limiting the international contagion channels that amplified the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 global crisis. But the structural mechanisms are identical; only the scales differ. The sectoral analysis of Minsky dynamics in Morocco’s real estate market (2007-2013), and the micro-bubbles periodically observable on the BVC in certain thinly traded stocks, confirm that financial instability is not a pathology of developed financial systems alone.

13.7 Morocco’s three capitalisms

To understand Morocco’s financial system, its strengths, limits, and blockages, one must first grasp the structure of Moroccan capitalism, which combines three distinct forms with different governance logics and different relationships to financial markets.

Patrimonial family capitalism is the most widespread form beyond large listed firms. Business families control diversified conglomerates through pyramidal structures: a family holding controls an intermediate holding that controls subsidiaries in real estate, agri-food, distribution, light industry. Effective control is exercised with a minority participation through leverage effects of nested structures. Groups like Sefrioui (Douja Prom), Chaâbi (Banque Populaire, construction), and Benjelloun (BMCE Bank of Africa) illustrate this configuration. This capitalism values discretion, interpersonal loyalty, and long-term trust networks. Growth is financed through retained earnings and bank debt from allied family banks rather than through the stock market, which requires transparency, disclosure obligations, and possible challenges to control that families structurally avoid.

Managerialist capitalism of public enterprises is embodied by OCP, ONEE, ONCF, ADM, and financial institutions where the state holds indirect stakes via Al Mada and CDG. These enterprises operate through professionalised managerial logic, technocratic executives trained at grande écoles, formalised governance processes, published performance indicators, sometimes subject to international bond market discipline. This model has enabled firms like OCP to transform profoundly, from raw phosphate exporter to sophisticated fertiliser producer to African agri-nutrition actor. But it presents its own risks: public enterprises may pursue political objectives (employment, subsidised prices) at the expense of economic efficiency.

The CDG’s institutional financial capitalism is the least visible but perhaps the most structurally significant. The Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion manages the reserves of several public social funds and invests across all asset classes, listed equities, bonds, real estate, infrastructure, private equity, with a long horizon and a risk-adjusted return logic. The CDG plays a structural stabilisation role: as a long-term shareholder in listed companies, it provides continuous demand that limits market volatility; as a structural buyer of Treasury bonds, it contributes to the liquidity of the bond market; through its subsidiaries (CIH Bank, infrastructure funds), it finances projects that neither private markets nor the public budget would finance alone.

These three forms are not sealed from each other. A family group can coexist with a public shareholder. A public enterprise can have private minority shareholders. The CDG can invest in family enterprises through private equity. This interpenetration is a structural feature of Moroccan capitalism, and it complicates corporate governance and legibility for external investors.

13.8 The Casablanca Stock Exchange and its structural limits

The Bourse des Valeurs de Casablanca (BVC) has approximately 76 listed companies with a total capitalisation of roughly 40-45% of GDP, a decent level by regional comparison, but structurally concentrated in a handful of large-cap stocks. The MASI index’s top ten companies (Attijariwafa Bank, Maroc Telecom, BCP, CIH Bank, Cosumar, among others) represent over 70% of total capitalisation. Below these blue chips lies a thin mid-cap market with insufficient liquidity to attract institutional investors, and a minimal small-cap segment.

This shallow market creates a financing gap for Morocco’s growth-potential SMEs. The logic is circular: SMEs hesitate to list because the market is illiquid and the compliance costs (AMMC disclosure requirements, audit obligations, governance standards) are high relative to the expected valuation gain. The market remains illiquid partly because not enough diverse issuers are listed. Breaking this circle requires either lowering listing barriers for smaller firms (a growth segment on the model of the London AIM or the Paris Alternext) or creating liquid instruments that give small investors access to broad economic growth, low-cost index funds, accessible ETFs, that would generate the demand pulling new listings.

13.9 Finance and development: the conditional relationship

The relationship between financial development and economic growth is empirically positive but conditional. Cross-country evidence consistently finds that countries with deeper credit markets, better shareholder protection, and more liquid capital markets tend to grow faster. The mechanisms are clear: better financial intermediation reduces the cost of capital for productive investment, enables risk diversification that encourages entrepreneurship, and produces information (through prices) that guides capital toward its most productive uses.

But this relationship is non-linear and subject to the composition of financial activity. Recent research (notably by Cecchetti and Kharroubi) suggests a “too much finance” effect: beyond a threshold (roughly 100% credit-to-GDP), further financial deepening is associated with slower growth, because financial sector expansion draws skilled workers and capital away from productive sectors and because the complexity and opacity of financial instruments beyond a certain point generates systemic risk rather than efficient capital allocation.

For Morocco, the constraint is not quantity but quality. The credit-to-GDP ratio (70-75%) is in the range associated with advanced developing economies. But the distribution of this credit is heavily concentrated toward residential real estate, large-firm corporate lending, and consumer credit, at the expense of SME productive investment and long-maturity industrial financing. The result is a financial system that is broad enough by macro indicators but allocatively inefficient in ways that constrain the productive transformation the economy requires.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s institutional perspective adds a complementary dimension: the causal relationship between financial development and growth runs in both directions. Institutions that protect property rights and ensure the rule of law simultaneously foster financial development and growth. Morocco’s financial deepening is therefore inseparable from broader governance questions: the transparency of corporate ownership structures, the enforceability of creditor rights, the independence and competence of the AMMC, and the rule of law in commercial disputes.

13.10 Finance and inequality: the double face

Financial markets maintain a complex relationship with inequality. They can reduce inequality of opportunity when they function well: microcredit, mobile banking, and accessible savings products break the liquidity constraint that prevents talented poor households from investing in education or enterprise. Morocco’s Al Amana microfinance institution, Al Barid Bank’s postal network, and the M-Wallet system are applications of this logic.

But several mechanisms amplify inequality. Information asymmetry between large institutional investors (with analyst teams and information networks) and small savers is extreme in thinly traded markets like the BVC. The concentration of capital returns: in a financialised regime, capital incomes (dividends, capital gains) grow faster than labour incomes, and capital ownership is concentrated in the upper patrimony deciles (Piketty’s central finding). Financial crises hit the poor hardest: wealthy households have reserves, diversified assets, and connections to access public relief. Vulnerable households lose employment, housing, and credit access simultaneously, without a buffer.

In Morocco, the underdevelopment of accessible savings instruments for ordinary households generates specific inequalities. Small savers place in residential real estate (concentrated geographically, illiquid) or in savings accounts at 3-4%. Large fortunes access private funds, higher-yielding bonds, and international markets. OCP’s 2022 exceptional profitability (net income approximately 28 billion MAD) did not “trickle down” to ordinary Moroccan savers, it benefited the principal shareholder (the Moroccan state through dividends that enter the budget) and sophisticated institutional investors. Were OCP partially listed with an accessible index mutual fund, part of this profitability would be distributable to ordinary savers. Financial inclusion is therefore not only about credit access; it is also about enabling broad participation in the returns from Morocco’s productive capital.

The AMMC (Autorité Marocaine du Marché des Capitaux) has progressively strengthened transparency obligations and market conduct rules. But the fundamental structural constraint is not regulatory, it is the reluctance of Morocco’s dominant family capitalism to accept the transparency and governance disciplines that public listing requires. As long as controlling families can access bank financing on advantageous terms through allied banks, the market incentive to list remains limited. The political economy of financial deepening in Morocco runs directly through this tension.

13.11 Financialisation: when finance captures the real economy

The repeated financial crises of the past forty years are not accidents. They reveal a structural transformation of capitalism since the 1980s that Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer, and the French Regulation school have analysed as a new regime of accumulation: financialisation, the process by which financial logics have taken command over productive logics.

In enterprises: shareholder value maximisation (shareholder value) drives executives to prioritise the share price over long-term investment. Large non-financial firms increasingly devote operating cash flows to share buybacks and dividends rather than productive investment. The financial crisis of 2008 revealed this starkly: many of the firms that suffered most severely had been reducing their productive capital bases for a decade while returning cash to shareholders.

In households: savings are increasingly intermediated through markets (pension funds, life insurance), exposing retirement security to market volatility. A household whose pension is fully invested in equity markets bears risks that have nothing to do with their productive effort and everything to do with the conventions governing financial market prices.

In macroeconomic governance: bond market constraints limit governments’ budgetary room for manoeuvre. A government perceived as insufficiently “credible” by financial markets faces rising sovereign spreads, increased borrowing costs, that limit its ability to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policy precisely when it is most needed. This asymmetry between market discipline in crises (strict) and market discipline in booms (lax, because credit is cheap) is a structural source of procyclicality in economic governance.

For Morocco, the financialisation diagnosis requires calibration. The Moroccan financial system is less financialised than Anglo-Saxon capitalism: family ownership is predominant, domestic productive investment remains central, and the stock market is too shallow to generate the shareholder value pressure that reshapes corporate strategy in New York or London. But the group Al Mada’s trajectory, from industrial and commercial conglomerate to investment holding that manages financial participations and optimises dividend flows between subsidiaries, is a Moroccan expression of the same logic. And the gradual deepening of Morocco’s financial system, desirable for the allocative efficiency reasons reviewed above, will bring with it financialisation pressures that will require active institutional responses if they are not to subordinate productive investment to financial returns.

Robert Shiller’s narrative economics provides the complementary behavioural dimension: financial markets are governed by collective narratives that shape expectations and can disconnect prices from fundamental values for extended periods. Real estate “that can only rise.” Emerging markets “with higher intrinsic growth.” Technology “that will revolutionise everything.” These narratives are not merely irrational; they express genuine uncertainty about the future and sometimes self-fulfil for long periods before reality reasserts itself. The CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings ratio) that Shiller developed, averaging earnings over ten years to filter out short-run cyclical distortions, predicted the 2001 and 2008 crises with remarkable accuracy. Its application to any market requires attention to the local narrative structures that inflate or deflate prices beyond what earnings fundamentals would justify.


14 Conclusion: Money, Credit, and the Political Economy of Development

This chapter has established three foundational reversals that are indispensable for serious economic analysis.

First reversal: it is not central banks that create the money circulating in the economy, it is commercial banks, with each credit granted. The central bank regulates the conditions of this creation; it does not initiate it. The endogeneity of money means that monetary policy acts on the price of credit, not its quantity directly, and that its effectiveness depends on the credit demand of enterprises and households, which depends in turn on their confidence in the future.

Second reversal: money is not wealth. Doubling the monetary mass without increasing production makes nobody richer; it raises prices. Morocco’s 2022 inflation episode illustrated this precisely: the monetary response to a supply-side cost shock was necessarily limited in effectiveness. The binding constraint was the price of wheat, not the availability of dirhams.

Third reversal: monetary and financial policy is never technically neutral. Choosing to target inflation rather than employment, to maintain independent central bank governance rather than subordinating monetary policy to industrial strategy, to allow credit to concentrate in real estate rather than productive investment, these are political choices, not natural constraints. For Morocco, the question is how to use the institutional assets built over decades (BAM’s credibility, a relatively stable banking system, improving financial inclusion) to orient credit toward the productive investments that structural transformation requires, without sacrificing the institutional credibility whose cost, as Turkey’s experience demonstrates, is measured in hundreds of basis points on sovereign debt.

What this chapter should leave with the reader

Money is endogenous: banks create it with each credit granted. The money supply follows demand; it does not precede it. BAM controls the price of credit, not its quantity.

The money multiplier describes an accounting relationship, not a reliable causal mechanism. When crisis hits, the multiplier collapses, as 2008 demonstrated dramatically.

Credit allocation has a political economy: structurally favouring collateral-rich borrowers over SMEs, real estate over productive investment, large formal firms over rural households. Monetary policy transmits imperfectly precisely because this allocation logic is not corrected by rate changes alone.

Financial assets are promises, not goods. Markets organise the expectation of uncertain future flows. This makes them sensitive to collective narratives, and prone to the Minsky cycle: stability engenders risk-taking, risk-taking engenders fragility, fragility engenders crisis.

Morocco’s monetary architecture rests on three pillars: BAM’s operational independence (a hard-won institutional asset); a concentrated banking system that transmits policy incompletely; and a shallow stock market that allocates capital inefficiently. The binding constraint on productive investment is no longer monetary quantity but financial allocation quality.

Aglietta and Graeber converge: money is a power relation, not a neutral instrument. Morocco’s reconquest of monetary sovereignty in 1959 was a political act with structural economic consequences. Its maintenance is among the most important long-run institutional choices the country makes.


15 Further Reading

Keynes, J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Macmillan. Chapters 13-17 on money, liquidity preference, and asset prices. The intellectual foundation of everything in this chapter that concerns effective demand and financial instability.

Aglietta, M. and Orléan, A. (2002). La monnaie entre violence et confiance. Odile Jacob. The institutionalist account of money as a social relation. Essential reading for understanding why monetary crises are political crises.

Graeber, D. (2011). Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Melville House. The anthropological demolition of the barter myth and the most historically grounded account of money’s origins in credit and power.

Minsky, H.P. (1986). Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. Yale University Press. The masterwork. Every financial crisis since 2008 has rediscovered what was already here. Essential.

Moore, B.J. (1988). Horizontalists and Verticalists: The Macroeconomics of Credit Money. Cambridge University Press. The systematic account of endogenous money and why banks do not multiply central bank reserves.

Kindleberger, C. and Aliber, R. (2005). Manias, Panics, and Crashes. Palgrave Macmillan. Eight centuries of financial crises through the Minsky framework. The empirical complement to Minsky’s theory.

Bank Al-Maghrib. Rapport annuel and Rapport sur la Stabilité Financière (latest editions). The primary empirical source for Morocco’s monetary conditions, banking system health, and financial inclusion data. Freely available at bkam.ma.

HCP. Note de conjoncture and Indice des prix à la consommation. Real-time inflation data and national accounts for Morocco, freely available at hcp.ma.