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11  Chapter 9 — Unemployment, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Coordination

Labour markets, demand management, and the role of the state

“In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.” — John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923)

The guiding thread of this chapter
  1. Involuntary unemployment is not a market accident. It is the possible normal condition of a market economy experiencing insufficient aggregate demand. The market has no automatic mechanism that returns it to full employment.
  2. The Keynesian multiplier amplifies both shocks and interventions. A unit of public expenditure generates more than a unit of national income, but the effective multiplier depends on import leakages, tax leakages, and the composition of expenditure. For Morocco, a highly open economy, the multiplier is structurally smaller than textbook theory suggests.
  3. IS-LM coordinates monetary and fiscal policy. In the short run, the economy’s equilibrium output and interest rate are jointly determined by the goods market (IS) and the money market (LM). The two instruments are complements, not substitutes.
  4. Kalecki’s political economy of full employment is indispensable. He showed not just that full employment is achievable but why capitalism resists it: full employment eliminates the disciplinary function of unemployment over labour, and the political resistance to reflation is structural, not accidental.
  5. Public debt dynamics depend on \(r\) versus \(g\). A country where the growth rate exceeds the real interest rate on its debt can sustain primary deficits without an explosive debt trajectory. The Godley sectoral balances identity shows that a government deficit is often the arithmetically necessary counterpart of a current account deficit and a private sector savings surplus.
  6. Morocco’s fiscal constraints are real but misread. The binding limit on fiscal policy is not the level of public debt per se but the external financing constraint, the import propensity of public expenditure, and the underdevelopment of automatic stabilisers.

The Map

The previous chapter showed how money and credit are created, how central banks govern the monetary system, and why financial markets are structurally unstable. This chapter moves to the macroeconomic question that touches people most directly: employment. Why can a modern economy simultaneously have idle factories, unemployed workers, and unmet social needs, and remain stable in that state? Why does the market not automatically correct this?

The chapter advances in four movements. First, the Keynesian foundations: the nature of unemployment, the anatomy of aggregate demand, the multiplier, and the paradox of thrift. Second, Kalecki’s political economy: a deeper diagnosis of why capitalism resists full employment and what this implies for income distribution. Third, the IS-LM and AS-AD models as tools for thinking about policy coordination, with Morocco’s COVID episode as the diagnostic case. Fourth, heterodox corrections to the standard framework: Modern Monetary Theory, Godley’s sectoral balances, and the South Global critique of fiscal policy applied to developing economies.


12 Part I — Unemployment and Aggregate Demand: Keynesian Foundations

12.1 What unemployment is — and what it hides

Before analysing unemployment, one must know what is being measured. The ILO’s international definition is precise: unemployed is any working-age person without employment during the reference week, available to work, and who has actively sought work. Each criterion matters. Someone who has given up searching, judging the search futile, is no longer counted as unemployed: they join the “discouraged inactive,” a statistical shadow zone that can be massive in high-informality economies.

Yassine, master’s degree, delivery rider: employed or not?

Yassine holds a master’s degree in management. For lack of a position, he does scooter deliveries. Officially, he “works”: he is not counted as unemployed. Yet he occupies a job far below his qualifications, paying for his diploma in 15-dirham delivery fees. His neighbour Réda, meanwhile, stopped searching after two years of rejections: discouraged, he is no longer “actively seeking,” so he exits the unemployment statistics as if by magic. These two stories reveal what the unemployment rate conceals: underemployment of graduates and discouragement of the invisible. The official figure can fall not because things are improving but because more Yassines accept anything and more Rédas give up. Behind a clean statistic are damaged trajectories.

Morocco’s official unemployment rate was 13.3% in 2024 (HCP data), but this figure masks a much darker reality. The activity rate stands at only 43.5%, meaning more than half the working-age population is not in the labour market. Youth unemployment (ages 15-24) reaches 36.7%, graduate unemployment 19.4%, a development paradox where education does not guarantee insertion. The informal sector, employing between 60 and 70% of occupied workers, constitutes a reservoir of visible underemployment that the statistics do not capture.

These structural features of the Moroccan labour market have direct macroeconomic implications that standard models miss. First, the segmentation of labour demand between a primary formal sector (large enterprises, public administration, major banks and telecoms) and a secondary informal sector creates a two-speed economy where macroeconomic stimulus reaches the formal sector directly but the informal sector only indirectly and with significant delay. Second, the hrig phenomenon (illegal emigration by young Moroccans without employment prospects) is not merely a social tragedy but an indicator of the expected returns to remaining in Morocco’s labour market. As Kalecki would note, the decision to emigrate is economically rational when the domestic labour market offers no credible pathway to primary sector employment, even for qualified graduates. Third, female labour force participation at approximately 19-20% (one of the lowest globally among comparable income countries) represents an enormous structural underutilisation of human capital. The barriers are multiple: inadequate childcare infrastructure, transport and security constraints in rural areas, cultural norms, and labour market discrimination that makes women’s qualifications systematically less rewarded than men’s equivalent qualifications. An economy that employs less than one in five women in the labour force is operating substantially below its productive potential — and monetary or fiscal stimulus alone cannot address this structural gap without complementary institutional and social investment.

Three forms of unemployment, three diagnoses

Frictional unemployment is the normal friction of a mobile labour market: someone has quit one job and not yet found another. It is temporary and compatible with a healthy economy. The appropriate response is better labour market information: job platforms, employment agencies, and streamlined hiring. Structural unemployment occurs when workers’ skills are mismatched with the jobs available: steelworkers in a city where the steel mill has closed, or holders of degrees in disciplines no longer demanded by the market. The appropriate response is retraining, education reform, and active industrial policies that create jobs requiring the skills the educational system produces. Cyclical unemployment arises from insufficient aggregate demand: the economy is below its productive potential, and firms simply have no customers for what additional workers would produce. The appropriate response is macroeconomic stimulus: fiscal spending to boost demand and monetary easing to reduce borrowing costs.

Diagnosing which form predominates is the precondition for choosing the right remedy, and the diagnosis is rarely clean. Morocco’s unemployment has all three forms simultaneously, in different proportions. Frictional unemployment is probably modest: the labour market is not highly mobile or well-matched, and information asymmetries between employers and potential workers are large, but this is not the binding constraint. Structural unemployment is significant: graduates with degrees in disciplines that the economy’s formal sector does not demand, workers in declining agricultural areas without transferable skills, women whose qualifications are systematically undervalued in private labour markets. Cyclical unemployment has been persistent since the 2012-2016 growth slowdown reduced formal job creation. The appropriate policy response must address all three: better employment information and intermediation (frictional), educational reform aligned with productive structure and active labour market policies (structural), and demand stimulus combined with investment in the formal job-creating sectors (cyclical). No single instrument addresses all three simultaneously.

12.2 The Keynesian revolution: equilibrium below full employment

The standard pre-Keynesian view held that unemployment was temporary and self-correcting. If there are more workers seeking jobs than jobs available, wages will fall, making labour cheaper; firms will hire more at the lower wage; employment will return to its natural level. This view, elegant and internally consistent, failed spectacularly during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment reached 25% in the United States and remained elevated for a decade despite falling wages.

Keynes’s revolutionary contribution in The General Theory (1936) was to show that an economy can reach a stable equilibrium well below full employment. This is not a market failure in the conventional sense (not a monopoly, an externality, or a public good problem). It is a macroeconomic coordination failure: a situation where individually rational decisions aggregate into a collectively irrational outcome.

The paradox of thrift captures the mechanism most cleanly. If one household decides to save more in response to economic uncertainty, this is a prudent and rational decision. But if all households simultaneously decide to save more, collective consumption falls, firms sell less, reduce production, lay off workers, and national income falls. In the end, aggregate saving decreases, because households save a fraction of a lower income. The market equilibrium imposes the accounting identity \(S = I\), but potentially at a lower level of national income: a stable equilibrium with persistent involuntary unemployment, without any automatic mechanism of return to full employment.

This is what economists call a compositional fallacy: what is true for an individual is false for the aggregate. The market’s celebrated ability to coordinate individual decisions breaks down at the macroeconomic level when all actors respond similarly to a common signal. The policy implication follows directly: if individual rationality can produce collective irrationality, there is a legitimate role for public action that coordinates what the market cannot.

12.3 Aggregate demand: the short-run motor of the economy

In the short run, Keynesian theory holds that output adjusts to demand rather than the reverse. Firms do not produce first and then seek customers; they anticipate demand and calibrate production accordingly. Supply is passive; demand is the motor.

Aggregate demand in an open economy decomposes into four components:

\[AD = C(Y - T) + I + G + (X - M)\]

Consumption \(C\) depends on household disposable income: total income \(Y\) minus taxes \(T\). Households consume a fraction of their income, the marginal propensity to consume \(c\), and save the rest. The value of \(c\) is central: the higher the propensity to consume, the more powerfully an initial demand injection propagates through the economy. Empirical evidence consistently finds that lower-income households have higher marginal propensities to consume, they spend nearly all of any income increment because they lack precautionary savings. This has direct implications for the distributional targeting of fiscal interventions.

Investment \(I\) depends on firms’ expectations and credit cost. It is the most volatile component of demand. In periods of uncertainty, firms postpone or cancel investment plans even if interest rates are low — a Keynesian insight that Kalecki sharpened into the observation that investment decisions are driven by expectations of future profits, not merely by the current cost of borrowing.

Government expenditure \(G\) is, in this model, decided autonomously by the state. These are direct purchases of goods and services, school construction, civil servant wages, hospital equipment. Their independence from current national income is what makes them a powerful lever: in a recession where private demand collapses, the state can maintain or increase its spending to compensate.

Net exports \(X - M\) reflects the difference between what the economy exports and imports. For Morocco, whose structural trade deficit regularly exceeds 15% of GDP, this term is systematically negative and represents a permanent “leakage” of demand to the exterior, a major structural constraint on the effectiveness of any stimulus policy.

The short-run equilibrium is the income level \(Y^*\) at which aggregate demand exactly equals output: \(AD(Y^*) = Y^*\). This level can be below full employment. This is the Keynesian rupture: equilibrium is not necessarily optimum.

12.4 The multiplier: amplification and its limits

Keynes’s most analytically fertile insight is that any initial demand injection generates a total effect larger than the initial shock. This is the Keynesian multiplier.

The 1,000 dirhams that go three times around the neighbourhood

The state pays 1,000 dirhams to a mason to repair a school. The mason spends 700 dirhams at the grocer and the barber. The grocer, enriched by this sum, spends part of it with the wholesaler. The barber buys supplies. The same initial 1,000 dirhams have fed a chain of spending well above 1,000 dirhams. This is the multiplier: public expenditure does not stop at its first beneficiary, it ricochets through the economy. The higher the propensity of recipients to spend rather than save or import, the stronger the ricochet. One dirham of public spending can support more than one dirham of activity, especially when the economy is running below capacity.

The mechanism is a cascade. The state builds a school in Béni Mellal for 10 million dirhams. These 10 million immediately become the income of construction firms, engineers, and workers. If their marginal propensity to consume is \(c = 0.8\), they spend 8 million on consumption, at shops, restaurants, artisans. These 8 million in turn generate income, 80% of which (6.4 million) will be reconsumed. The sum of this infinite geometric series converges to:

\[\Delta Y = \frac{1}{1-c} \cdot \Delta G = \frac{1}{1-0.8} \cdot 10 = 50 \text{ million}\]

With \(c = 0.8\), one dirham of public expenditure generates 5 dirhams of national income in theory. But three types of leakage reduce this in practice.

Savings (\(s = 1-c\)): each recipient spends only a fraction of their additional income. Imports (\(m\)): part of consumption directs toward foreign products, removing demand from the national circuit. Tax levies (\(t\)): taxes reduce disposable income at each turn of the cascade.

The complete multiplier formula in an open economy is:

\[\Delta Y = \frac{1}{s + m + t} \cdot \Delta A\]

For Morocco, highly open to trade (openness rate above 70% of GDP), the marginal import propensity \(m\) is high, and the effective multiplier is well below the theoretical value. Empirical studies place the Moroccan fiscal multiplier at 0.6 to 1.2 depending on expenditure type, against 1.5 to 2 for large, relatively closed economies. This has direct policy implications: the quality of expenditure matters as much as its volume.

The most important strategic principle follows: fiscal stimulus is most effective when it maximises local content (reducing import leakages), targets households with the highest propensity to consume (lower-income households), and invests in sectors with strong domestic linkage effects. A relance that funds domestic construction workers generates a higher multiplier than one that imports capital equipment. An income transfer to low-income families generates a higher multiplier than a tax cut for high-income households. This is not a distributional argument alone; it is an efficiency argument.


13 Part II — Kalecki’s Political Economy: Why Capitalism Resists Full Employment

Keynes showed that full employment is achievable through demand management. Michal Kalecki, a Polish economist who arrived at very similar macroeconomic conclusions through a completely different theoretical route, posed the deeper question: why does capitalism resist full employment even when the tools to achieve it exist?

13.1 The identity: capitalists earn what they spend

Kalecki’s starting point is an accounting identity. In an economy with two classes (capitalists and workers), if workers spend all their income (consume what they earn), aggregate capitalist profits are identically equal to capitalists’ own expenditures: their consumption plus investment.

\[\Pi = C_K + I\]

The intuition: think of Casablanca. A developer invests to build a residential complex. He orders cement, hires workers. The cement supplier reinvests. The engineer consumes at the souk. Where do the developer’s profits ultimately come from? Not from prior savings, not from market magic. They come from his own spending and that of other capitalists. This is Kalecki’s famous aphorism, carried in the post-Keynesian tradition: “Workers spend what they earn; capitalists earn what they spend.”

But this identity is still only a description. The decisive question is causality. The neoclassical reading: anticipated profits determine capitalists’ investment and consumption decisions, expected profitability is primary, spending follows. Kalecki inverts the causality: it is the decisions to spend that determine profits, not the reverse. As he formulated: “Capitalists can decide to consume or invest, but they cannot decide to earn more.”

This reversal is conceptually revolutionary. It implies that investment precedes income, not savings preceding investment as in the classical tradition. It gives a motor role to expenditure decisions, expectations, and credit. And it logically justifies active macroeconomic policies: if there are insufficient spending flows in the circuit, incomes stagnate, profits fall, and the economy sinks.

13.2 Kalecki’s formal model: investment, profits, and the circuit

Kalecki’s macroeconomic model formalises his accounting insight with full analytical rigour. In a closed economy with two classes, national income \(Y\) decomposes into wages \(W\) and profits \(\Pi\): \(Y = W + \Pi\). Workers, by assumption, spend all their income on consumption. Capitalists divide their income between consumption \(C_K\) and investment \(I\), with a propensity to save \(lpha_K\) from profits.

The goods market equilibrium requires that output equals demand: \[Y = C_W + C_K + I = W + lpha_K \cdot C_K + I\]

Since \(W = C_W\) (workers spend all wages) and substituting, one derives the fundamental Kaleckian result:

\[\Pi = C_K + I\]

The profit level is determined by capitalists’ expenditure decisions, not by prior savings. When we add government spending \(G\) and net exports \((X-M)\), the expression becomes:

\[\Pi = C_K + I + (G - T) + (X - M)\]

Public deficits \((G > T)\) increase profits. Trade surpluses increase profits. This is the macroeconomic arithmetic that explains why deflationary fiscal policies in a depressed economy are self-defeating: cutting government spending reduces profits, reduces investment incentives, reduces output, and reduces the tax base: exactly the austerity spiral.

The investment function in Kalecki is not determined by interest rates in the standard IS-LM sense. It is determined by two factors: the current level of profits (which signals the profitability of existing capital and provides internal financing) and the rate of change of profits (which signals whether expansion is warranted). Crucially, investment creates its own profits through the multiplier process, but it does so with a lag, creating the business cycle: periods of high investment generate high profits which encourage further investment, until financial fragility or distribution conflicts (workers’ wage demands eroding profit margins) trigger a downturn.

13.3 The markup, profits, and the wage share

Kalecki’s analysis of price formation, from Chapter 4, links directly to the distribution of national income. In industrial markets, firms set price as a markup over unit variable costs:

\[P = (1 + m) \cdot CUV\]

The markup \(m\) depends on the degree of monopoly, market concentration and the barriers that prevent competitive entry from eroding above-normal returns. The profit share in value added is:

\[\frac{\Pi}{Y} = \frac{m}{1+m}\]

The profit share rises with the markup. Greater market concentration raises the markup, raises the profit share, and compresses the wage share. Market structure is directly a mechanism of income distribution, a point the standard supply-and-demand framework cannot see, because it treats market power as a distortion rather than a structural feature of most real markets.

This gives a second dimension to Kalecki’s analysis: not only do capitalists earn what they spend, but the division of national income between wages and profits reflects the balance of market power between firms and workers, and between large firms and small ones. Policies that increase market concentration do not just reduce allocative efficiency, they shift income from workers to capital owners.

13.4 The political obstacle to full employment

Kalecki’s most original and enduring contribution is his 1943 essay “Political Aspects of Full Employment”, a text that may be the single most important short paper in political economy of the 20th century. Its argument can be compressed into three propositions.

First: full employment is technically achievable through sustained government expenditure, as Keynes had shown. The technical knowledge existed in 1943. Nothing in economic mechanics prevented it.

Second: the business community would systematically oppose sustained full employment, not because they prefer recession, but because full employment would undermine the disciplinary mechanism that keeps labour costs under control. When unemployment is high, workers accept worse conditions, slower wages, and managerial authority because they fear replacement. When unemployment is near zero, workers gain bargaining power, wages rise, and the threat of dismissal loses its force. Industrial discipline loosens. Kalecki wrote: “the social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class would grow.”

Third: the political system would translate business preference into policy. This is not a conspiracy theory; it is an observation about structural power. Business interests are concentrated, organised, and well-represented in political processes. The political costs of high unemployment fall on scattered individuals, while the political benefits of full employment (reduced labour discipline, reduced profit shares) are concentrated on organised capital.

Kalecki’s permanent relevance for Morocco

Kalecki’s argument is not merely historical. In Morocco, the coexistence of persistently high youth unemployment, a compressed wage share (35-40% of value added against 55-60% in comparable Asian economies), concentrated market structures in key sectors (cement, telecoms, food distribution, banking), and limited political organisation of labour in private SMEs constitutes precisely the configuration Kalecki described. The high unemployment among graduates is not only a problem of educational-labour market mismatch or insufficient credit, it is also the product of a productive structure that has not generated enough formal employment in the primary segment. The distributional question, who captures the gains from Morocco’s productive growth, cannot be separated from the employment question. They are two faces of the same Kaleckian dynamic.


14 Part III — IS-LM and AS-AD: Policy Coordination in Practice

14.1 The IS curve: goods market equilibrium

The IS-LM model represents the short-run macroeconomic equilibrium as the intersection of two relationships.

The IS curve (Investment-Savings) traces all combinations of output \(Y\) and interest rate \(i\) for which the goods market is in equilibrium, that is, where aggregate demand equals output. Its negative slope reflects the investment channel: a higher interest rate raises the cost of borrowing, reduces investment demand, reduces aggregate demand, and reduces equilibrium output. Fiscal policy shifts the IS curve: an increase in government expenditure \(G\) raises aggregate demand at any given interest rate, shifting IS rightward (higher equilibrium output); a tax increase shifts IS leftward.

The LM curve (Liquidity-Money) traces all combinations of \(Y\) and \(i\) for which the money market is in equilibrium, where money demand equals money supply. Its positive slope reflects the transactions demand for money: higher income increases the demand for money for transaction purposes, which at a given money supply requires a higher interest rate to restore equilibrium. Monetary policy shifts the LM curve: a decrease in the policy rate (an expansionary monetary policy) effectively shifts LM rightward.

The macroeconomic equilibrium is the intersection of IS and LM, determining simultaneously the equilibrium level of output \(Y^*\) and the equilibrium interest rate \(i^*\).

14.2 The investment function and animal spirits

The IS curve’s negative slope depends critically on the responsiveness of investment to the interest rate — one of the most empirically contested relationships in macroeconomics. In the standard formulation, investment demand is a decreasing function of the interest rate: \(I = I_0 - b \cdot i\), where \(b\) captures the sensitivity of investment to borrowing costs and \(I_0\) represents autonomous investment determined by profit expectations and technology.

Keynes introduced the concept of animal spirits to describe the volatile, fundamentally non-rational element in investment decisions. Entrepreneurs making investment decisions under genuine uncertainty cannot calculate expected returns with the precision that classical theory assumed. They rely on conventions, on optimism or pessimism about the future, on their assessment of what others are doing. When animal spirits are buoyant, firms invest even if quantitative risk calculations would suggest caution. When they collapse, as in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis, even historically low interest rates cannot induce investment, because the problem is not the cost of borrowing but the absence of any profitable project horizon worth borrowing for.

For Morocco, this Keynesian insight has direct practical relevance. The private investment rate (gross fixed capital formation by the private sector as a share of GDP) has been structurally weak relative to comparable economies, hovering around 20-22% of GDP against 30-35% in the most dynamic Asian comparators. This is not primarily a credit cost problem, Moroccan lending rates, while higher than European levels, are not prohibitive by regional standards. It is partly an expectations problem: the expectation of future demand, of stable regulatory frameworks, of infrastructure complementing private investment, of educated workers being available. Public investment in transport, energy, human capital, and stable institutions raises private investment’s expected return, the complementarity effect, precisely through its effect on animal spirits.

The policy implication is that fiscal policy acts on investment not only through the direct demand effect of public expenditure but through the indirect confidence effect: sustained, strategic public investment signals to private actors that the economic environment is stable and improving, shifting \(I_0\) upward and rotating the IS curve rightward independently of any interest rate effect.

14.3 Crowding out and the liquidity trap

IS-LM generates two important results that structure the debate between fiscal and monetary policy advocates.

Crowding out: if the government increases expenditure (shifting IS rightward), output rises but so does the equilibrium interest rate (moving up along the LM curve). The higher interest rate reduces private investment, “crowding out” private expenditure to partly offset the public stimulus. If LM is steep (inelastic money demand), crowding out is large; if LM is flat, crowding out is small. The practical implication: fiscal expansion is more effective when monetary policy accommodates it, that is, when BAM simultaneously expands liquidity to prevent interest rates from rising, keeping LM flat at the prevailing level.

The liquidity trap: if nominal interest rates are at or near zero, monetary policy loses traction. The LM curve becomes horizontal at the zero lower bound, the central bank can inject unlimited liquidity without reducing rates further, because agents absorb all injected money at the prevailing near-zero rate. In this configuration, only fiscal policy (shifting IS) can raise equilibrium output. The IS-LM model predicts maximum effectiveness for fiscal policy precisely when monetary policy is at its limit.

BAM in partial liquidity trap, 2020-2021

In 2020-2021, BAM lowered its policy rate to 1.5%, a historical low, and injected liquidity massively through open market operations. Moroccan banks received abundant liquidity. But corporate credit demand remained weak for the first 12 months post-COVID: uncertainty about the recovery of activity, tourism, and export orders discouraged investment even at low rates. This is the partial liquidity trap logic: the monetary instrument had lost effectiveness because the binding constraint was not the cost of credit but uncertainty about future demand. The stimulus came primarily from fiscal policy, the Special COVID Fund, and from the progressive recovery of global activity. The COVID episode thus illustrates IS-LM’s core prediction: when LM is flat and private demand collapses, fiscal policy shifting IS is the binding instrument.

14.4 AS-AD: supply-side shocks and the Moroccan drought

IS-LM analyses demand. The AS-AD (Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand) model adds the supply dimension, allowing the analysis of shocks that simultaneously affect output and prices, the stagflationary supply shocks that IS-LM cannot handle.

Aggregate demand (AD) is downward-sloping in the output-price space: higher prices reduce the real value of money holdings (the real balance effect) and cause the central bank to tighten, both reducing spending. Aggregate supply (AS) slopes upward in the short run: higher prices induce firms to expand output, as margins improve for a given nominal wage.

Three scenarios matter. A positive demand shock (fiscal stimulus, export surge) shifts AD rightward: output rises and prices rise. In the medium term, higher wages shift AS leftward, returning output toward potential at a higher price level. A negative supply shock (oil price surge, drought, war) shifts AS leftward: output falls and prices rise, stagflation. The policy dilemma is cruel: stimulating demand to fight the recession aggravates inflation; compressing inflation through monetary tightening deepens the recession. A positive supply shock (productivity gain, falling commodity costs) shifts AS rightward: output rises and prices fall, the ideal scenario of growth with disinflation.

Morocco’s recurring drought constitutes precisely a negative supply shock, particularly severe in an economy where agriculture still represents 10-14% of GDP and employs over 30% of the active population. The 2022 crisis illustrated this sharply: the simultaneous surge in wheat prices (+50% post-Ukraine) and petroleum products (+40%) shifted AS leftward, producing textbook stagflation, growth slowing from 7.9% in 2021 to 1.1% in 2022 while inflation accelerated from below 2% to above 8%.

The policy response illustrates the dilemma: BAM raised its policy rate from 1.5% to 3% (fighting inflation via LM), but this compressed domestic credit demand and slowed already fragile growth. The government maintained subsidies on butane gas and partially on food products via the Caisse de Compensation, partially absorbing the shock on vulnerable households at the cost of a temporary fiscal overrun. This case shows why supply shocks are the hardest to manage: there is no good short-run answer, only trade-offs between inflation and recession.

14.5 Mundell-Fleming and the open economy constraint

The Mundell-Fleming model extends IS-LM to the open economy by adding a BP curve (balance of payments equilibrium) representing combinations of output and interest rate for which the current account and capital account balance. The model generates fundamental results according to the exchange rate regime.

Under fixed exchange rates (Morocco’s semi-fixed dirham peg): fiscal policy is relatively effective. A fiscal expansion raises output without triggering a destabilising appreciation. Monetary policy is constrained by the obligation to defend parity, BAM cannot lower rates below the level consistent with the exchange rate anchor without losing reserves. Under flexible exchange rates: monetary policy is highly effective (a monetary expansion depreciates the currency, stimulates exports and growth). Fiscal policy is less effective, the interest rate rise it induces attracts capital inflows, appreciates the currency, and reduces competitiveness, partly offsetting the demand stimulus.

For Morocco, which has progressively widened the dirham fluctuation band from ±0.3% to ±5% since 2018, this transition toward greater flexibility implies more active monetary management and careful coordination between BAM, the Ministry of Finance, and the Office des Changes. The implication for fiscal policy: under Morocco’s current semi-fixed regime, fiscal expansion is the more reliable macroeconomic lever, which reinforces the importance of careful fiscal strategy.


15 Part IV — Heterodox Corrections: MMT, Godley, and the South Global Critique

15.1 Historical cases: what fiscal history teaches

The theory of the multiplier and fiscal policy is best evaluated through its historical record. Four episodes are particularly instructive.

The American New Deal (1933-1937): Roosevelt’s New Deal combined large-scale public employment programmes (the Works Progress Administration employed 8.5 million workers at its peak), infrastructure investment (the Tennessee Valley Authority, rural electrification), and financial regulation (Glass-Steagall Act separating commercial and investment banking, creation of the FDIC deposit guarantee). GDP grew at 9-10% annually from 1934 to 1937. In 1937, Roosevelt cut spending under political pressure to balance the budget. The result: a sharp recession in 1937-1938 that economists have called the “recession within the Depression.” The lesson: premature fiscal consolidation, driven by political orthodoxy rather than economic conditions, can abort a recovery precisely when confidence is not yet self-sustaining.

Japan’s lost decade (1990s): Japan’s asset bubble collapsed in 1990-1991 after a decade of rapid credit expansion and land price inflation. The government’s response was a series of fiscal stimulus packages between 1992 and 2001, totalling over 100 trillion yen. Yet growth remained anaemic throughout the decade. The apparent failure of fiscal stimulus in Japan is often cited as evidence that fiscal policy cannot work, a reading that misses the critical institutional context. Japanese banks, with balance sheets destroyed by collapsed asset values, were not lending; monetary transmission was broken. Fiscal stimulus was fighting a massive private sector deleveraging, businesses and households simultaneously reducing debt, that absorbed the public sector’s stimulus without generating recovery. The sectoral balances analysis explains exactly this: when the private sector is intensively saving (deleveraging), the public sector must run offsetting deficits. The Japanese lesson is not that fiscal policy failed; it is that fiscal policy without concurrent banking system repair and balance sheet restructuring cannot restore private investment demand.

European austerity (2010-2013): As documented by Blanchard and Leigh (2013), eurozone fiscal consolidation during 2010-2013 operated with fiscal multipliers well above 1.0, the opposite of what pre-austerity IMF forecasts assumed. Every euro of spending cuts contracted the economy by more than a euro, worsening the debt-to-GDP ratio even as it reduced the absolute deficit. The austerity paradox operated in textbook form. Greece lost 25% of GDP. Unemployment in Spain and Portugal exceeded 25%. The mechanism was precisely the Keynes-Kalecki prediction: insufficient aggregate demand, no automatic self-correcting mechanism, and procyclical fiscal tightening amplifying the downswing.

Morocco’s COVID response (2020): Morocco’s Special COVID Fund mobilised approximately 33 billion MAD (3.3% of GDP), the fiscal deficit widened from approximately -3.6% to -7.6% of GDP, and the policy rate fell to 1.5%. The recession reached -6.3% of GDP in 2020, severe but substantially smaller than it would have been without intervention. The 2021 recovery of +7.9% confirmed that the productive fabric had been preserved. The instruments were calibrated to the Moroccan multiplier reality: direct enterprise support (Damane Relance, Damane Oxygène) to prevent bankruptcies and maintain future supply capacity; household transfers through the RAMED system; and monetary accommodation keeping banks well-supplied with liquidity. What the response could not fully achieve was coverage of the informal sector, over 50% of employment, whose workers lacked access to formal social protection mechanisms and received support only with delay through emergency RSU mechanisms.

15.2 Public debt dynamics: \(r\) versus \(g\)

Before examining heterodox challenges, a fundamental reframing of how public debt is assessed. The prevailing political discourse treats public debt as unconditionally bad, a burden imposed on future generations, a sign of living beyond one’s means. The economic reality is more nuanced.

The debt dynamics equation shows what actually matters:

\[\frac{\Delta (D/Y)}{D/Y} \approx (r - g) \cdot \frac{D}{Y} + \text{primary deficit}\]

If the economy’s growth rate \(g\) exceeds the real interest rate \(r\) on the debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls even with a modest primary deficit, the economy “outgrows” the debt constraint. This is the condition Olivier Blanchard highlighted in 2019, noting that it had prevailed for most advanced economies in the post-2008 period of near-zero interest rates.

Morocco’s public debt trajectory illustrates this. Between 2000-2010, debt stabilised around 45-50% of GDP through strong growth (5-6% annually) and moderate deficits. Between 2010-2022, it rose progressively toward 70-76% of GDP under successive shocks (2012: subsidy crisis; 2020: COVID; 2022: inflationary shock). Since 2023, gradual consolidation aims to return toward 65% at medium term.

Two features of Morocco’s debt structure shape its risk profile. Approximately 70% is domestic (in dirhams), limiting exchange rate vulnerability. The approximately 30% external component (in euro and dollar) must be repaid in foreign currency, its dirham cost rises mechanically if the dirham depreciates, creating a fragility that large current account deficits can activate. The annual debt service currently represents approximately 25-26% of fiscal revenues: a quarter of every dirham collected by the state services debt obligations before financing public services.

15.3 Morocco’s fiscal structure: the revenue constraint

Any analysis of Morocco’s fiscal space must reckon with the structural features of its revenue system. Fiscal revenues represent approximately 22-25% of GDP, reasonable by emerging economy standards but concentrated in ways that create structural fragility.

The Value Added Tax (TVA) is the largest single source of fiscal revenues, contributing approximately 30-35% of total tax receipts. Because TVA applies uniformly to consumption, it is regressive relative to income: lower-income households spend a higher share of their income on consumption and therefore pay a higher effective TVA rate as a fraction of income than wealthier households. This regressive element in Morocco’s revenue structure means that fiscal consolidation through TVA increases falls disproportionately on lower-income households, compounding the distributional problems of austerity.

Corporate tax is highly concentrated: a small number of large formal enterprises and financial institutions contribute the majority of corporate tax revenues. The broad mass of Moroccan enterprises, SMEs, informal operators, small traders, contributes relatively little to the direct tax base, either through formal informality (registered but under-reporting) or complete informality. This creates both a fiscal fragility (revenues concentrated in cyclically sensitive large firms) and a structural inequity: formal enterprises bear disproportionate tax obligations relative to informal competitors at the same income level.

Personal income tax operates on a narrow base: primarily formal sector employees whose wages are directly declared and withheld at source. Self-employed workers, informal business owners, and the large majority of agricultural income largely escape personal income taxation. The effective tax-to-GDP ratio on labour income in Morocco is therefore much lower than headline rates suggest, because the tax falls on a fraction of total labour income.

This structure has a fundamental implication for fiscal space: expanding Morocco’s fiscal capacity for development investment requires broadening the tax base, integrating the informal economy progressively, taxing capital gains and inheritance more systematically, and extending property taxes, rather than simply raising rates on the existing narrow formal base. Tax reform is therefore both a fiscal capacity question and a distributional question: who pays determines both what can be funded and whether the fiscal system contributes to or compounds inequality.

15.4 The paradox of austerity

The historical record of fiscal consolidation programmes is systematically misread in mainstream policy discourse. Blanchard and Leigh’s landmark 2013 IMF study demonstrated that fiscal multipliers in eurozone countries after 2010 were substantially above 1.0, meaning that every euro of spending cuts contracted the economy by more than a euro, worsening the recession rather than resolving it. Greece lost 25% of its GDP. Portugal, Spain, and Ireland experienced deep recessions with unemployment rates exceeding 20%.

The spiral logic is straightforward once one takes multipliers seriously. An economic shock reduces tax revenues and automatically increases social spending. The deficit widens and debt rises. Creditors or international institutions impose austerity: spending cuts, tax increases, reduced transfers. These measures, by reducing public demand, deepen the recession. Household and firm incomes fall, consumption and investment contract, fiscal revenues fall further, and debt continues rising despite the adjustment effort. This is the austerity paradox: measures designed to stabilise debt can be self-defeating by destroying the growth that alone makes debt sustainable.

Morocco experienced a moderate version of this dynamic during 2013-2016, when reducing the fiscal deficit from 7.3% of GDP in 2012 to below 4% by 2016 was accompanied by a growth slowdown and retreat in public investment, without significantly reversing the debt trajectory. The lesson: fiscal adjustments are necessary when well-calibrated, gradual, and accompanied by structural reform of expenditure composition rather than simple cuts, and when their timing is not procyclical.

15.5 Modern Monetary Theory: the constraint is not the debt

Modern Monetary Theory, developed in the United States from the 1990s-2000s by Warren Mosler, L. Randall Wray, and Stephanie Kelton, starts from a simple observation about contemporary monetary systems: a state that issues its own currency can technically never “run out of money” in its own denomination. It creates money by spending and destroys it by taxing. The logical sequence is not “the state collects taxes, then spends” but the reverse: “the state spends by creating money, and taxes serve to regulate the quantity of money in circulation and give it value.”

This framing inverts the priorities of fiscal debate. The real constraint is not debt or deficit, but inflation: as long as the economy has underutilised real resources (unemployed workers, idle factories, available productive capacity), the state can spend more without triggering inflation. It is only when resources are fully mobilised that additional spending becomes inflationary.

The MMT’s signature policy proposal is the job guarantee: the state offers employment at the minimum wage to anyone willing to work. This programme becomes a powerful automatic stabiliser, expanding when unemployment rises, contracting when private employment recovers, without requiring discretionary political decisions. It replaces unemployment as the instrument of inflation regulation (which central banks achieve by slowing the economy to reduce labour demand) with a public employment buffer whose size varies with the cycle.

MMT’s application to Morocco is limited by structural constraints that its proponents, calibrated for reserve-currency-issuing developed economies, underweigh. A significant share of Morocco’s public debt is denominated in foreign currency: creating dirhams does not service these obligations. Imported inflation, driven by dependence on energy and food imports priced in dollars, is a real risk that domestic money creation cannot address. Rating agencies and institutional lenders monitor fiscal credibility. These constraints are real.

But MMT is not without Moroccan relevance. It challenges the taboo on deficits as an end in themselves, invites recasting the debate around available real resources rather than accounting balances, and reminds that the objective of economic policy should be full employment, not market satisfaction. The question “can we afford to spend?” is in many contexts badly posed: the relevant question is “what real resources do we have available, and what institutional framework would allow us to mobilise them?”

15.6 Godley’s sectoral balances: the arithmetic of fiscal space

Wynne Godley’s sectoral balances approach provides the most rigorous analytical tool for evaluating whether a fiscal position is sustainable, and whether “fiscal consolidation” makes arithmetic sense.

The starting point is an accounting identity true by construction:

\[\underbrace{(S - I)}_{\text{private sector}} + \underbrace{(T - G)}_{\text{public sector}} + \underbrace{(M - X)}_{\text{external sector}} = 0\]

The three sectoral balances must sum to zero. The private sector’s net financial saving plus the government’s budget balance plus the current account balance must always add to zero, this is not a theory but an arithmetic fact, like a balance sheet.

The implication is stark. If the external sector runs a deficit (\(M > X\), i.e., more imports than exports, so external sector absorbs domestic savings) and if the private sector seeks to accumulate net savings (\(S > I\), typical after a shock as firms and households rebuild balance sheets), then the government must run a deficit. There is no arithmetic alternative.

Godley’s identity applied to Morocco, 2023

Morocco’s approximate sectoral balances in 2023: - Current account deficit: approximately -2.5% of GDP (the external sector absorbs net national savings) - Private sector seeking positive net savings after recent shocks: approximately +1 to +2% of GDP - Government balance: necessarily around -4 to -5% of GDP

If the government decided to eliminate its deficit by force, it would need to impose on the private sector an equivalent contraction: reducing household incomes, compressing corporate profits, or forcing a recession until imports fell enough to rebalance the external account. Fiscal austerity “succeeds” in reducing the public deficit by reducing activity, but at the price of a recession. The public deficit is often merely the reflection of the external deficit and the private sector’s savings need, not its cause. Evaluating fiscal sustainability requires reading the coherence between all three balances, not the public balance in isolation.

This Godley framework is what correctly predicted the eurozone crisis before it occurred. By 2007, Godley had shown that Germany’s persistent current account surpluses necessarily implied equivalent deficits in the south of the eurozone, and that these imbalances were unsustainable without a fiscal transfer mechanism. The crisis that erupted in 2010 was the arithmetic result he had identified three years earlier.

15.7 The South Global critique: the external constraint

The South Global economists, Dani Rodrik, Jayati Ghosh, Ha-Joon Chang, and the structuralist Latin American tradition of Prebisch, Furtado, and their contemporary heirs, insist that the Keynesian standard framework was built for developed economies with sovereign currencies and low external dependence. For emerging and developing economies, the conditions are radically different.

External constraints manifest across several registers. A fiscal stimulus in a country with a structural trade deficit partly translates into import increases, multiplier leakage. This creates pressure on foreign exchange reserves and can trigger currency depreciation that raises the cost of foreign-currency-denominated debt: a vicious cycle. Rating agencies can downgrade the sovereign, increasing the risk premium and therefore financing costs, precisely when financing is most needed. This is what Guillermo Calvo called the sudden stop: an abrupt halt to capital inflows that forces a brutal adjustment of domestic demand. Countries with high external debt and weak currencies are structurally vulnerable to this form of crisis, which converts an ordinary recession into an external financing crisis.

For Morocco, the external constraint is real but manageable: a current account deficit of 1-2.5% of GDP (significantly improved since 2022), foreign exchange reserves covering approximately 5-6 months of imports (comfortable but not inexhaustible), and approximately 25-30% of public debt in foreign currency. The strategic implication is that Morocco’s fiscal multiplier is structurally limited by import propensity, and that the most effective use of fiscal space is expenditure that directly builds domestic productive capacity, reduces import dependence, and expands the tax base.

This leads to what Rodrik calls the strategic framing: the question for developing economies is not “can we afford to spend more?” but “how to spend in ways that expand domestic productive capacity and reduce the external dependence that limits precisely the fiscal room?” Industrial policy in the PAI sense, investment in domestic input supply chains, and integration policy that increases the domestic value content of exports are all ways of simultaneously expanding fiscal multipliers and reducing external constraints. This is a development strategy question as much as a macroeconomic stabilisation question.


15.8 Morocco’s three macroeconomic crises: institutional lessons

Morocco’s post-independence macroeconomic history contains three episodes that illuminate fiscal and monetary policy effectiveness under Moroccan structural conditions, and that make the theoretical frameworks of this chapter concrete.

The 1983 structural adjustment crisis: following the collapse of phosphate prices and the global oil shock, Morocco entered the 1980s with an unsustainable external position. The IMF-designed structural adjustment programme imposed fiscal consolidation, subsidy elimination on food and fuel, public wage freezes, privatisation, and import liberalisation. The social consequences were immediate: the bread riots of January 1984 in Marrakech, Nador, Tétouan, and Al-Hoceima directly resulted from the removal of food subsidies. A decade of structural adjustment produced fiscal stabilisation and created the institutional conditions for a market economy. But it terminated the directed credit model that had supported early industrialisation, reduced public investment, and generated a decade of slow growth and stagnant private investment. The lesson from this episode: fiscal consolidation imposed in a context of external shock, without growth-supporting alternatives, shifts adjustment costs onto the most vulnerable, destroys productive capacity needed for long-run growth, and undermines the social contract that makes market economies politically sustainable.

The 2011-2012 twin shocks: the global commodity price surge of 2010-2011 and the domestic political pressures of the Arab Spring combined to create a severe fiscal challenge. Fuel and food subsidies expanded massively through the Caisse de Compensation to shield households from commodity prices, ballooning to nearly 6% of GDP. The fiscal deficit reached 7.3% of GDP in 2012. The subsequent consolidation replaced the universal subsidy system with targeted transfer programmes, progressively transitioning toward the RSU-based direct transfer model. This consolidation was better designed than the 1983 programme: more gradual, with social protection instruments that preserved vulnerable household purchasing power rather than cutting it. But the fiscal tightening coincided with weak growth in 2013-2016, again illustrating the procyclical risks of consolidation during demand shortfall.

The COVID-2022 compound shock: Morocco’s first genuinely counter-cyclical fiscal response, the Special COVID Fund operated as a discretionary stimulus during the shock, complemented by monetary accommodation. The key institutional lesson: response quality correlated with prior institutional infrastructure. Support was faster and more targeted where existing social protection infrastructure existed (formal sector workers with CNSS coverage, enterprises with banking relationships) and slower, more imprecise, and incomplete where it did not (informal workers, unregistered enterprises). Building the institutional mechanisms in advance is not merely good governance; it is the operational precondition for effective crisis response.

16 The Moroccan Fiscal Architecture: Automatic Stabilisers as a Strategic Investment

Morocco’s structural macroeconomic vulnerability, high sensitivity to droughts, fluctuations in MRE remittances, and commodity price shocks, is amplified by the weakness of automatic stabilisers. Unemployment insurance covers less than 10% of active workers. In Europe, unemployment allowances can pay 60-70% of the previous salary for one to two years, a massive shock absorber that maintains a large fraction of household consumption even when employment collapses.

Morocco’s social protection reform of 2021-2025 (generalisation of AMO health insurance, expansion of family allowances, construction of unemployment insurance) is therefore not only a social justice project. It is a macroeconomic investment. A simple calculation illustrates: if 500,000 additional workers lose their employment during a recession, and if unemployment insurance replaces 50% of average previous salary (approximately 2,500 MAD per month), the multiplier effect of this income maintenance would preserve approximately 3-4 billion dirhams of demand, automatically, without any ministerial signature, limiting the contraction of consumption precisely when its maintenance is most valuable.

The Registre Social Unifié (RSU), the centralised household database designed to enable targeted cash transfers, provides the information infrastructure for a new generation of automatic stabilisers that can activate quickly in crises without the months of administrative delay that discretionary programmes typically require. Building these institutional mechanisms before the next crisis, not in response to it, is the macroeconomic case for Morocco’s ongoing social protection reform, quite apart from its social justice dimension.


17 Conclusion: Employment, Distribution, and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy

This chapter has established six propositions that together constitute the political economy of macroeconomic stabilisation.

Markets do not automatically produce full employment. The paradox of thrift, the volatility of investment expectations, and the liquidity trap are structural features of capitalist dynamics that Keynes identified in 1936 and that Morocco’s employment statistics confirm empirically: 13.3% official unemployment, 36.7% youth unemployment, and a female participation rate below 20% cannot be attributed to market frictions alone. They reflect the Kaleckian reality that the labour market distributes bargaining power unequally, and that the private investment decisions that would create formal employment are structured by profit expectations that are themselves shaped by aggregate demand, which loops back to fiscal and monetary policy.

The multiplier is real but contextual. Morocco’s effective fiscal multiplier is 0.6 to 1.2, structurally smaller than textbook values because of import leakages in a highly open economy. The quality and targeting of expenditure matters as much as its volume. Fiscal policy that maximises domestic content, targets low-income households, and invests in sectors with strong domestic linkages achieves higher multipliers.

Kalecki’s political economy explains the resistance to full employment. The disciplinary function of unemployment, keeping wages and labour militancy in check, gives concentrated capital a structural interest in maintaining slack in labour markets. Understanding this dynamic is indispensable for diagnosing why full employment is politically contested even when it is technically achievable.

IS-LM and AS-AD are tools, not laws. They organise thinking about demand and supply interactions and policy trade-offs. They have known limitations in developing economies: investment may not respond reliably to interest rates, the money multiplier is unstable, and the external constraint can dominate domestic adjustment. The COVID and 2022 inflation episodes in Morocco are diagnostic exercises that reveal both the models’ analytical utility and their limits.

Godley’s sectoral balances reframes fiscal sustainability. Morocco’s public deficit is not an autonomous choice; it is largely the arithmetic counterpart of the current account deficit and the private sector’s savings surplus. Evaluating fiscal policy requires reading the coherence of all three balances, not the public balance in isolation.

Building automatic stabilisers is Morocco’s most important macroeconomic structural reform. AMO, RSU, unemployment insurance, and direct household transfers are not social expenditures traded against fiscal prudence, they are the infrastructure for macroeconomic resilience. An economy with strong automatic stabilisers requires smaller, slower, and less politically contentious discretionary interventions to weather the next shock.

What this chapter should leave with the reader

Involuntary unemployment is possible as a stable equilibrium, not a temporary market friction but a macroeconomic coordination failure. The market has no automatic return mechanism to full employment.

The Keynesian multiplier amplifies public expenditure: \(\Delta Y = \frac{1}{1-c} \cdot \Delta G\) in theory, but substantially smaller in practice due to import leakages, tax leakages, and savings behaviour. For Morocco, 0.6 to 1.2 is the empirical range.

Kalecki showed that full employment is politically contested because it reduces the disciplinary function of unemployment over labour, the structural business community resistance to reflation is not a policy preference but an interest.

IS-LM jointly determines equilibrium output and interest rate. Fiscal policy is most effective when monetary policy accommodates it. The liquidity trap, near-zero rates, flat LM, is precisely when fiscal policy is the dominant stabilisation instrument.

Public debt dynamics depend on \(r - g\). When growth exceeds the real interest rate, modest deficits are compatible with stable debt-to-GDP ratios.

Godley’s identity: private sector surplus + public sector surplus + external surplus = 0, always. Morocco’s public deficit is the arithmetic counterpart of its current account deficit and private savings need, not an autonomous policy choice.

Building automatic stabilisers (AMO, RSU, unemployment insurance) is Morocco’s most important macroeconomic structural investment, not a social expenditure traded against fiscal discipline.


18 Further Reading

Keynes, J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Macmillan. Chapters 1-3 and 8-10 on effective demand and the paradox of thrift. The intellectual foundation of this chapter.

Kalecki, M. (1943). “Political Aspects of Full Employment.” Political Quarterly. The most important short paper in political economy of the 20th century. Six pages that explain more about macroeconomics than most textbooks.

Kalecki, M. (1971). Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy. Cambridge University Press. The collected formalisation of Kalecki’s macroeconomic framework.

Godley, W. and Lavoie, M. (2007). Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth. Palgrave Macmillan. The systematic development of the sectoral balances framework. Technical but essential for serious fiscal analysis.

Blanchard, O. and Leigh, D. (2013). “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers.” IMF Working Paper. The paper in which IMF economists admitted that fiscal multipliers had been systematically underestimated during the eurozone austerity of 2010-2013.

Kelton, S. (2020). The Deficit Myth. PublicAffairs. The most accessible statement of Modern Monetary Theory. Engaging, though the constraints on developing economies are underdeveloped.

Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton University Press. The most rigorous argument for context-sensitive macroeconomic policy for developing economies. Chapter 4 on growth diagnostics is directly applicable to Morocco.

HCP. Enquête nationale sur l’emploi (annual). The primary empirical source on Moroccan labour market conditions. Freely available at hcp.ma.