3 Chapter 1 — What Economics Is, and Is Not
Theories, methods, and the multiplicity of perspectives
“The purpose of studying economics is to learn how not to be deceived by economists.” — Joan Robinson
“Profit is the realised value of human labour.” — Ibn Khaldoun, Al-Muqaddima (1377)
The Map
Before studying firms, markets, money, or growth, this book pauses to examine the instrument it will use. The chapters that follow traverse the major questions of economic life: how enterprises organise production, how markets coordinate millions of decisions, how money structures trust, how states intervene, how economies grow or stagnate. But before using these instruments, it is necessary to understand what they are, what they do, what they allow one to see, and what they risk concealing.
This chapter is not an abstract introduction to epistemology. It is a compass. It answers simple questions that have less simple answers: What does economics study? Why do its practitioners disagree so fundamentally on essential questions? Are its models true or useful, and what is the difference? Are its prescriptions scientific truths or political choices dressed as technical requirements? And for an economist working in a developing society, what is the real role?
The answer to the last question carries a particular weight. The dominant centres of academic economics, a handful of American and British universities, a small number of prestigious journals, define the frontier of the discipline, set the questions that matter, and validate the methods that count. This creates a structural asymmetry: economists trained at these centres bring tools designed for their contexts and apply them elsewhere, sometimes with genuine usefulness and sometimes with genuine distortion. The economist working in Morocco, in Côte d’Ivoire, or in Bangladesh faces a double task: mastering those tools with enough depth to use them critically, and adapting or supplementing them when the local reality requires it. This is not a lesser intellectual mission than producing at the global frontier. In many ways it is harder, and more urgently needed.
4 Part I — Defining Economics: Scarcity, Choice, Markets, and Wealth
Every discipline begins with its definitions. In economics, those definitions are themselves at stake: they are not neutral, and they shape what is considered worth studying.
4.1 Six competing definitions
The definition one adopts for economics is not an innocent preamble. It determines which problems the economist treats as economic problems, which actors are placed at the centre, which mechanisms are sought, and what is set aside. Before adopting any definition, it is worth understanding what each of the major competing definitions sees — and what each leaves in the dark.
Economics as the science of choice under scarcity. The most widely taught definition in contemporary universities is the one Lionel Robbins formulated in 1932 in his Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science: economics is the science that studies human behaviour as a relationship between multiple ends and scarce means that have alternative uses. Wherever resources are scarce and uses are multiple, there is an allocation problem. The concept of opportunity cost, the idea that every choice implies a renouncement, becomes central. Allocating time to work means renouncing leisure. Subsidising agriculture means forgoing the same funds for health or education. This logic of trade-offs is universal and analytically productive.
The power of Robbins’s definition is also its limit. By centring analysis on individual choice under constraint, it tends to make the rational maximising agent its central character. Institutions, power relations, distributional conflicts, and historical structures enter as given constraints rather than as objects of analysis in their own right. This definition illuminates consumption choices, factor allocation, and pricing decisions. But it can obscure questions of collective production, market power, and structural transformation — precisely the questions that matter most in developing economies.
Economics as the study of behaviours, preferences, and incentives. A variant of Robbins’s definition, developed by contemporary behavioural economics, enriches the notion of rationality without abandoning it. Gary Becker applied the logic of rational choice to domains that seemed outside economics’ traditional scope — crime, the family, discrimination. Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler demonstrated that real agents systematically deviate from formal rationality, but in predictable ways: loss aversion, framing effects, present bias, overconfidence. This approach considerably enriches the predictive capacity of models, and nudge policies are its direct practical application.
Economics as the study of markets, prices, and coordination. A third definition conceives economics as the study of how human activities are coordinated through markets and prices. Adam Smith’s invisible hand, the idea that agents pursuing their individual interest can produce collectively beneficial outcomes without intending to, is the most celebrated formulation of this intuition. This approach is powerful for understanding decentralised coordination and price signals. But it tends to present the market as the natural mode of coordination, rendering other institutions, firms, states, families, networks of trust, implicitly secondary or exceptional.
Economics as the study of the production, circulation, and distribution of wealth. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx had a radically different definition. For them, political economy is the study of how a society collectively organises the production of what it lives on, how those riches circulate between actors, and how they are distributed between classes, sectors, and nations. The central question is no longer: how does one choose under the constraint of scarcity? It is: who produces what, with what means, in what type of organisation, and who receives the proceeds? These questions foreground collective actors, classes in Marx, nations in List, corporations in Smith, and historical structures that the Robbinsian definition tends to efface.
Economics as the study of institutions. The institutional economics of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Douglass North, and Elinor Ostrom conceives economics as the study of the institutions that organise the material life of societies. These institutions, property rights, contractual systems, behavioural norms, regulatory agencies, administrative structures, are not given constraints. They are historical, political, and social constructions, shaped by power relations, susceptible to transformation, and frequently contested. For developing economies, this definition is particularly relevant: the central question is often not which policies to apply, but which institutions to build so that policies are credible, effectively implemented, and durable.
Economics as the study of well-being and capabilities. Amartya Sen developed a sixth approach: what matters is not wealth produced in itself, but the capacity of individuals to lead a life they have good reason to value — access to education, health, political participation, dignity. This definition leads to very different measures of development than GDP per capita alone.
4.2 Why this book favours the classical definition
This book adopts the classical definition of economics as the study of the creation, circulation, and distribution of wealth. This choice is deliberate and deserves an explicit justification.
The Robbinsian definition is powerful for analysing agents facing resource constraints. It produces precise, testable, and practically useful models for sectoral policy. But it presents an economy without history, without classes, and without distributional conflicts. It treats preferences as given and exogenous, without asking how they form, who shapes them, and to what degree they reflect power relations. It tends to present market outcomes as optima from which public policies can only improve or degrade allocation — a strong normative presupposition that is not a scientific truth.
The classical definition allows, by contrast, holding together questions that a purely allocative approach artificially separates. Understanding a firm is not only understanding how it maximises profit under cost constraints: it is understanding how it organises labour, generates or destroys skills, distributes its gains between shareholders, managers, and workers, and inserts itself into a global value chain. Understanding a market is not only understanding the supply-demand equilibrium: it is understanding who has the power to set prices, who bears the risks, how the rules were constructed and by whom, and to what extent gains are captured by a few actors or diffused broadly.
Preferring the classical definition does not mean abandoning neoclassical tools. It means using them while placing them in a broader framework that does not forget that allocative efficiency is only one dimension of economic performance, and that the distribution of gains, between classes, sectors, regions, generations, is an equally fundamental dimension. This articulation is what this book seeks to construct, chapter by chapter.
5 Part II — Economics as Social Science: Rigour, Reflexivity, and Limits
Economics frequently presents itself as a science. But what kind of science, exactly? This part examines the criteria of scientific rigour applicable to a discipline whose object is itself a social being that reacts to the theories that describe it.
5.1 Subject, object, and the difficulty of social science
The distinction between the knowing subject and the known object is foundational to scientific method. In the natural sciences, this distinction is relatively clear. A chemist analysing a molecule is not herself a molecule. An astronomer observing a nebula faces no risk that the nebula will modify its behaviour in response to observation. The object is stable, indifferent to the gaze, measurable through instruments whose precision can be verified independently of the observer.
In the social sciences, this distinction blurs in a structural way. The economist who studies labour markets is herself a worker, or an employer, or a rentier, or a civil servant. She belongs to a social class, a generation, a nation, an institution. She has been trained in a particular academic context, with its dominant paradigms, its prestige journals, its frontier debates, its funders. Her analytical categories, wage, profit, capital, unemployment, value added, rent, productivity, are not neutral terms that describe reality transparently. They are historically constructed, socially contested, and bear the mark of the conflicts that preceded their formation.
This situation is not unique to economics. It runs through all social sciences. But in economics it is particularly intense for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First, because economics deals with questions that directly affect the interests of the most powerful social actors, firms, banks, governments, international institutions, all of which have strong reasons to seek to influence research conclusions, to fund theoretical currents that serve them, and to delegitimise those that challenge them. Second, because economics has developed a formal apparatus, mathematical models, econometric tests, randomised experiments, that gives it the appearance of an exact science, sometimes concealing the normative assumptions and political choices underlying its results.
Pierre Bourdieu developed this point with precision in his theory of the academic field. In every academic field, including economics, researchers struggle for the legitimate definition of the object, valid methods, important questions, and the boundary of what counts as economics. These conflicts are not only intellectual: they are also conflicts over recognition, positions, funding, and influence on public policy. The structure of the international academic field, dominated by a handful of American and British universities, a small number of prestigious journals that concentrate prestige, a small group of economists who monopolise institutional advisory spaces, is not without effect on which questions are asked, which methods are valorised, and which objects are judged worthy of attention.
The response to this challenge is not relativism, the idea that all economic positions are equally valid because they all reflect interests. It is the demand for reflexivity: the economist must be capable of questioning the social conditions of production of her own knowledge, identifying the presuppositions of her models, recognising the questions she does not ask, and making explicit the normative values that orient her recommendations.
5.2 The criteria of scientific rigour in economics
Economics can be rigorous without claiming to be a social physics. Its scientific character rests on precise demands that define what distinguishes a serious economic analysis from an opinion dressed in numbers.
Clarity of assumptions. Every economic model rests on assumptions, about agent rationality, market completeness, information availability, the nature of competition. The first demand of rigour is to make them explicit rather than leaving them implicit. A model that assumes rational expectations, complete markets, and zero transaction costs is not a model of the real economy: it is a model of an idealised economy. This idealisation can be useful for isolating a pure mechanism, provided one does not confuse it with reality or use it to justify policies in contexts where its assumptions are violated.
Logical consistency. An economic argument must be coherent: conclusions must follow from assumptions. Recommending simultaneously a tax reduction and a reduction in the fiscal deficit without specifying which expenditures to cut, or promising both a more competitive industry and higher wages without identifying the productivity mechanism that would reconcile them, are forms of logical incoherence disguised as economic policy.
Confrontation with facts. Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of scientific character: a scientific theory must formulate predictions that can be contradicted by the data. In economics, strict falsifiability faces a practical problem: theories are bundles of linked assumptions. When a prediction fails, one cannot know which assumption is at fault, one can always rescue the model by relaxing a peripheral assumption rather than abandoning the core. Falsifiability is therefore a useful aspiration but cannot be applied mechanically.
Paradigms and their succession. Thomas Kuhn showed that science progresses not by successive refutations but by paradigm shifts. A dominant paradigm, a set of founding assumptions, validated methods, and legitimate problems, organises the field until accumulated anomalies become unbearable and a new paradigm imposes itself. The history of economics illustrates this pattern: the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s, the monetarist counter-revolution of the 1970s, the rational expectations turn of the 1980s, the empirical revolution of the 2000s, and now the integration of the financial sector and instability models in the wake of 2008.
The discipline of proof. An economic claim that aspires to rigour must be supported by data, identified estimation methods, and a discussion of possible biases. Correlation between two variables is not causation. An effect observed in one particular context does not automatically generalise to others. A theory that correctly predicts past data does not necessarily predict future data if structural parameters change.
5.3 What economics can and cannot do
Economics is often judged by its predictive capacity. By this criterion, it seems regularly found wanting: economists did not precisely foresee the 2008 financial crisis, the 2021-2022 stagflation, or many currency crises documented in their leading indicators. This verdict is real but rests on a badly formulated expectation.
Economies are open, historical, political, and reflexive systems. Their fundamental parameters are not stable over time. Predicting their evolution with the precision of a short-range weather forecast is a fundamentally limited objective, not because economists lack methods, but because the nature of the objects studied does not permit it. What economics can do is something else, and these other functions are often more valuable.
It can explain mechanisms: why an increase in Bank Al-Maghrib’s policy rate slows investment by raising the cost of credit; why a monopoly sets prices above marginal cost; why a currency depreciation improves exporters’ competitiveness but deteriorates importers’ purchasing power. These mechanistic explanations are robust even when quantitative prediction remains uncertain.
It can understand configurations: why the Korean economy industrialised rapidly in the 1960s-1990s while other economies starting from comparable levels did not, despite similar geographic and demographic contexts. These configurational questions are not answered by a prediction but by a comparative analysis of institutional, political, and strategic conditions.
It can diagnose constraints: identifying what blocks growth in a particular economy, whether it is an investment financing problem, a skills shortage, weak logistics infrastructure, poor corporate governance, informational asymmetries in financial markets, or insufficient competitive pressure on incumbent firms. This diagnostic work is the core of the economist’s job in the service of public policy, and the Hausmann-Rodrik-Velasco method (developed in later chapters) gives it a rigorous analytical framework.
It can formulate conditional scenarios: if this policy is adopted, what are its probable effects under specified conditions, with what risks and uncertainties? These scenarios are not univocal predictions; they organise trade-offs and make visible effects that would remain hidden without analysis.
6 Part III — Economic Models: The Power of Abstraction and the Risk of Distortion
6.1 Why economists build models
The economic world has a complexity that defies any complete description. Millions of agents take millions of decisions simultaneously, interacting with each other, in different institutional, historical, and cultural contexts, under conditions of imperfect information, with expectations about an uncertain future. To describe this complexity in its totality would not only be impossible, it would be useless. A map at 1:1 scale helps no one find the way.
A model is a simplified representation of reality constructed to isolate a particular mechanism. It does not describe the world as it is; it extracts a relationship to make it intelligible by temporarily freezing the rest. The central formula of every economic model is ceteris paribus, all else equal. This abstraction allows the temporary suspension of part of complexity to understand a particular effect: if one wants to understand the effect of the price of bread on the quantity demanded, one temporarily assumes that incomes, the prices of substitutes, preferences, and all other variables remain constant.
This abstraction is indispensable for analysis to be possible. But it becomes dangerous when one forgets that things are almost never equal by assumption in real economies. A bread price increase can simultaneously trigger a demand for wage increases, pressure on governments to subsidise cereals, and substitution toward other starches, and these effects may dominate the direct effect measured by the isolated supply-and-demand model.
6.2 The economist’s toolkit
Economics is not a single method. It is a toolkit, and the economist’s competence lies in choosing the right instrument for the right problem.
Partial equilibrium models analyse a particular market while taking conditions in other markets as given. Supply curve, demand curve, equilibrium, consumer and producer surplus, the incidence of a tax or subsidy: these tools allow the analysis of sectoral policy effects with useful precision. Will a rise in the excise tax on sugary drinks affect producers or consumers more? Price elasticity of demand and supply elasticity answer this question, and their empirical measurement is possible. These models are insufficient the moment effects propagate through the whole economy.
General equilibrium models account for interdependence among all markets simultaneously. A rise in the price of oil affects transport costs, which affect agricultural prices, which affect rural incomes, which affect demand for manufactured goods, which affect urban employment, in a cascade. Leontief’s input-output tables and the Social Accounting Matrices used by Morocco’s Haut-Commissariat au Plan allow these interdependencies to be modelled and the macroeconomic impact of sectoral shocks or policy changes to be estimated.
Macroeconomic models represent the economy as a whole through equations linking national income, interest rates, inflation, employment, and output. The IS-LM model of John Hicks remains the standard introduction to macroeconomic policy mechanisms. DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models dominate contemporary central banks: they have the advantage of microfounded consistency, and the disadvantage of having long ignored the financial sector.
Game theory analyses decisions by agents who mutually anticipate each other’s choices. It is indispensable for all situations of strategic interdependence: industrial duopolies, wage negotiations, relationships between banks and regulators, competition policy in the face of cartel behaviour. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates how individual rationality can produce collectively suboptimal results, a lesson that applies directly to understanding cartels, free-trade agreements, and macroeconomic policy commitments.
Econometrics allows the estimation of quantitative relationships in real data. The revolution in identification econometrics, instrumental variables, natural experiments, differences-in-differences, regression discontinuity, has made it possible to estimate causal effects from observational data. These methods have transformed empirical research practices in economics since the 1990s and constitute standard equipment that every modern economist must command.
Experimental methods apply to development economics the logic of medical clinical trials. Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee, and Michael Kremer (Nobel Prize 2019) used these methods to evaluate the impact of educational programmes in India and Kenya, cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa, and microcredit in several low-income countries. These evaluations led to the abandonment of programmes presumed effective and the scaling of interventions whose impact had been underestimated.
Historical and institutional comparison allows learning from the diversity of national trajectories over the long term. Why did South Korea industrialise rapidly? How did Botswana transform its mineral revenues into solid institutions? How did OCP move from raw extraction to an integrated agri-nutrition strategy? These long-run questions require process analysis, institutional configurations, and political choices that formal models cannot handle alone.
6.3 The limits of models
Every model leaves something in the shadow. The question is not whether a model simplifies, that is its definition, but whether what it leaves aside is secondary or essential for the problem one seeks to address.
Standard general equilibrium models assume complete markets, well-informed agents, and perfect competition. These assumptions allow the demonstration of the allocative efficiency of competitive markets: this is the contribution of the two fundamental welfare theorems. But they leave precisely out of frame the informational asymmetries, market power, externalities, and public goods that constitute most of the real economic problems that public policies seek to correct. All of economic policy, regulation, antitrust, environmental taxation, public goods provision, only makes sense where these assumptions are violated.
The dominant macroeconomic models of the 1990-2008 period represented an economy without a financial sector, or with a financial sector assumed to be perfectly efficient and transparent. The 2008 crisis revealed the catastrophic cost of this omission. Hyman Minsky had said so decades earlier: but his work on the endogenous instability of financial markets was marginal in the leading universities until the crisis made it unavoidable. This is a perfect example of how anomalies accumulate without producing a paradigmatic revision, until a major crisis makes the intellectual status quo untenable.
Joseph Schumpeter had identified a fundamental limit of equilibrium models: they cannot account for economic change. Innovation, entrepreneurship, creative destruction, the emergence of new sectors and the decline of old ones are dynamic processes that static analyses capture poorly. Understanding how Morocco’s automotive sector emerged around the Renault plant at Tanger-Med and developed into an ecosystem of subcontractors and local suppliers requires an analysis of industrial dynamics, organisational learning, and investment policies that models of static competition do not furnish.
7 Part IV — Empirical Economics: Understanding Before Measuring
7.1 Data are social constructions
Contemporary economics has undergone a remarkable empirical revolution since the 1990s. The availability of massive administrative databases, tax registers, social security data, customs files, digitised banking transactions, mobile phone data, has opened analytical possibilities that did not exist twenty years ago. This revolution has produced important knowledge. But it carries a risk of methodological reductionism that must be named.
Data never speak alone. They have a history of production that the economist must understand before using them: who collected them, with what institutional resources, according to what classification categories, with what coverage of populations and activities, and with what potential biases. Economic data are institutional and methodological constructions, not transparent reflections of reality.
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, in Laboratory Life (1979), showed that scientific facts do not impose themselves on researchers: they are the result of labour, instruments of measurement, protocols, conventions, institutions that validate and diffuse them. In economics, this takes a concrete form. Morocco’s CPI is calculated by the HCP from a basket of goods representative of an average urban household. This basket under-represents the expenditures of poor rural households, informal products, and non-medicalised health services. When one reads that “inflation was 6.6% in 2022”, one is reading the evolution of an index built from a particular basket, not the same reality for all Moroccan households. Rural households heavily dependent on food prices experienced perceived inflation significantly above this aggregate figure.
Beyond quantitative data, economists have a broader empirical arsenal. Semi-structured interviews with economic actors, firm managers, public policy officials, workers, farmers, allow one to understand logics of action, perceived constraints, policy interpretation mechanisms, that aggregated data cannot capture. Historical archives allow the reconstruction of past economic processes with a richness that statistical series cannot replicate. Direct field observations, how an informal market actually functions, how an agricultural cooperative works, how an export processing zone operates, produce knowledge about the concrete mechanisms of coordination that theoretical models presuppose without describing.
7.2 The plurality of empirical methods
The methods available to the economist are complementary, not substitutable. Each is suited to certain types of questions and poorly suited to others. Econometric identification methods are powerful for estimating the causal effect of a specific intervention, the impact of a minimum wage increase on employment in the formal sector, the effect of a trade liberalisation episode on manufacturing productivity, provided one can find an instrument or natural experiment that isolates the variation of interest. These methods are poorly suited to the large questions of structural transformation: why do some countries industrialise and others do not, why do developmental states sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, how do informal economies persist across decades of formulation policy?
For these questions, comparative historical analysis, the tradition of Alexander Gerschenkron, Albert Hirschman, Alice Amsden, and Dani Rodrik, provides indispensable insight. By comparing the Korean, Taiwanese, Botswanan, and Moroccan trajectories, identifying what conditions were present when success occurred and absent when it did not, one can develop hypotheses about the mechanisms at work that no experimental method could identify because there is only one history.
The practical implication for reading economic analysis is to ask, for each claim, what type of evidence supports it, what questions that type of evidence can reliably answer, and whether those are in fact the questions being asked. A randomised evaluation of a conditional cash transfer programme in rural Morocco can establish rigorously whether the programme improved school attendance in the treated villages. It cannot establish whether, at national scale over a generation, social protection reforms of this type change the structural relationship between education investment and labour market outcomes. Both are important questions. They require different methods.
8 Part V — Schools of Thought: A Pluralist Map
8.1 The major intellectual traditions
Economics is not a unified discipline with a single set of agreed foundations. It is a field of competing traditions that have developed different analytical tools, asked different questions, and reached different conclusions. Understanding these traditions, not just their outputs but their internal logic and their blind spots, is an essential part of economic literacy.
The classical tradition (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill) analyses the economy as a system for the production and distribution of surplus. Its central preoccupations are: What determines the growth of national wealth? How is the surplus distributed between landowners (rent), capitalists (profit), and workers (wages)? What is the source of exchange value? These questions led to the theory of comparative advantage, the theory of rent, and the labour theory of value. The classical tradition set the agenda for the two centuries of economic debate that followed.
The Marxist tradition takes the classical framework and turns it into a theory of capitalism as a specific mode of production with internal contradictions. Capital is accumulated surplus value extracted from wage labour through the production process. Competition forces capitalists to invest in labour-saving technologies, raising the organic composition of capital and tending to produce a falling rate of profit. The theory generates testable hypotheses about technological change, industrial concentration, the business cycle, and the tendency of capitalism to produce crises. Whether or not one accepts Marx’s theoretical foundations, his analysis of capitalism as a dynamic, contradiction-laden system with internal tendencies toward instability has been vindicated by the subsequent history of the system he studied.
The neoclassical tradition (Jevons, Walras, Marshall, Pigou) shifts the focus from the production of surplus to the allocation of scarce resources among competing uses. Value is determined by marginal utility, not by labour time. Markets, under competitive conditions, allocate resources efficiently. Distribution is explained by the marginal productivity of factors. This tradition generates the two fundamental welfare theorems, the tools of partial and general equilibrium analysis, and most of the microeconomics taught in contemporary universities.
The Keynesian tradition (Keynes, Kalecki, Robinson, Minsky) argues that the economy can reach stable equilibria well below full employment, that effective demand is the primary determinant of output in the short run, and that the financial system is endogenously destabilising. The classical and neoclassical traditions had assumed that Say’s Law held, that supply creates its own demand and that any unemployment was temporary and self-correcting. Keynes demonstrated that this was wrong: that an economy could get trapped in a low-employment equilibrium through insufficient aggregate demand, and that fiscal intervention was the appropriate correction. Michał Kalecki, working simultaneously and from a different theoretical direction, reached similar conclusions and added the crucial political dimension: full employment is politically threatening to capital because it eliminates the disciplinary function of the unemployment reserve army.
The institutionalist and evolutionary tradition (Veblen, Commons, Schumpeter, Nelson, Winter) insists that economic actors operate within institutional frameworks that shape their behaviour in ways that cannot be reduced to optimising responses to price signals. Firms are not production functions; they are organisations with routines, capabilities, internal politics, and path dependencies. Technologies are not freely available blueprints; they are tacit knowledge that must be built up through experience. Markets are not natural phenomena; they are institutional constructions that can be designed better or worse.
The structuralist and development tradition (Prebisch, Lewis, Myrdal, Hirschman, Amsden, Rodrik) argues that the international economy is structured in ways that systematically disadvantage developing countries, and that development requires active state intervention to overcome market failures that are particularly acute in contexts of structural transformation. The theory of comparative advantage, applied to a world where technological capabilities are unequally distributed and learning requires protection during infancy, leads to prescriptions that perpetuate peripheral status rather than enabling catching-up.
8.2 Individualism, holism, and institutions as mediation
The discipline is traversed since its origins by a fundamental tension in the way economic explanation is constructed: should one start from individuals or from structures?
Methodological individualism holds that social and economic phenomena must be explained from individual behaviours, the choices, constraints, and incentives of agents. This position, defended notably by Friedrich Hayek and economists in the neoclassical tradition, rests on a philosophical conviction: individuals are the only entities that decide, act, and have interests. Social classes, structures, or systems do not act by themselves; they are abstractions that merely aggregate individual behaviours. The analytical force of methodological individualism is considerable. It forces precision about mechanisms: which individual decides what, under what information constraints, with what incentives, in anticipation of what behaviours by others?
Holism asserts, by contrast, that social structures, classes, institutions, norms, power relations, precede and condition individual choices. Understanding why a Moroccan textile worker accepts a given wage cannot start only from her individual preferences: it requires understanding the power balance in the labour market, the level of unionisation in the sector, the minimum wage policy, the unemployment level in the region that determines workers’ resistance capacity, and the sectoral wage conventions. These structures cannot be deduced from individual behaviours; they precede, constrain, and sometimes determine them in ways that rational maximising agent models cannot represent.
Institutions provide the mediation between individual behaviours and collective structures. By institutions, one means the formal and informal rules of the game that organise economic interactions: property rights, contractual systems, accounting norms, money and payment conventions, regulatory agencies, wage conventions, social norms of market behaviour. These institutions are not naturally given. They are historical, political, and social constructions, shaped by power relations, susceptible to transformation, and often contested.
Douglass North demonstrated in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990) that differences in long-run economic performance are substantially explained by institutions. A country where property rights are insecure, contracts are difficult to enforce, and corruption generates uncertainty about the rules of the game will have lower investment and slower growth than a country with comparable endowments but stronger institutions. North distinguished formal institutions (laws, constitutions, regulations) from informal ones (norms, conventions, business cultures) and emphasised that the latter change much more slowly than the former. This is why formal institutional reforms often produce disappointing short-run effects: actors continue to follow the inherited informal rules even when the formal rules have changed.
Elinor Ostrom enriched this perspective by demonstrating that communities can develop effective institutional rules for managing common resources, fisheries, pastures, forests, irrigation systems, without external authority imposing them and without privatisation. Her lesson is that institutions need not be formal or state-provided to be effective. In Morocco, the collective water management systems in southern oases, the khettaras and their associated communal rules, are an eloquent example of an effective informal institution that neither the market nor the state constructed.
9 Part VI — Economics, Power, and Performativity
Economics does not float above politics. Economic theories have political consequences; political interests influence what economists choose to study; and economic models sometimes transform the world they describe. This part explores these entanglements.
9.1 Why economics is politically sensitive
Economics speaks about wealth, wages, profits, taxes, property, trade, money, debt, and the state. It directly affects the interests of the most powerful and most numerous social actors. These interests do not disappear before the models. The questions asked, the models privileged, the indicators used, and the policies recommended can be selected in ways that serve certain interests better than others, without the economists making these choices necessarily being conscious of it.
Recognising that economics is politically sensitive does not lead to the conclusion that it is merely ideology. This conclusion would be both false and intellectually lazy. Real economic mechanisms, the effect of an interest rate increase on investment, the relationship between monopoly and price, the fiscal multiplier under given conditions, are real and can be established with relative rigour. What is true is that the selection of questions, the presentation of results, and the formulation of recommendations can reflect interests as much as scientific truths.
The deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s-2000s was justified by serious economic arguments about market efficiency and risk diversification. These arguments were not wrong; they simplified, and they ignored the dynamics of endogenous instability that Minsky had documented. Whether this simplification was due to sincere intellectual blindness or to the influence of well-organised financial sectors on academic institutions is an open question, probably both simultaneously. What is not open is the consequence: the intellectual omission had catastrophic practical effects.
John Kenneth Galbraith had a phrase for the economist in the service of the status quo: technician of the convenient. The formulation is caricatural, but it points to a real risk that every economist must learn to recognise in her own practice. The response to this risk is transparency: making explicit the normative assumptions that underpin recommendations, clearly identifying what the data allow one to conclude and what they leave open, and acknowledging the interests that might benefit from a particular conclusion. These demands are not obstacles to economic science; they are an indispensable component of it.
9.2 Performativity and responsibility
The performativity of economic theories is one of the most important and least discussed ideas in standard economics teaching. A theory is performative when it does not merely describe the world but contributes to transforming it: when actors adopt its categories, models, and indicators in ways that shape their behaviours and, ultimately, the realities it was supposed to describe.
The most documented case is that of financial option pricing models. The Black-Scholes-Merton model, developed in the 1970s, not only provided a calculation tool but transformed the way options markets functioned: actors adopted the model as a common reference, actual prices converged toward the model’s predictions, not because the model was true in an absolute sense, but because its generalised adoption created the liquidity and convergence it presupposed. The model made itself true by being believed.
More generally: accounting norms define what counts as profit or loss in a firm, and therefore what managers seek to maximise. The sovereign rating systems of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch define what counts as solvent or risky, and these definitions directly affect sovereign borrowing costs, sometimes creating self-fulfilling prophecies in sovereign debt crises. Fiscal targets agreed with the IMF acquire a constraining reality that goes beyond their analytical justification. For Morocco, engaged in fiscal consolidation programmes, the logic is similar: the agreed deficit targets acquire a binding reality that extends well beyond what strict economic analysis would impose.
These considerations reinforce the responsibility of the economist. Her concepts can become instruments of government, and vigilance about their social and political uses is an integral part of scientific practice. The economist who presents normative choices as technical necessities, and political decisions as economic laws, is not being neutral: she is exercising power under the cover of objectivity.
10 The Value Theory Debate: A Founding Controversy
The question of value, why do things have the price they have? , runs through the entire history of economic thought. The classical and Marxist tradition grounds value in incorporated labour: a good is worth what it costs to produce in labour time. The neoclassical tradition grounds value in subjective marginal utility: a good is worth what the marginal buyer is willing to pay. The Marshallian synthesis reconciles both: in the short run utility determines demand; in the long run production costs determine supply.
This debate is not purely academic. It informs the pricing policies of public services in Morocco, water, electricity, urban transport. Should these be priced at their cost of production, at users’ willingness to pay, or according to redistributive criteria? The answer depends on the theory of value one implicitly adopts.
The heterodox critique underlines that market prices incorporate power relations and rents as much as productive value. The price of Moroccan phosphate on world markets does not reflect only production costs and value to farmers: it reflects OCP’s quasi-monopolistic market power and the geopolitical structures conditioning exchange. A Moroccan development policy that does not understand the difference between price and value will systematically underestimate its strategic capital.
The positive-normative distinction matters here. Positive economics describes what is. But behind every description hides a normative question: what is the source of economic value? This apparently philosophical question structures very concrete debates about prices, wages, profits, and distribution. A student who cannot see this connection, between the abstract debate about value and the practical question of how to price phosphate exports, has not yet understood what economics is for.
11 Capitalism as an Economic System
Capitalism rests on four foundational institutions: private ownership of the means of production, the market as coordination mechanism, wage labour, and the pursuit of profit as the motor of activity. This system is distinguished by its dynamic of continuous transformation, Schumpeter called it creative destruction: innovations erode established rents and reconfigure productive structures. Most contemporary economies are mixed capitalist economies: they combine private markets and public intervention in variable proportions.
Understanding capitalism as a system rather than as a collection of individual markets is one of the most important contributions of the classical, Marxist, and institutionalist traditions. A firm does not exist in isolation: it exists within a system that determines the conditions of access to financing, the enforceability of contracts, the power relations on labour markets, the conditions of access to technology, and the stability or instability of the macroeconomic environment. The behaviour of the firm, how aggressive it is in cost-cutting, how much it invests, whether it uses retained earnings for productive investment or share buybacks, cannot be explained without reference to the systemic environment in which it operates.
For Morocco, the relevant question is not whether it has capitalism, it does, but what variety of capitalism, with what specific institutions, what distribution of power between state, private capital, and labour, and what trajectory of transformation. The coexistence of a dynamic export-oriented private sector (automotive, aeronautics, agricultural exports), a set of large quasi-sovereign enterprises (OCP, CDG, MASEN), a state that simultaneously regulates, produces, and invests, and an informal economy employing a third of the labour force is a specific institutional configuration that generic market-economy models do not capture. Understanding this configuration is the starting point for understanding Morocco’s economic challenges.
12 Conclusion: What This Chapter Should Leave with the Reader
Economics is a difficult discipline because it deals with a complex, conflictual, uncertain world traversed by interests. It contains useful models and misleading ones. It produces both solid and fragile empirical results. It is traversed by deep disagreements on essential questions. And it is used both to understand the world and to govern it, and these two uses do not always coincide.
But it is indispensable. There is no serious alternative to economics for understanding how firms organise production, how markets coordinate millions of decentralised decisions without central authority, how money structures relations of debt and trust, how macroeconomic policies influence activity, how economies grow or stagnate, how international exchanges distribute gains and losses between nations.
Joan Robinson’s formulation, which opens this chapter, should be read as an invitation to exigence rather than cynicism. The real mastery of economics is the capacity to look at economic arguments critically: to identify their hidden assumptions, recognise what they illuminate and what they conceal, and formulate independent judgements rather than delegating one’s thinking to experts. This course does not teach economics as a doctrine. It offers a reasoned toolkit, multiple in its approaches, critical about its own limits, anchored in the realities of the Moroccan economy, and attentive to the conditions under which models apply and those in which they distort.
The following chapter sets up the common language that all economic analysis requires: the economic circuit, the measurement of production, and the basic concepts of GDP, value added, and inflation.
13 Further Reading
Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. The most influential formulation of economics as the science of the allocation of scarce resources. Foundational for understanding the neoclassical tradition, and for seeing what it leaves in shadow.
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. The founding text of classical political economy. More complex than its standard textbook simplification: Smith was also a moral philosopher acutely aware of the inequalities markets can produce.
Keynes, J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. The book that revolutionised macroeconomics. Difficult but essential for understanding the intellectual foundations of contemporary macroeconomic policy.
Rodrik, D. (2015). Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science. The best contemporary account of what economic models are for, why their diversity is a strength, and how to use them critically. Essential reading for any student of development economics.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. How science progresses through successive paradigms. Illuminating for understanding why major controversies in economics do not resolve themselves by accumulation of evidence.
Chang, H.-J. (2014). Economics: The User’s Guide. The most accessible introduction to the plurality of economic schools and their respective contributions. Written in the same spirit as this book: pluralist, accessible, and refusal to treat any single school as the final word.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. One of the most influential works in political economy, applicable to firms, states, and economic organisations. Indispensable for any economist working in developing contexts.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. The classical argument that markets are embedded in social institutions and cannot function outside them. Essential counterpoint to any version of economics that treats markets as natural rather than constructed.